

खण्डनखण्डखाद्यम्

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KhandanaKhandakhadya is the highest order of text studied in the philosophy of non-dualism. It forms the triad of AdvaitaSiddhi by Sri Madhusudana Saradwati, Chitsukhi by Sri Chitsukha Muni and finally the text at hand. This is one of the finest treatises which can be given as an example for the logical thinking. Though this may not be the original idea in this line of thought, there were other texts like the tattva-upaplava-simha of Charvaka system, or some texts in the Buddhists school. Nevertheless this is conceived in a proper way and the logic is mind boggling, the to say least.

The Author : the author of this text is Sri SriHarsha (the second Sri is part of his name, distinguished from the first which is for respect), was born to Sri SriHira and Srimati Mamalla Devi. It is important to know the parents, at least in this case, to better understand the man behind this text. Sri SriHira was a great man of unsurpassed knowledge, when he was visiting some King and there was a debate between a minister of the kingdom and Sri SriHira, in which Sri SriHira was defeated very badly. He wanted a son to take revenge for his loss, and was blessed with Sri SriHarsha. But still, the defeat was not taken lightly by Sri SriHira, and thus his health was affected. In deathbed he took promise from the child Sri SriHarsha to take necessary action to defeat the minister. Thus after the death of his father, Sri SriHarsha left the responsibility of managing the family to the relatives and went to Kashi (Varanasi) for studies, vowing not to return to the homeland before defeating the minister.

He was initiated in the mantra called "Chintamani", which he meditated upon for five years. There is another story relating to the initiation – his mother wanting the son to fulfill the promise, initiated the boy in "chintamani" mantra (in tantra it is accepted if the mantra pertaining to a female deity is initiated by the mother will bear fruit (siddhi – accomplishment) very soon), after initiating the boy, she made him to sit on her body and slit her throat (some mantras are accepted to produce result if it is chanted sitting upon a corpse). Whatever may be the truth about the initiation, the final truth is he was blessed by the vision of the Goddess Chintamani Devi, who blessed Sri SriHarsha with unlimited knowledge. After this, studying the different schools of philosophy was a child's play, in a very short span of time he acquired mastery over almost all the philosophy.

There is no need to say, he defeated the minister, and it was easy too. He presented himself in front of the King and Minister and sang a song on each one of them, seeing the mastery in the poetry, the minister immediately accepted defeat even before entering into a debate.

But still, the logic he used was beyond the grasp of the common learned men, so his knowledge became an obstacle to gain the desired result. Therefore as per the advice of the deity, he practiced a penance of taking cold shower in the night and eating buffalo's curd (yogurt). Thus he was able to write a book this simple!

Though there are many other texts written by the same author, this and another poetical text called Naishadiya-Charita still stands the test of time. Naishadiya charita is a text on the story of the king Nishada, written on the request of the King of Kanyakubja, the patron of the author. Though superficially may sound like a poetical story, is a vedantic treatise written in the style called "dwi-sandna or dwi-arthaka" (double meaning) literature.

This text is called Khandana-Khanda-Khadya because, 1. It negates the different substances accepted by the logic school and which is easily understandable (bhakshya - eatable), 2. Because it negates the kha (space) etc. substance, 3. But the important meaning of the name is, there is medicine called khanda-khadya accepted in the ayurvedic text which improves the immune system and gives good health, destroying any type of disease.

This is also called as Anirvacaniyata-Sarvasva. Nirvacaniya means explicable, anirvacaniya means inexplicable and Sarvasva means everything. Thus it means, everything here is inexplicable, which is the basic principle of advaita Vedanta, anirvacaniya-vada.

The text is written in keeping with the cannon of the nyaya school, "maana-adhina meya siddhi, maana siddhi ca lakshanaat" (the object is dependent upon the means of right knowledge, which in turn is dependent on the definition). This is accepted by the logicians to negate the Buddhists, who negate everything from the standpoint of (shunyavada) (voidism – the basic tenet of madhyamika buddhists). They say "na pratignaa maatrena vastusiddhi" (just by naming the object cannot be established, but by the definition and means of right knowledge). Though the logic school in general is negated, since the minister one who defeated the author's father is Sri Udayana who is a follower of Sri Udhayanacharya's Vaisheshika school, the author negates them both. It may also be interpreted as the anger for the very name.

Therefore, Sri SriHarsha, rattled their basic idea by negating the base for all this "lakshana" (definition). Without a definition nothing can be established. And he declares, whoever desires to win a debate if he follows this process of logic explained in this book or repeats the same lines given here, will win the debate.

This book is written in four parts, and like advaitasiddhi or other famous Vedanta text does not follow the naming convention of Brahma Sutra, which is Samanvaya, Avirodha, Saadhana and Phala (corroborating, non-contradictory, practice and result). Some opine this is loosely based on the logical school text with three chapters. But the acharya has a style of his own, which he follows-up here in the case of the chapters too. Each chapter condemns different aspect 1. Pramaana-Tadaabhasa, 2. Nigraha-Sthaana, 3. Sarvanaama-Artha and 4. Avashesha-Lakshana.

1. Pramaana-Tad-Aabhasa-Anirukti – this is the biggest of the chapters, here he condemns the pramaanas (in this case as in mimamsa, 6 pramaanas only) and things related to it.
2. Nigraha-sthaana-anirukti – there are different nigra-sthaanas, place which the opponent falters. Like, when he gives a wrong reply, not following his philosophy, taking a lot of time etc., if pointed out by the other causes the defeat of the opponent.
3. Sarvanaama-artha-anirukti – the meaning of the pronoun, here only 'kim' is discussed.
4. Avashesha-lakshana-anirukti – the rest of the definition is negated.

We can explain this with a simple example, when we are asked, "who are you?", our answer invariably revolves around the height, weight, colour etc. which are comparative and therefore are not definitive. For example, when we say 'I am 75 kg', this is not a constant even in this planet earth, as there is a small difference in the gravitational force in Europe and India, and when weighed in a different planet, it differs according to the planets gravitational pull. If we say, 'I am brown / white / black / yellow', this is again comparative, as there are more shades to each colour we have specified. If we say 'I am son of so and so', this is a great confusion, as the mother is the pramaana for establishing the father, and nurse is the proof for the mother. Even if we say that it can be proven scientifically through DNA analysis, there also, the DNA of the whole family will have similar trait, and the DNA belonging to a group will have other similar traits etc. etc. Therefore, finally we have to surrender by saying 'I don't know myself'. When a simple question about

us cannot be clearly answered, should we say about the rest of the things, which has existence because of us.

Another example, when we are asked 'what is a table', we have to answer, it is something with four legs, this definition also fits for the cot. We may say, table is something on which I keep my books etc., but again this fits for the cot, because some people keep their books or eat on the cot. Finally, we have to say, table is something which I place before the chair. Then, we will have to ask, 'what is a chair', finally, we have to say 'chair is something that is placed before a table'. This is a knowledge which is inter-dependent, even if it be accepted as knowledge. Thus, we see everything is inexplicable. Therefore, instead of going into the reality or non-reality of the things, accepting it for the transaction is what is done in Vedanta.

Even a mere translation of this book is difficult. Because, it requires a lot of knowledge of all the other philosophies, to understand the opponents supporting dialog. And here I have tried to put in writing my understanding of each of the passages, with some insights for each of the difficult ideas presented here for an easy and better understanding for the readers. Sometimes, even if one understands, it is rather difficult to put those ideas in another language, and definitely very difficult in English. Hope the ideas conveyed by the Acharya Shri ShriHarsha are presented by me properly.

The Hindi Commentaries of Sri Swami Yogindrananda ji (my Grand-Guru) and Sri Chandi Shukla Prasada ji was very useful, in understanding some of the intricacies, which could otherwise be lost in the translation. I have followed the latter's way of presenting it as Supporting and refuting arguments, for ease of understanding, And I thank my Acharya Sri Shanti Dharmananda ji for teaching this text to us. To Thank them will be very formal, I will always be indebted to them.

We include the Devanagiri version of the Text, along with the translation in Italics and commentary in plain text.

अविकल्पविषय एकः स्थानुः पुरुषः श्रुतोऽस्ति यः श्रुतिषु।

ईश्वरमुमया न परं वन्देऽनुमयापि तमधिगतम्॥ १॥

I salute that which is discussed in the scriptures as "ekam eva advitiam" (here in the sloka as "eka sthanu purusha" (one only non-dual)) and gained through the non-qualified knowledge, who is the Iswara himself, gained by not only Uma (Shiva's wife) but also by the inference. – 1 –

Here the author salutes Shiva, who is the supreme God for the logicians, to gain his blessing to defeat His own followers.

In the first line the "svarupa-lakshana" (inherent definition) for the Self is explained and in the next the "tatastha-lakshana" (the implied definition), implied through the creation, sustenance and dissolution.

Avikalpa means Vikalpa (attributes / quality) vina (without), i.e. nirvikalpa Samadhi. Nirvikalpa means without any attributes. Nirvikalpa is explained as nishprakarakam gnanam which is unqualified / unattributed knowledge. Here it is the knowledge gained as a thought function through a means of valid knowledge (pramaana) is said, as the knowledge (Self) per say being the substratum for the ignorance cannot be the negator of the ignorance.

Sthanu means pillar generally, here like a pillar that is the base for the superimposition, this Self also is the base for all the superimposition. If the Self transforms itself (called parinama vada – the idea of transformation) either partially or completely then it will be non-eternal.

Purusha means Self. It can be said, if Self is transformation-less than all the karmas (actions / rituals) enjoined by the scriptures are useless, because, all the actions are based on the Kaarya-Karana-Sangaata (the body-sense organ complex) and not for the Self.

Still, the superimposition is accepted in both ways, the Self on the non-self and non-self on the Self, therefore, if it be negated then there will remain nothing but void, cannot be true, because the negation anywhere is accepted only till the substratum. And there cannot be any superimposition without any substratum, as in this case the void.

Here the term Anumaya can be understood in three different ways

1. Anumaya – through the inference. The logicians desire to prove even the objects directly perceived by inference. And, since there is no perceptibility of Iswara, they prove Him through an inference. The syllogism being – “kshit-ankuraadikam sakartrukam, kaaryatvaat, ghatavat” (the earth and the plants have a creator, being a creation (effect), like pot).
2. Anu maya – Even by me after studying the scriptures. Author himself declares this in the later portion of the text.
3. An-umaya (na umaya) – Uma is the consort of Shiva and one who is not Uma is Anuma, here the Author as though blackmails Shiva into blessing him for the success, by reminding Uma of the other wife, Ganga who sits in the matted lock of Shiva.

मानापनोदनविनोदनते गिरीशे भासेव सङ्कुचितयोरुचितं तदिन्द्रोः।

भेत्तुं भवानिशचितं दुरितं भवानि नम्रीभवानि धनमङ्घ्रिसरोजयोस्ते॥ २॥

I humbly bow down on your lotus feet which have shrunk due to the cool rays from the crescent moon in the forehead of Iswara for the destruction of all my vice earned in multiple births. OR When people worship your lotus feet for the removal of the ignorance, it (ignorance) shrinks due to the luminous rays of the meditation on the feet. – 2 –

This sloka should be understood from the standpoint of the three explanations for Anumaya.

1. The first is the desire for victory over the logicians. Therefore, the author seeks the blessings of Iswara for the removal the obstacle which the logicians put forth, namely the pramaanas. The blessings in the form of “maanam nivartataam” (let the veil of the pramaana etc. be removed)
2. In the second case the author seeks the blessing of Iswara for the removal of the ignorance of the Jiva. The blessing in the form of “maanam nivartataam” (let the veil of ignorance seen as ego is removed).
3. In the third the story is developed to the next stage, being reminded about the ‘other woman’, and who is given a higher place than herself, the ego of Uma is hurt, resulting in her moving to her chamber in anger. Thus Iswara wills “maanam nivartataam” (let me remove the ego), and enters the chamber of Uma.

Now the words “indho bhaasa” (light from the moon), plays a key role in the understanding. For the first two it is the removal of the ignorance because of the illumination of knowledge. But in the case of the third, when Iswara enters the chamber and bends towards Uma, due to the soft cool rays from the crescent moon placed in the forehead of Iswara which reaches the feet of the Uma, she feels the chill and shrinks it a little bit.

Bhetum – to destroy, Bhavaani-Shacitam – Here Bhava means samsaara, the cycle of birth and death. Shacitam means earned. To destroy the vice and virtuous karmas earned in multiple births.

Bhavaani – is calling Uma by another name.

Namri-Bhavaani – I salute with all humbleness.

शब्दार्थनिर्वचनखण्डनया नयन्तः सर्वत्र निर्वचनभावमखर्वगर्वान्।

धीरा यथोक्तमपि कीरवदेतदुक्त्या लोकेषु दिग्विजयकौतुकीमातनुध्वम्॥ ३॥

O learned one; even by repeating whatever said here like a parrot, by condemning the definitions they make for the word and its meaning (substances) can defeat the egotistical logicians, and make them speechless. – 3 –

The author leaving aside all the show-offs declares clearly the greatness of this text. By repeating the text even without any understanding one can gain victory over the opponents, if one has the necessary wit to understand, he can further develop the logic to condemn the other things in the same line of thought. But, this is said for the people who are interested in the debates and its victory. But for a genuine sadhaka (seeker of Truth) this means, he can negate all the doubts with respect to the duality which arise in him using this logic.

Here the vedantin will be the one who refutes and the other one accepting things will be the other philosophers. Therefore, when we see ‘**Supporting**’ it is the other philosophy and when we see ‘**Refuting**’ it should be understood as the vedantin. But in majority of the dialog, instead of using the vedanti as the opponent Author uses the Madhyamika (shunyavadin – voidist) to condemn, and by resorting to “prathamamallā nyaya” (the worldly logic of defeating the world champion, by defeating him all the others are as well defeated). Later negates the Shunyavadi through Advaita. Author though seem to give equal importance for both shunyavadi (by showing great respect for Buddha by calling him Bhagavan) and advaitin (even in the very beginning referring to Bhagavan Bhashyakara Shankaracharya as Bhagavatpada), very clearly distinguishes himself as Advaitavadi. [vedanti, vedantin, advaiti, advaitin etc. are synonyms for the non-dualist].

Before starting a dialog, the parties decide what is called as “samaya-bandha” (the rules of the dialog). This includes the philosophy each one will accept, if they will use the others philosophy too for negating one of the other party in the dialog, the time limit for answering etc. And the judge also should be one who has a complete knowledge of both the philosophies, and the philosophies they are going to use in the dialog.

1. Condemning the acceptance of Pramaana etc. as part of dialog

प्रमानाद्यभ्युपगमस्य कथाङ्गत्वखण्डनम्

अथ कथायां वादिनो नियममेतादृशं मन्यन्ते .- प्रमाणादय सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्ततया सिद्धाः पदार्थाः सन्तीति कथकाभ्यामभ्युपेयम्।

Supporting: *The logician accepts the pramaana etc. different substances as a necessary pre-requisite for any dialog. They say “since they are accepted by all the philosophies it should be accepted as part of the dialog”.*

The pramaana etc. are “pramaana-prameya-samshaya-prayojana-drshtaanta-siddhaanta-avayava-tarka-vaada-jalpa-vitandaa-hetvaabhaasa-chala-jaati-nigrahastanaani shodasha padaartha:” (means of right knowledge, object of knowledge, doubt, result, example, conclusion, parts, logic, dialog to know, dialog to win, dialog to condemn, illogic, deceitful logic, self-contradictory, logical pitfalls are the sixteen substances).

There are three types of “katha” (dialog) which one can enter into:

1. Vaada – A dialog between two people with the intent to know the truth.
2. Jalpa – A dialog between two people with intent to defeat the other. Though the first and second type maybe similar in majority of the aspects, in the second, people resort to the “chala” (deceitful logic). An example for this type of deceit is, “nava kambalam aanaya” here in this statement nava may mean new or nine, so according to the opponents statement the meaning is changed to form the other, bring a new / nine blanket/s.
3. Vitandaa – This is the form of dialog which resorts only to negating / refuting / condemning the opponents, and not proving anything. Though nyaya sutra bhashyakara (commentator) Sri Prasastapada declares, even if the one doing vitandaa accepts his position of being a follower of vitandaa-vaada, he loses the dialog. But the later authors of logic and others accept, he may declare his intent / idea but should not follow it up by trying to prove it. This is what the author here does in many a place to show the standpoint of the Advaita.

There are four types of “siddhanta” (definite valid conclusion)

1. Sarvatantra – If something is accepted universally by all the philosophies. For example, the object of knowledge is dependent upon the valid means.
2. Pratitantra – Things which are exclusive for each of the philosophies. Like things accepted in nyaya is not accepted in Vedanta and vice-versa.
3. Adhikarana – If on proving something, something else is also proven. For example, while proving the knower to be different from the sense organ of sight and sense organ of hearing etc., we have established not only the knower, but also the existence of manifold sense-organs, and each one of them having different objects for its perception.

4. Abhyupagama – When something not explicitly said is inferred. Like the mind as a sense-organ.

From here the Opponent (in this case Vedanti) speaks

तदपरे न क्षमन्ते। तथाहि- प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वं यदभ्युपेयं कथकेन तत्कस्य हेतोः।

Refuting: *The others (vedantins) do not accept this. They ask – the existence of pramaana etc. which is to be accepted, what is the reason for this?*

From here the Vedantin's refute the idea of the logicians of accepting the pramaana etc. as the pre-requisite for the dialog. In the next paragraph, the author gives four possible clauses for this.

किं तदनभ्युपगच्छद्भ्यां वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां तदभ्युपगमसाहित्यनियतस्य वाग्व्यवाहारस्य प्रवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वात्। उत कथकाभ्यां प्रवर्तनीयवाग्व्यवहारं प्रति हेतुत्वात्। उत लोकसिद्धत्वात्। अथवा तदनभ्युपगमस्य तत्त्वनिर्णयविजयफल अतिप्रसञ्जकत्वात्।

Is it because 1. Both the parties in the dialog who do not accept it cannot possibly enter the verbal transaction which is based on (the concomitance of) its acceptance or 2. It is the cause for the verbal transaction in the dialog or. It is an established rule of the world or 4. Non acceptance of it will be a hindrance for deciding the conclusive knowledge or the victory.

The difference between the first and the second is the former is based on the concomitance and the latter is based on the reason. The concomitance being, wherever there is acceptance of pramaana etc. there is verbal transaction. In the latter, because there is pramaana etc. there is verbal transaction.

The worldly rule being, the pramaana etc. is accepted as the reason for the dialog.

All the four options are refuted one by one. First we take the first option - based on concomitance.

न तावदाद्यः। तदनभ्युपगच्छतोऽपि चार्वाकमाध्यमिकादेर्वाग्विस्तरणां प्रतीयमानत्वात्। तस्यैव वाऽनिष्पत्तौ भवतस्तन्निरासप्रयासानुपपत्तेः।

It cannot be the first, because even by the people like "charvaaka" (materialist), "maadhyamika" (Buddhist voidism) who do not accept it (pramaana etc.) too are seen to elaborate (in dialog fashion). If that elaboration itself is not acceptable, then there is no possibility of you putting great effort to negate it.

Chaarvaaka literally means one who speaks beautifully. But here in this context it is the materialist, people who accept the body / sense-organs as the Self. They do not accept any pramaana except Pratyaksha (direct perception). Though so, they use inference to negate the others, like when they negate the mimamsakas (ritualist) ask, if you say the cow or any animal killed for the sake of the ritual reaches heaven, why not kill your father for the sake of the ritual, do you not want him to enjoy the pleasures of heaven.

Maadhyamika are people who follow the middle path. They do not accept any extremes of existence or non-existence, since everything is void in reality for them.

Thus if someone does not accept the pramaana then it is easier to negate them by not entering into a dialog, and if a dialog is started to negate them, then as the dialog has started already, one should not stick to the rule of accepting the pramaana etc. for the dialog, as it stands vindicated.

सोऽयमपूर्वः प्रमानादिसत्त्वानभ्युपगमात्मा वाक्स्तम्भनमन्त्रो भवताऽभ्यूहितः नूनं यस्य प्रभावात् भगवता सुरगुरुणा लोकायतिकानि सूत्राणि न प्रणीतानि तथागतेन वा मध्यमागमा नोपदिष्टाः भगवत्पादेन वा वादाराणीयेषु सूत्रेषु भाष्यं नाभाषि।

This is some unforeseen mantra you have devised for blocking the speech of the opponent in the form of acceptance of the existence of the pramaana etc. Because of its super power, Bhagavan Brihaspati has

not written the sutras on the charvaka system, Bhagavan Buddha has not preached the system of middle path or did the Bhagavatpada Sri Shankaracharya write the commentary on the sutras of Sri Badharayana.

Vaak-stambhana mantra – in the mantra shastra there are different methods of application according to the need prescribed, though it is negated for the real sadhaka (as it is said, the mantra becomes an enemy, and it makes him be associated with the karmas (the karmas propelled by the desire)). They can be distinguished as sattvic, rajasic and tamasic - the karmas like attraction (vashikarana) fall in the first category, the karmas pertaining to creating of enmity (vidveshana) in the second and the karmas like stambhana and maarana (blocking and killing) fall in the third. Stambhana is also of different levels, blocking the body – from activity, speech from talking or the mind from thinking, these types of chants can be used to control the nature too. Here the logician's acceptance is similar to this stambhana - if you do not accept the pramaana etc. as pre-requisite for dialog, then do not have the right to speak.

There is a general rule – “pramaanavanti adhrushtaani kalpayaani, bahuuniapi na nishpramaanaka” (one should imagine different effects with respect to the pramaana and not without a pramaana).

From *nuunam* author pulls the leg of the logician, by pointing out to the great people who have not though accepted this standpoint have written great works. Here, by referring to all these three schools, he is presenting them as the refuters.

प्रमाणाद्यनभ्युपगम्यापि प्रवर्तयन्तु नाम ते वाचो भङ्गीः तास्तु साधनबधानक्षमा न भवन्ति तावतति चेत्।

Supporting: *let them do verbal transaction who speak beautifully (charvaka and Buddhist, even you vedanti) without accepting the pramaana etc. as the pre-requisite, but still their words won't have the ability to establish or refute anything, if be said.*

Sadhana-badhana-kshama – Sadhana-kshama is the ability to establish ones idea. Badhana-kshama is the ability to refute the opponents idea. Thus, to be able to prove or win a dialog, you still have to accept the pramaana etc. as the pre-requisite.

न । प्रमाणाद्यनभ्युपगम्य प्रवर्तितत्त्वं तदीयसाधनबाधनक्षमतायां न नियामकम् । किन्तु सद्वचनाभासलक्षणयोगित्वं

इत्यवश्यमभ्युपेयं भवता । येनाभ्युपगम्यापि प्रमाणादि प्रवर्तिता मतान्तरानुसारिभिर्व्यवहारा अभ्युपगत

प्रमाणादिसत्त्वैः मतान्तरव्यवहारिभिरपरैरतथाभूता इति कथ्यन्ते ।

Refuting: *No. The verbal transaction accepting the pramaana etc. is not the cause for its ability to prove or refute anything. But, even you should accept it as the one that has in it the eligibility of being endowed with wrong logic. Thus, the verbal transaction accepting the pramaana etc. belonging to a different school (mimamsa philosophy) is negated by the people who accept the pramaana etc. in the verbal transaction (logicians).*

Sad-vacana is the statement which has the right logic. And the contrary is the sad-vacana-aabhaasa – the statement which has seeming logic, and not right logic. This Sadvacana-aabhsasa can be understood in other words, as the statement which has hetvaabhaasa (illogic). Here we are not talking about completely wrong logic, Asad-vacana.

Here one school of logicians – nyayika condemn the other school of logicians – vaisheshika, too can be accepted.

यदि त्वस्मद्वचसि सद्वचनाभासलक्षणं न भवान् दर्शयितुमीष्टे तदाऽनभ्युपगम्य प्रमाणादीनि भवता प्रवर्तितोऽयं व्यवहार इति शतकृत्वस्त्वया उच्यमानेऽपि नास्माकमादरः। अन्यथा अभ्युपगम्य प्रमाणादीनि भवता प्रवर्तितोऽयं व्यवहार इत्येतावता भवदीय व्यवहाराभास इत्यस्माभिरपि वक्तुं शक्यते।

If you do not have the capability to show the illogic in our statement, then even if you repeat a hundred times that 'you have entered the verbal transaction without accepting the pramaana etc. (therefore it is

illogical)' we do not care. Otherwise, we can also say that 'you have entered the verbal transaction accepting the pramaana etc.', therefore your statement too is illogical.

If we start negating something without resorting to logic, anything and everything can be negated. One may say buffalo is black; therefore buffalo's milk is black too.

ननु यदि प्रमाणादीनि न सन्ति तदा व्यवहार एव धर्मी कथं सिद्ध्येत् दूषनादिव्यवस्था वा कथं स्यात् सर्वविधिनिषेधानां प्रमाणाधीनत्वात्।

Supprtive: *But, if there are no pramaana etc. (attributes) then how can there be the existence of it's attributed, the verbal transaction, or how can there be the existence of the negation etc., since, the entire injunction or negation are based (dependent) on the pramaana.*

As said earlier, "manaadhiinaa meyasiddhi, maana siddhi ca lakshanaat" (an object is dependent on the means of right knowledge, and that in turn is dependent on the definition), is the dictum of logicians. If we do not accept the pramaana, then there can be no object of knowledge like the injunction or negation is dependent on it. Injunction – existence, negation – absence.

मैवम्। न ब्रूमो वयं न सन्ति प्रमाणादीनि इति स्वीकृत्य कथाऽऽरभ्येति। किन्नाम सन्ति न सन्ति वा प्रमाणादीनीत्यस्यां चिन्तायामुदासीनैः। यथा स्वीकृत्य तानिव्यवह्यन्ते तथा व्यवहारिभिरेव कथा प्रवर्त्यताम्।

Refutive: *Not so. We do not say to start the verbal transaction accepting 'pramaana etc. do not exist'. Then what, we say without being bothered about the thought of the existence or non-existence of the pramaana etc. As you do the verbal transaction accepting it (pramaana etc.), similarly we should start the verbal transaction in the dialog.*

As we vedantin's do not accept anything other than the Self to be eternal, we cannot accept the pramaana etc. as eternal, but that does not mean we cannot accept the transactional reality (temporarily permanent status) still as the world etc. is accepted to be pramaana, until there is the experience of the body-sense-organ complex or the non-experience of the Self.

[Paramartika – permanently permanent. Vyavaharika – temporarily permanent. Pratibhasika – temporarily temporary]

अन्यथा न सन्ति प्रमाणादीनीति मतमस्माकमारोप्य यदिदं भवता दूषनमुक्तं तदपि वक्तुम् न शक्यम्।

Otherwise superimposing that 'we (vedantin) do not accept the pramaana etc.', whatever defects you explained, that is impossible to say too.

Though we never said, we do not accept the existence of the pramaana etc., the logician thought we think so. Thinking thus, he is pointing out the defect in our system that is impossible. The impossibility in all the three ways is shown.

कीदृशीं मर्यादामालम्ब्य प्रवृत्तायां कथायामिदं दूषणमुक्तम्। किं प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वमभ्युपगम्य उभभ्यां वादिभ्यां प्रवर्तितायां कथायां। उत असत्त्वमभ्युपेत्या अथैकेन सत्त्वमपरेणासत्त्वमङ्गीकृत्या॥

On what basis (rule) did you refer to the defects in a dialog which is taking place? Is it in the dialog taking place between both the parties (defendant and opponent) who accept the existence of the pramaana etc. Or is it in the dialog accepting the non-existence. Or in which one accepts the existence and the other the non-existence (of pramaana etc.).

We have three possibilities in any type of dialog with respect to the pramaana: 1. Both accepting 2. Both not accepting and 3. One accepting and the other not accepting.

नाद्यः अभ्युपगतप्रमाणादिसत्त्वं प्रति एतादृशपर्यनुयोगानवकाशात्। द्वितीये स्वतोऽप्यापत्तेः। न तृतीयः तथैव कथान्तरस्यापि प्रसक्तेः।

Not the first, because in the one who accepts, there is no possibility for this kind of defect. In the second, even one will have the defect. Not the third, since there is a similar possibility in other dialogs too.

1. Both accepting – since both accept, there cannot be the defect of non-acceptance in any one of them.
2. Both not accepting – if we show the defect in the other, since one is not accepting to the same defect will be common.
3. One accepting and other not accepting – Since the dialog has started about the acceptance and non-acceptance. Similar dialog on other subjects too can be started.

उभयाभ्युपगानुरोधित्वाच्च कथानियमस्य। अन्यथा स्वाभिप्रायमालम्ब्य तेनापि त्वद्वचसि यत्किञ्चिद्वागात्मनि दूषणेऽभिहिते कस्य जयो व्यवतिष्ठताम्। प्रमाणाभ्युपगन्तुरेव यावन्नियमभरयन्वणा महती स्यात्।

A dialog is always dependent / based upon both the parties. Otherwise, (if one shows defects from ones standpoint) the other will also show defects in your verbal transaction with reference to one's own idea, then who will be decided as the victor. And for the one accepting the pramaana etc. there will be the more trouble.

If everyone shows defect from one's own standpoint there can be no decisive winner or loser. If one says $1+1=2$ and the other says after A it is only B and not C. There can be no winner or loser, even if both are correct, the defect pronounced has nothing to do with the others statement.

The greater trouble for the one accepting the pramaana etc. is, he has to find a way to establish the validity in accepting the pramaana etc. and also should remove the defect pointed out by the other party.

तस्मात् प्रमाणादिसत्त्वाभ्युपगमौदासीन्येन व्यवहारनियमेन समयं बद्ध्वा प्रवर्तितायां कथायां भवतेदं दूषणमुक्तमित्युचितमेव तथासति स्यात्। योज्यम् भवान् स्वाभिप्रायमपि नावधारयितुं शक्नोति दूरतस्तस्मिन् पराभिसन्धानावधारणप्रत्याशा।

Therefore without being bothered about accepting the existence of the pramaana etc. one should form the rule for the dialog, then the defect established by you (if we do not accept the pramaana etc., then there can be no verbal transaction) will be proper. When you are not capable of understanding your own viewpoint, expecting you to understand our (vedantins) viewpoint is highly improper.

The defect he imposed upon us (or anyone for that matter) is possible, only if we are not bothered about the existence or non-existence of the pramaana etc., and not in the other three types of dialog as shown earlier.

Since the opponent thought we do not accept the existence of pramaana, and not what we said, that we should not be bothered about the existence or non-existence of the pramaana etc. for starting the dialog.

अथ वादीकृत्य दुर्वैतण्डिकं तस्मिन्नुपाधौ वाधौऽभिधीयते इत्येव नेष्यते श्लाघ्यादयस्तु तस्य कथानधिकारं ज्ञाप्यन्ते।

Supporting: Now, we do not say that we show the defects in the dialog where there is a bad *vaitandik* (follower of *vitanda* form of dialog), but to teach our own disciples his ineligibility in the dialog.

We (vedantins) negated the logician's idea of the defect in the dialog where the pramaana etc. is not accepted, giving choice. For this the logician, holding to the proverbial final straw, replies; we are not showing the defects of dialog in the dialog where the opponent is someone like you, where the opponent is as ruthless as you. But to expel the doubts in the mind of the disciples, about the dialog regarding the people who do not accept the existence of pramaana etc.

For proving this idea, he brings in the statement from Bhasya, here Bhasyakara does not mean Sri Shankaracharya ji, but Sri Prashastapada ji who commented upon the nyaya sutras.

अत एव भगवान् भाष्यकारः - स प्रयोजनमनुयुक्तो यदि पर्तिपाद्यते इत्याह स्म न तु प्रतिपाद्यसे इत्।

This is the reason Bhagavan Bhashyakara (commentator Sri Prashastapada ji), if he is seen to refer to an idea, and not as you refer.

The idea here is, the vaitandika according to the sutra is "svapaksha-sthaapana-heena" (one who does not establish his own idea). Therefore, to him if someone asks what your idea is, if he says anything in answer, even if it be "I am a vitandavadi" (I am just a refuter), then he loses the status of being the vitandavadi. The point being made here is Sri Prashastapada ji refers to the vitandavadi in third person "pratipadyate" and not in second person "pratipadyase". Thus the choice accepted by you to refute us is not proper.

But, here irrespective of this defect, we see the Author explain the salient features of the vedantins position, even accepting this form of defect on himself, shows his (Sri SriHarsha's) great compassion. This can also be seen as (not negating his great compassion) the later form of logicians accept the vitandavadi too to express his views, but he should not follow it up with some proofs, to establish the ideas.

मैवम् । शिष्यादीन् प्रत्यपि चार्वाकादेर्दोषोऽयमित्यैवाभिदातव्यम्। कथं च तथा स्यात् तस्य
कथाप्रवेशनाप्रवेशनयोः तद्वाधाक्षमत्वात्। कथायामेव हि निग्रहः।

Refuting: Not so. Because even to the disciples you can only tell that these are the defects in the philosophies like Charvaka etc. And how is that possible, since it does not have the eligibility to negate his right in the dialog. Since, only in a dialog can there be victory (refuting).

The idea is, even if it be accepted for argument sake, the teaching is for the disciples, outside of the dialog. Still, what use can that be of, since it is useless any which way. If the opponent is eligible, negating his eligibility is a defect. And if the opponent has no eligibility there is no need for you to teach these things, since he is not going to use this logic anywhere. Whichever way, the logic is useful only in a dialog, which he can never enter into.

नापि द्वितीयः। तथा हि - स्यादप्येवं यदि कथकप्रवर्तनीयवाग्व्यवहारं प्रति प्रमाणादीनां हेतुता
तत्सत्त्वानभ्युपगमे निवर्तेत। न त्वेवं सम्भवति तथा सति तत्सत्त्वानभ्युपगन्तृणां वाग्व्यवहारस्वरूपमेव न
निष्पद्यते हेत्वनुपपत्तेः।

Refuting: The second choice (accepting pramaana etc. as the cause) too is not correct. Since – Even if it be accepted that for the party (defendant and opponent) to enter into a verbal transaction, on non-acceptance of the existence of the pramaana etc., is negated. But this does not happen so, if it be so then for the people who do not accept the pramaana etc. there cannot be any verbal transaction (the effect), since there is no cause.

Though our position is different from the Madhyamika Buddhist, since we though accept the pramaana etc., but do not accept its existence, since for us vedantins, nothing other than the Self is eternal (has existence).

उक्तस्वायमर्थो यन्माद्यमिकादिवाग्व्यवहाराणां स्वरूपापलापो न शक्यत इति।

This was said earlier (just because existence of pramaana etc. is not accepted) the maadhyamika Buddhist verbal transaction cannot be completely negated.

After giving four choices, when we spoke about the "vaak-stambana-mantra" (the mantra to keep our mouth shut), we ridiculed with the statement, fearing this Chaarvaaka Guru Sri Brihaspati, or Maadhyamika Guru Nagaarjuna or Vedantins Guru Sri Bhagavan Bhashyakara Shankaracharya ji, did not speak.

अथ मन्यसे कथकव्यवहारं प्रति हेतुत्वात् प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वम् सत्त्वाच्चाभ्युपगमः यत्सत् तदभ्युपगम्यते इति स्थितेरिति।

Supporting: Therefore if you accept, being the reason for the verbal transaction between the parties the existence of the praamana etc., and due to its existence its acceptance, since that which has existence should be accepted.

Here the logician implies two syllogies: Praamana etc. has existence since they have a cause and pramaana etc. should be accepted since they have existence.

The rule of the world too states that whatever has existence is accepted and whatever is otherwise (non-existent) is not accepted.

मैवम् कयापि नियमस्थित्या प्रवृत्तायां कथायां कथकवाग्व्यवाहरं प्रति हेतुत्वात् प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वं सत्त्वाच्चाभ्युपगमो भवत प्रसाध्यः।

Refuting: No so. This can be said so only in the dialog where both the parties accept the existence of pramaana etc. as the rule for the dialog. If the pramaana etc. exists they should be accepted.

If we accept the existence of the Pramaana etc. as the rule for the dialog, then there will be defect of interdependence (anyonyashraya). Only if the pramaana etc. are accepted the dialog can start, and only in that kind of dialog the pramaana etc. can be accepted.

And in a dialog since the pramaana etc. are accepted as its cause, through it you may accept it too. Still, since in the dialog proving the existence of the praamana etc., there will be defect of non-existence or non-acceptance and as this dialog is done to prove the existence the other dialogs can be done too without pressurising the others to accept the existence.

कथातः पूर्वं तत्त्वावधारणं वा परपराजयं वाऽभिलषद्भ्यां कथकाव्यां यावता विनाऽविलपितं न पर्यवस्यति तावदनुरोद्धव्यम्।

Before the dialog starts, whatever is the basic (bare) necessity for both the parties to establish their ideas, without which it's conclusive knowledge or victory is not possible, only that much should be accepted.

तच्च व्यवहारनियमसमयबन्दादेव द्वाभ्यामपि ताभ्यां सम्भाव्यते इति व्यवहारनियमसमयमेव वधीतः।

And that desired result can be possible by fixing the rules for the dialog, for both of them; this is why both decide upon the rule for the dialog.

स च प्रमाणेन तर्केण च व्यवर्तव्यं वादिना। प्रतिवादिनाऽपि
कथाङ्गतत्त्वज्ञानविपर्ययलिङ्गप्रतिज्ञाहान्याद्यन्यतमनिग्रहस्थानं तस्य दर्शनीयम्।

And that rule for the dialog is of the form of – One (defendant or opponent) should try to establish his idea through pramaana (means of right knowledge) and logic. And the other (opponent or defendant) too should also show the defect of shortfall like negation of one's standpoint etc. through wrong knowledge than the accepted (said).

Kathaa-Tattva-Gnaana – the knowledge accepted (declared) as the part of the dialog as to be one's philosophy that needs to be proven or the method one will accept to negate the other. Since, sometimes people accept to negate the others philosophy only through their own philosophy, and sometimes through any other philosophy.

Viparyaya – contradictory to that which is declared. If this is pointed out the dialog ends then and there in favour of the one who points out, this is called as Pratigna-haani – negation of the declared idea.

तद्व्युत्पादने प्रथमस्य भङ्गो व्यवर्तव्यः। अन्यथा द्वितीयस्यैव। तादृशेतरौ जेतृतया व्यवर्तव्यौ। प्रामाणिकः
पक्षस्तात्त्विकतया व्यवर्तव्यः इत्यादिरूपः।

If the other is able to re-establish the negated idea, then the first one should be declared as loser. Otherwise the other (either the defendant or the opponent should be adjudged the loser). The other one (other than the loser) should be declared as the victor. The one with the logical one will be accepted as the conclusion.

Here understanding the loser and the victor is little tricky. Let us say, if the defendant wants to prove $1 + 1 = 3$ and the opponent shows the error in this then the opponent wins. But for some reason, the opponent is not able to disprove this, and then the defendant will have to be declared the victor. Though, this may not be the logical conclusion.

This may be true even in the case of defendant saying 1 and 1 is 1 and the opponent proves this to be wrong by saying 1 and 1 is 2, still since the defendant has resorted to the deceitful logic, will say, 1 and 1 in binary is 1, since binary is either 1 or 0.

अत एव व्यवहारनियमसमयबन्धेऽपि हेतुर्वक्तव्यः। तथा च सोऽपि कथायां प्रवृत्तायामभिधातुं युक्त इति
प्रमाणसत्त्वहेतुत्वभिधानवत् प्रत्यवस्थानमनवकाशम्।

Supporting: *This is why we should accept the samaya-bandhaa (rule of the dialog) too as a cause (in a dialog). And that too can be understood only when we enter into a dialog for establishing it, therefore as said for the acceptance of the pramaana etc. here too we will have interdependence or we should start the dialog without the rules.*

द्वाभ्यामपि वादिभ्यां विचारप्रवृत्त्या अभिलष्यमाणतत्त्वव्यवस्थाजयमूलत्वेन व्यवहारनियमस्य स्वेच्छायैव
परिगृहीतत्वात्।

Refuting: *Since both the defendant and the opponent accept the dialog as the means to gain their desired result of establishing the philosophy or victory, they decide upon the rules for the dialog according to their interest.*

Since the rules for the dialog is acceptable for both the parties, we need not establish it through another dialog as in the case of the acceptance of the pramaana etc.

न चैवं प्रमाणानुपज्ञस्वेच्छामात्रपरिगृहीतमूलत्वात् मूलापरिशुद्धिसम्भवेन
सर्वविचारविचार्यफलविप्लवापत्तिः स्यात्।

Supporting: But then, since without resorting to the pramaana (any proof), since the rules for the dialog is accepted according to one's own desire, its root is not pure (not valid), therefore the whole of dialog, its knowledge and the result will be baseless (defective)

Like the tree with a defective root will only produce a defective fruit, likewise, the defective cause will produce only a defective effect.

And this also will be like the keyword used while hypnotizing. The hypnotizer says "when it is said 'good' or when you hear a clap, you wake-up slowly". Now, if anyone says the word 'good' one will achieve the desired result. Here in a dialog, I will fix a rule something like, if I say cheers, I win.

अविद्यमानाऽनादिपारम्पर्यायातस्य लोकव्युत्पत्तिगृहीतसंवादस्य च तस्य
अन्यथाभावासम्भाव्यतालक्षणस्वतःसिद्धपरिशुद्धित्वात्।

Refuting: Gained through the tradition without a beginning and from the worldly knowledge (transaction) which cannot be negated and this is self-established through the world and is completely valid.

The tradition of the learned accept this and the world also accepts this kind of desire propelled rules for the dialog, since they are result producing, whether it be victory or the conclusive knowledge.

न च प्रमाणादि सत्तापीत्यमेवोभाभ्यामङ्गीकर्तुमुचिता तादृशव्यवहार मात्रेणैव कथाप्रवृत्त्युत्पत्तेः।
प्रमाणादिसत्त्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि तथाविधव्यवहारनियमव्यतिरेके तत्त्वनिर्णयस्य जयस्य वाऽभिलषितस्य
कथकयोरपर्यवसानात्।

Supporting (doubt): But it should not be said, the existence of the pramaana etc. too can be accepted in this very manner by both the parties

Refuting: Because even without accepting it, there is the possibility of the dialog even if the rules are set as said earlier. On the other hand, even if the pramaana etc. are accepted, without the aforesaid rules, there is not possibility for the parties to come to a conclusion about the conclusive knowledge or the victory.

Next the author starts with the third choice, lokavyavahaarasiddha - accepted by the world.

नापि तृतीयः। लोकव्यवहारो हि प्रमाणलोकव्यवहारो वा स्यात् पामरादि साधारणव्यवहारो वा।

Refuting: Therefore the third too is not right. By worldly acceptance what is said, the learned one's worldly transaction or the illiterate's general worldly transaction.

नाद्यः विचारप्रवृत्तिमन्तरेण तस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात्। तदर्थमेव पूर्वं नियमस्य गवेषनात्।

It cannot be the first (learned one's worldly transaction), because without entering a dialog it cannot be proven, and only for that dialog we are searching for the proper rules.

नापि द्वितीयः शरीरात्मवादीनामपि तथासति भवता स्वीकर्तव्यत्वापातात्।

It cannot be the second (illiterate's transaction), then you should have to accept their idea of body to be the Self.

The materialists (Charvaaka) accept the body as the Self, and the illiterates too accept the Self as the body etc. and not as different from it.

पश्चात् तद्विचारबाध्यतया नाभ्युपेयतेति चेत्।

Supporting: We do not accept it (body as the Self) because it gets negated later by the inquiry (dialog).

Though it may be true, that the others accept the body etc. as the Self, but upon inquiry on the Self, in different dialog on this subject we negate this idea.

तर्हि प्रमाणादयोऽपि यदि विचारबाध्या भविष्यन्ति तदा नाभ्युपेया एव अन्यथा तु उपगन्तव्या इति
लोकव्यवहारसिद्धतया सत्त्वमभ्युपगम्यते इति तावन्न भवति।

Refuting: Then if the pramaana etc. too if is negated by the inquiry (dialog) then they too should not be accepted, otherwise it should be accepted. Still, as it is accepted through the worldly transaction we should accept the existence of the pramaana etc., is not proven.

From the previous standpoint, if something is not proven through the dialog, or if something is disproven in a dialog, then it should not be accepted.

नापि चतुर्थः। यादृश भवता प्रमाणादीन्यभ्युपगम्य व्यवहारनियमः कथायामालम्ब्यते तस्यैव प्रमाणादिसत्त्वानुसरणोदासीनैरस्माभिरप्यवलम्बनात्। तस्य यदि मां प्रति फलातिप्रसञ्जकत्वं तदा त्वां प्रत्यपि समानः प्रसङ्गः।

Refuting: It cannot be the fourth also. As you accept the existence of the pramaana etc. as the rule for the dialog, so too, we accept being not bothered about the existence or the non-existence of the pramaana etc. If there is a problem for us in gaining our desired result (victory or conclusive knowledge) you too will be in the same situation.

The fourth is the acceptance of pramaana etc. for the conclusive knowledge or the victory. The four are : 1 Concomitance 2. Reason 3. Worldly acceptance and 4. For victory or conclusive knowledge.

The idea is – in accepting of the existence of the pramaana etc., one has to first prove it and not just that because of it he will be bound and therefore will face the defect. But for the vedanti, since he is not for or against in acceptance of the pramaana etc., his task is easier and does not face any defect.

स्यादेतत् - नियतवाग्व्यवहारक्रियासमयबन्धेन कथां प्रवर्तयताऽपि व्यवहारसत्ता अभ्युपगन्तव्या। न हि सत्तामनभ्युपगम्य व्यवहारक्रियाऽभिधातुं शक्या। क्रिया हि निष्पादना असतः सद्रूपताप्रापणमिति यावद्।
Supporting: Fine let it be. Even for one who enter the verbal transaction you are up to enter accepting the rules for the dialog, should accept the transactional reality. For, without accepting the existence one cannot enter the activity of (verbal) transaction. Since the activity is to create, is to bring the non existence to existence (give existence to non-existence)

Here the opponent wants the vedanti to accept the cause-effect relationship between the acceptance and the dialog, which we have already negated, earlier in the second choice.

प्रमाणैर्व्यवहर्तव्यमिति नियमबन्धनं प्रमाकारणभावस्य नियमान्तराभावात् नियतपूर्वसत्त्वं कारणत्वं प्रमाणानामनादाय न पर्वस्यति। दूषणानां चास्तित्वेन भङ्गावधारणनियमबन्धेन साधनाङ्गव्यास्यादीनां सत्त्वेन तद्विषयस्य तत्त्वरूपताव्यवहारनियमनादौ च कण्ठोक्तमेव तस्य तस्य सत्त्वमङ्गीकृतमिति रिक्तमिदमुच्यते प्रमाणादीनाम् सत्तामनभ्युपगम्य कथारम्भः शक्यते इति।

Supporting: Similarly in the rule we laid for the dialog the statement "we should transact through the pramaana", the pramaana is included in as one of the cause. Cause is that which has the definitive existence prior to the effect, and this (effect – dialog) cannot take place without accepting the pramaana etc. And since there are rules formed that if the defects exist, the party afflicted by it loses and there is the concomitance through which the rules based on the existence (of the pramaana, defects) are explicitly said. Therefore, what was said here, that without accepting the existence the dialog can take place, is useless statement.

Here the cause – effect relationship is explained. Cause is accepted to be something that has definitive existence prior to the effect. Like the existence of clay, potter's wheel, stick or the potter. And the cause can be either material or the instrumental cause. Though we have the existence of the donkey used for carrying the clay, or potter's son playing / crying, the cloud above etc., they are not a must for the effect; therefore they do not come in the causal state.

मैवम्। एभिरपि बाधकैः कथायामारब्धायामेव अभिमतस्य प्रसाधनीयत्वे पूर्वोक्तवाधाया अनिस्ततारात्।

Refuting: Not so. Through these defects too one can establish the desired idea (existence of pramaana) only after entering a dialog; therefore the aforesaid defects have no utility.

न च व्यवहारनियमस्य स्वेच्छास्वीकृतस्यैव प्रमाणादिसत्तास्वीकारपर्यवसायितया नायं दोषः स्यात्। यतः सत्ताज्ञानस्य तत्राङ्गत्वम् न तु सत्तायाः।

Supporting: As said earlier, we accept the desired rules for the transaction through which we accept the existence of the pramaana etc.; therefore there is no defect.

Refuting: Cannot be said, since the desire propelled only proves the knowledge of the existence and not the existence per say.

When we discussed earlier about the rules for the dialog, it was said, the rules are formed keeping both the parties desired goal, whether it is conclusive knowledge or victory, in sight. Therefore, if this is so, we are free to accept the existence of the pramaana etc., even without entering a dialog for establishing this.

Therefore there can be no defect as said earlier, of accepting it before or after, if before the pramaana is not established yet, if it is after the dialog then the other dialog too can function likewise without accepting the existence.

Here even if it be accepted by fancy, still that only proves the knowledge of the existence and not the existence.

तत्र किं सत्त्वावगममात्रात् सत्ताऽभ्युपगम्येति मन्यसे अबाधितात् तदवगमाद्वा न तावदाद्यः मरुमरीचिकादौ जलरूपतासद्भावाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात्।

Refuting: Now what do you accept, just by the knowledge of the existence do you accept the existence or through the knowledge that is not negated. It cannot be the first, for even in the mirage water, one should accept the existence of the water.

We give two choices in accepting the existence: 1. is it just by the knowledge of existence or 2. knowledge of non-negated existence.

द्वितीयेऽपि किं वादिप्रतिवादिमध्यस्थमात्रस्य तस्यापि कथाकालमात्र एव बाधितावगमाभावात्। अथवा कस्यचिदपि कालान्तरेऽपि च बाधितबोधविरहात्। नाद्यः अतिप्रसङ्गात् पुरुषत्रयावगतस्यापि एकक्षनावगतस्य पुरुषान्तरेण तेनापि क्षनान्तरे बहुलं बाध्यत्वदर्शनात्। न चासौ अर्थोऽसत्योऽपि द्वित्रादिपुरुषामात्रपूर्वजाततत्प्रतीत्यनुरोधत् बाधदर्शने संजातेऽपि तथैव सन्नित्यभ्युपगम्यते। तस्माद् द्वितीयः पक्षः परिशिष्यते यत्र सर्वप्रकारेण बाधितत्वं नास्ति तत्सदित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

Refuting: In the second too. Is it that during the dialog decided by the defendant, opponent, and the judge? Or is it in any different time when the knowledge of it being negated is not known to anyone. It cannot be the first, since there will be defect. Since, even though it is understood by these three people in a moment, is seen to be negated by somebody else or by them in a different moment. And it is not possible to accept which is non-existent as existent with respect to the knowledge of the accepted three or four people, even after it being negated. Therefore the second choice remains, where there is no negation of any type possible should be accepted as existence.

When three people, the defendant, the opponent, and the judge, decides about something during the dialog. Later gets disputed or negated by someone else, or by the very same people who accepted it in the first place. There are a lot of examples to establish this fact, like it was accepted earlier the sun revolved around the earth so on and so forth.

It is said too, some intelligent fellow may establish something, but always some other more intelligent one will refute it (prove it to be otherwise). AdvaitaSiddhi by Sri Madhusudhana Saraswati was written condemning Nyayamrta of Sri Vyasa Tirtha, though contained beautiful logic, was condemned by Tarangini which was again condemned by Sri Gauda Brahmananda Saraswati.

तदित्थं यदि नाम वादिप्रतिवादिमध्यस्थमात्रस्य दूषणादिसत्त्वावगमः कथाकालमात्रे तैरबाध्यमानः

कथाङ्गत्वेनाभ्युपेयते तदा किमायातं

सर्वप्रकाराबाधिततत्सत्त्वावगमायत्तत्सत्ताभ्युपगमकथाङ्गतानङ्गीकारस्य।

कतिपयप्रतिपत्कतिपयकालतथात्त्वावगमादेव प्रायेण लौकिको व्यवहारः प्रतीयते तादृशचायं सत्त्वावगमः

कथाङ्गम्।

Refuting: Therefore thus, even if the defendant, opponent and the judge in their own dialog accept the existence of the pramaana etc. as a part of the dialog, so what. Since its non-negated knowledge is not gained by everybody in every situation therefore even if it is not accepted as a part of the dialog there is no harm. The worldly transaction is seen in things when in general it is seen by some people for a period of time. And this acceptance of existence too is similarly accepted as a part of dialog.

एतत्तदुच्यते - व्यवहारिकीं प्रमाणादिसत्तामादाय विचारारम्भ इति। तस्माद् यादृशव्यवहारनियमः कृतः तन्मर्यादा अनेन नोल्लङ्घितेति यद्वादिवागव्यवहारे मध्यस्थावगमः स विजयते यस्य तु वचसि तस्यावगमस्यतस्य पराजयः यत्र वाच्युक्तनिग्रहसत्त्वावगमः स निगृहीतः तदितरस्तु न तथेत्यादिनियम एव कथारम्भाय ग्राह्यः।

Refuting: This is the conclusion. We start the dialog accepting the existence of the pramaana etc. in the transactional reality. Therefore, whatever be the rules of the transaction which were set, if the judge does not see one overstepping it in the dialog he wins and in one whom that (overstepping) is seen he loses. And where the faults pointed by the opponent is found to be true then the other loses, and (wherever that is disproven the other one wins) wherever the knowledge of it (faults) are not seen he does not loose. Only these rules are to be accepted to start a dialog.

असतोऽपिसमयबन्धस्य कारणात्वम्

2. Acceptance of non-existence too etc. as part of dialog

अनेन नियमेन वक्तव्यमित्यस्य अयमर्थः - अनेन नियमेनोक्तमनेनेति मध्यस्थावगमस्य विषयीभवितव्यमिति।
Refuting: The meaning of this should be said by this rule, is – the judge should be able to understand that the party spoke this, following this rule.

The idea said here is – the parties' logician (supporting) and the Buddhist (refuting) discuss here. Previously it was said there should be a rule for the dialog which the parties put together for gaining the desired result. There the logicians accept the existence of the objects and the knowledge of the object. But for both the Vedanti and the Buddhist the object is Non-real. From the highest standpoint of the Vedanta, there are only two states (though we do not accept anything other than the Self, from the point of ignorance) we accept the existence and non-existence. This is what is accepted in Mandukya Karika by Sri Gaudapada ji. Now, for the sake of the mediocre student, we introduce another order of reality which is vyavahaarika reality (the transactional reality). But the Buddhist does not accept any kind of reality because they accept the philosophy of Voidism. Therefore, both the object and its knowledge, pot and the knowledge of the pot, are non-real. Therefore there is no duality philosophy accepted.

Therefore, the Buddhists say, there is no need for the object to exist for the transaction, but if it understood it is enough. By object we can understand here, the rule of the dialog.

न च वाच्यमन्ततस्तदवगमस्यापि सत्ताऽभ्युपेयेति तस्यापि सत्ताचिन्तायां तत्सत्तावगमान्तरस्यैव शरणत्वात्।
Supporting: But, (even though the existence of the object is not accepted) at least the knowledge of the object should finally be accepted.

Refuting: This need not be so, because when we think about the knowledge, its knowledge is the refuge.

By the refuge in the knowledge of the knowledge, what we mean is, since there is really nothing real, there is no problem.

न चैवमनवस्था तदनुसरणावश्यम्भावानङ्गिकारात्। एवं त्रिचतुरज्ञानजन्मनो नाधिका मतिः इति न्यायात्।

Supporting: But, if we accept the refuge in the knowledge of the knowledge, we will fall in the trap of regress ad infinitum.

Refuting: Not so, since we do not accept its existence as necessary. As per the rule (logic) there is no knowledge series accepted after the third or fourth stage.

For the existence of the rule, we have to depend upon its knowledge and that knowledge depends upon the second and that again on the third, in this way there will be a series of unending knowledges. If we accept the first knowledge supporting the second and the second supporting the first, it will be Anyonyaashraya (interdependence) defect. Therefore if we accept the first with second, second with third and third with first then we will end up with the defect called chakraka (cyclic). Finally if we accept as validity, for each of the previous knowledge existence the next knowledge, invariably we will end in the anavastha (regress ad infinitum).

The rule accepted is accepted by the famous mimamsaka Sri Kumarila Bhatta, who says, there is no proof for accepting the knowledge series beyond the third or the fourth stage / level, since by this time the desire for the knowing is destroyed. Like in the case of a gem stone or a disease we may take two or three opinions, and after that we come to a conclusion about it.

न चान्तिमासत्त्वे पूर्वप्रवाहासत्त्वापत्तिः तथा च अवगममादायापि व्यवहारतो न निस्तार इति वाच्यम्। अस्तु एवं हि तथापि त्रिचतुरज्ञानकक्षागवेषणमात्रविश्रान्तेन विचारेण ततः परमननुसरणरमणीयेनैव च समयं बद्ध्वा कथायां मिथः सम्प्रतिपत्त्या प्रवर्तनात्। अन्यथा प्रमाणादिसत्त्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि ज्ञानानवस्थायाः दुष्परिहरत्वात्।

Supporting: If the final knowledge is non-existent too, the whole knowledge series will become non-existent, and therefore even if one gains the transactional knowledge there can be no transaction possible.

Refuting: This cannot be said. Even if the knowledge is non-existent, in three or four stages since the inquiry process comes to an end, thereafter without going further accepting that as the final knowledge we should formulate the rule for the same. Otherwise even if we accept the existence of the pramaana etc., one cannot escape the defect of regress ad infinitum with regard to its knowledge.

If the final knowledge is non-existent the penultimate will become non-existent, likewise, till the first knowledge will become non-existent therefore there will be no knowledge possible. But, if it accepted in the aforesaid method, of not accepting the knowledge series for more than the third or fourth stage, we will not face this defect.

But if the logician still finds it difficult, this will be a problem in his own backyard, since to accept the first pramaana (valid knowledge) he should use some other pramaana, as one cannot validate itself, and the second needs a third, to escape the defect interdependence, and therefore he will be looking into the same regression defect.

न च वाच्यं मत्पक्षे स्वरूपसत्ता ज्ञानेन व्यवहारस्य चरितार्थयितुं शक्यत्वात् तज्ज्ञापरम्पराननुसरणमुचितम्। न त्वेवं त्वत्पक्षे ज्ञानेन व्यवहारस्य चरितार्थता ज्ञानस्वरूपसत्त्वाङ्गिकारप्रसङ्गादिति।

Supporting: But in our system (logician's), since we accept the inherent existence in the knowledge, we will be able to handle our transaction (without any defect). Therefore we do not have to accept the knowledge series. But you cannot accept the same with respect to the knowledge for the transaction, since in that case you will be accepting the inherent existence of knowledge.

Since, the Buddhist do not accept any existence, he will be falling into the trap of "nigrahasthaana" (defect of accepting the wrong philosophy).

स्वरूपसत्तामादायापि परिहरतोऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गस्य स्वप्रकाशप्रस्तावे वक्तव्यात्।

Refuting: We say no. Even by hiding behind the acceptance of the inherent knowledge of the knowledge, you cannot escape the defect of regress ad infinitum. This we will explain in the "svaprakasha-vada" (the topic discussing the self-fulgence).

Until there is not valid proof to express the self-fulgence it cannot be accepted. And as said earlier to establish the pramaana (validity) to prove its existence we need to depend upon another and so on and so forth, therefore we will still face regress ad infinitum.

यथा च त्वत्पक्षे स्वरूपसत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि विज्ञास्वरूपसत्तैव परं व्यवहारोपपादिका न घतादिसत्ता एवमेवासत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि ज्ञानमेवासद् व्यवहारोपपादकं नान्यत्।

Refuting: As in your system (logician) since there is no difference in the inherent existence, but still to explain the transaction you accept the inherent existence of the knowledge as the reason and not the inherent existence of the pot etc. object. Similarly, though there is no difference in the non-existence we (Buddhist) accept the knowledge of the non-existence to explain the transaction.

The inherent existence of the object and knowledge is same.

असञ्च उपपादकश्चेति व्याहृतमिति चेत्।

Supporting: To say it is non-existent and it is the cause for transaction is contradictory.

सञ्च उपपादकमिति कुतो न व्याहृतम्। न हि सदुपपादकं असन्नेति क्वचिदावयोः सिद्धम्।

Refuting: How is it, saying, it is existent and cause for transaction, not contradictory. Since we have not established (through a dialog) that the existent is the cause for transaction and not non-existent.

ननु तदसत्त्वाविशेषात् कार्यस्य अन्यदापि जन्मप्रसङ्गः।

Supporting: *But, there is no difference in the non-existence therefore, the effect will take place otherwise too.*

Since the non-existence is accepted as the cause for the creation, and it is there even before the creation of the pot etc., the creation should take place even before.

न। कार्यस्याद्यसत्ताक्षण इवान्यदापि सामग्र्यसत्त्वाविशेषात् तवापि किं नन्यदा कार्यजन्म।

Refuting: *No. As with the first instance of the effect (where there is no prior non-existence), there is no difference in the second etc. instances, then how is it you do not have the effect otherwise too.*

Since there is non-existence of prior absence in the first instance, which is accepted as the cause for the effect, in the second etc. instance too it exists, therefore the logicians too will have the same problem and not just that, since the effect takes place from the prior-absence of the first instance, you (logician) too should accept the cause as non-existent.

अथ न मम तदानीन्तनं सामग्र्यसत्त्वं तदानीन्तनस्य कार्यजन्मनो नियामकम्। किन्तु ततः प्राक् समाग्रीसत्त्वं तथादर्शनात्।

Supporting: *But for me (logician), the absence of the materials in the first instance is not the guiding principle for the creation of the effect, but the existence of the materials before the creation, since it is perceived so.*

तर्हि ममापि कालान्तरस्थमपि तदसत्त्वं तदतनकार्यजन्मनो नियामकम् तथादर्शनादेव।

Refuting: *Then for me (Buddhist) too, the non-existence in a different instance can be the guiding principle for the creation of the effect, since it is perceived so.*

If the logicians perceives the existence of the materials before the creation to be the cause then if someone perceives it in a different form it cannot be negated. This is called as "Pratibandi-uttara" (an answer countering the opponent, with a contrary question).

मम तु तदव्यवहितोत्तरत्वं तदा कार्यजन्मनो नियामकमिति चेत्।

Supporting: *But for me (logician), accept the attribute "avyavahitottara kshana" (that which exists just next to the effect) as the guiding principle for the effect to take place*

There are two states – The logicians accept the attribute near to the effect associated with the materials like prior absence, which acts as the guiding principle (controller). But since the Buddhist does not accept any existence there cannot be any controller-controlled relationship.

न। समसमयत्वादागन्तुकत्वाच्च अविशेषेण नियम्यनियामकव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः। तस्माद् अन्यदास्थायाः

सामग्र्याः तदा कार्यजन्मनियमोऽभ्युपेयस्तथादर्शनादित्येव वाच्यम्। तथा च समः समाधिः।

Refuting: *No. Since they exist in the same period and they are transitory. Therefore since there is no difference there cannot be controller-controlled relationship. Therefore, we should accept the materials existing in a different (prior) instance being the cause for the effect existing in a different (post) instance. Then we (Buddhist) too accept the same.*

They exist in the same period, here they means, the instance of the creation of effect and the instance post the materials. That which exists in the same period cannot be in cause-effect relationship, like the left horn and the right horn.

And this "avyavahitottara kshana" (that which exists just next to the effect) is not an eternal attribute, but a temporary one, and therefore itself needs a controller. If another controller be accepted then we will be facing regress ad infinitum and if we do not accept another controller, then itself being uncontrolled, cannot be a controller of something else.

The logician should resort to answering, by saying, the existence of the materials prior instance being the cause for the existence of the effect in later instance. The Buddhist too accept the non-existence of the prior instance being the cause for the non-existence of the effect in later instance

तथापि कार्यजन्मकालस्य को विशेषः।

Supporting: *But still, what is the difference between the other and the instance of the effect taking place. कार्यजमैव। अन्यथा यद् विशेषान्तरं तदपि विशेषान्तरवतः कालस्य स्यादित्यपर्यवसानमेव पर्यवस्येत्।*

Refuting: *The creation of the effect is. Otherwise, whatever other special reason (adjective) given will be still dependent upon a different instance; therefore will end in the defect of regress ad infinitum.*

In the other instance there is no creation of the effect but in this instance there is the creation of the effect.

The idea is similar to the one shown by Sr Vidyanaya ji in Pancadashi (1 chapter 50 Sloka). If there is some other adjective accepted leaving aside the creation of the effect, then we have to explain whether it (instance) is devoid of adjective or endowed with adjective, it cannot be the former (devoid of adjective) because the question was raised by the opponent himself, and if we accept the latter (endowed with adjective) then we will put a similar question for this instance too, devoid of or endowed with adjective.

तथापि तत्कालस्यानुगतं किं रूपमिति चेत्।

Supporting: *Still, what is the form that is flowing through that instance (of the effect).*

रूपान्तरवतोऽपि किं तदित्यस्यापि पर्यनुयोगस्यापत्तेः।

Refuting: *Again, if another form is accepted, then the question regarding its form will only lead to the defect of regress ad infinitum.*

Anugata – it is what is referred to as “ness” of the object, like potness etc.

किञ्च -

अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत् कारणं तदसत्ततः।

नान्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत् कारणं तदसत्ततः॥४॥

Refuting: *Again. If there is existence in that endowed with existence then the cause will be non-existence. If there is no existence in that endowed with existence then the cause will be non-existence. – 4*

As the existence cannot be accepted for the existence, the thing endowed with existence cannot have existence too (non-existence), since it will lead to defect of interdependence. If we do not accept this existence fearing the defect, then it is like directly accepting the non-existence as the cause.

This sloka is explained by Author in his own words

तथा हि - अन्तर्भूतसत्त्वं यदि कारणात्वं तदा स्वविशिष्टे स्ववृत्तिरंशतः स्वाश्रयत्वमापादयति।

विशिष्टस्यार्थान्तरत्वेऽपि च स्ववृत्तिव्यतिरेकवत् स्वविशिष्टे स्ववृत्तिव्यतिरेकनियमदर्शनात्।

Refuting: *The object endowed with Existence if is accepted as the cause-ness then, as the existence is accepted in the one endowed with existence, it has the defect of inter-dependence. And if the adjective is accepted as different from the adjective-adjectified, then, since as acceptance of itself in itself is contradictory; so too is acceptance of itself in the one with itself as the attribute (adjective), as the contradictory is seen (itself not in itself as adjective).*

According to the rule, that whatever is attribute that is associated with the adjectified (endowed) will also be there in the adjective too. And since, it expects its own knowledge for its existence, has the defect of inter-dependence.

In the second if the adjective is accepted as different from the non-adjectified (pre), will be contradictory to the logician's dictum “vishishtam shuddaat naatiricyate” (the endowed is not different from the pure). There will be interdependence if we accept itself in itself or itself as adjective. To avoid the defect if it is accepted as different, since the existence has no relationship directly with the object, the cause will invariably be only non-existence.

न सैव सत्ता तस्मिन्निति। अन्यस्या विशिष्टवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे तामनिवेश्य कारणत्वमभ्युपगन्तुः सर्वथैवासत्कारणं पर्यवस्यति। अपरापरसत्तानिवेशने चाऽपर्यवसानमेव।

Supporting: *But if it be said, it is not the same existence that exists there in the cause endowed with existence.*

Refuting: *No. If the other (inherent) existence be accepted in the adjectified, then since the cause-ness is accepted without it, it will only lead to voidism. If therefore, a different existence is accepted for each adjective, then it will end only in the defect of regress ad infinitum.*

The logician tries a different approach, since he has to accept the existence, he says, the existence in the cause if in "samavaaya sambandha" (inseparable relationship) and the cause endowed with existence it is in "svarupa sambandha" (inherent nature). Since the "sambandha" (relation) is different there is no interdependence. The logicians accept, if the relation or the place and time differ, then it differentiates one object from the other.

The refuters (Buddhists) say, if the existence does not exist in "samavaaya" (inseparable) relation, then how it can be accepted as the cause itself. And since the existence in the cause is not accepted in inherent nature, therefore it will lead to "asat kaarana" (non-existence).

Does the other existence exist as the cause or not.

No – then the cause cannot be existence, the logician should accept voidism.

Yes – then again is the second existence, it exists as the cause or not

No - then the cause cannot be existence, the logician should accept voidism.

Yes – again what gives the existence to the second existence, if it is the first then there is defect of "aatmashraya" (interdependence), if a third existence is accepted then we will find ourselves in the defect of "chakra" (cyclic) and if to escape this we accept a fourth and a fifth existence, then we will invariably fall in the defect of "anavastha" (regress ad infinitum).

न च सत्ताभेदानन्त्यमस्त्येवेत्यपि पादप्रसारिका निस्ताराय। सत्ताभेदे हि सद्वुद्धिव्यवहारानुगम
समर्थनलंघिनः प्रथमापि सत्ता न स्यादित् वृद्धिमिच्छतो मूलमपि ते नष्टमिति हा कष्टतरम्।

Supporting: But if we accept multiple existence, since it is experienced so.

Refuting: This too is not right, because stretching beyond limit too cannot help. If multiple of existence is accepted; then for the people accepting one pervading knowledge (anugata dharma – jati) negate themselves; the first existence itself cannot be proven. It is indeed a sad state; greedy for the interest you have lost the principle too.

The logicians though do not accept the existence in existence or for that matter the inherent existence as accepted earlier, this is presented to negate this idea too. They accept the "jati" (class) of existence as multiple. The Jati is accepted as "nityam ekam anekaanugata" (eternal, one and existing in many), for this reason as the vedantin's do not accept anything other than the Self as eternal; do not accept jati (class).

न च स्वरूपसत्तोपगमाय स्वस्ति। भिन्नानपि अनुगतबुद्ध्याधानपदेऽभिषिञ्चता त्वया हि जातिमात्राय
जलाञ्जलिर्वितीर्येत। मा भूदनुगतिः स्वरूपसत्त्वस्येति वदन् तद्भिर्भिर्णीं कारणतां कथमनुगमयिताऽसीति।

Supporting: Then again if we accept the "svaruupa" (inherent) existence (and not "jati" (class) existence) we will not have any problem.

Refuting: No. If the multiple "svaruupa" (inherent) existence is accepted as the cause for the pervading knowledge, then you have washed your hands of the "jati" (class) you accept. By accepting the non-pervasion in the inherent existence, how can you establish the cause-ness in it (since the inherent existence is different for each individual, therefore there can be no pervasive knowledge).

The logicians accept "jati" (class) for establishing the common knowledge pervading all the individual, like "gotva" (cow-ness) in the "go:" (cow).

किञ्च स्वरूपसत्त्वं स्वरूपाद् घटाद्यात्मनो नाधिकम्। असतोऽपि स्वरूपं स्वरूपमेव। न हि असन् घटादिर्न
घटादिः। तथा सति घटादिः न इत्यपि न स्यात् असतोऽघटादिवत्।

Refuting: There is more to it. Since the inherent existence is not different from the inherent (object) like pot etc. The non-existence too is the inherent nature (of object). It cannot be said, the non-existence pot is not pot (but it is). Since, if it is not pot, then there cannot be the knowledge "this is not a pot", since non-existence is non-pot.

If the nature of the pot etc. is existence so is the non-existence. If this is not accepted then the negation of pot through "pot does not exist" cannot be done. Since the negation pre-supposes existence, without accepting the existence we cannot negate.

अथ सदपि सत्तामनन्तर्भाव्य कारणम्। तदानीमसदिपि तत्तथास्तु। सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः

कारणकोट्यप्रवेशाविशेषात्।

Supporting: If the existence is not accepted in the cause.

Refuting: Then let the non-existence be so too. Since both the existence and non-existence are not in the state of cause, there is no specialty to accept the existence as the cause (, so why not accept the non-existence).

By not accepting the existence as the nature, the logician accepts it as the “upalakshana” (pointer). Like the crow is a pointer when we identify a house from distance, which need not be there in the house upon reaching. So too, the existence need not be there in the cause.

अथ सत्ता न कारणकोटिनिविष्टा किन्तु कारणात्वं सत्त्वं नियतपूर्वसत्तां हि कारणात्तां मन्ये इति मन्यसे तर्हि मत्पक्षेऽपि सैव कारणात्ताऽस्तु।

Supporting: *Therefore, if it is said, the existence is not in the causal state, but the cause-ness is existence-ness. Since the cause-ness is that which definitely exists prior to the effect.*

Refuting: *Then let it be the same for us too.*

As explained earlier we (logicians) do not accept the inherent or the pointed existence, but accept the cause-ness as the existence-ness. Since the cause-ness is that which has definite existence prior to the effect-ness.

तर्हि कारणस्य सत्ताभ्युपगतवानसीति घट्टुकुट्ट्यां प्रभातमिति चेन्न भावानवबोधात्।

सत्तामसतीभ्युपगच्छताऽपि सत्ता मयाऽभ्युपगतैव। अन्यथा कऽसौ असतीति। त्वमपि किं सत्तां तत्सत्तामन्तर्भाव्य कारणत्वमिच्छसि। न त्वेवम् पूर्ववत् क्वापि सत्तात्यगो वा अनवस्थायां वा पर्यवसानं स्यात्।

Supporting: *Then, since you (Buddhist) have accepted the existence of the cause, therefore have come round about accepting the same.*

Refuting: *You (logician) have not understood our (Buddhist) purport (as always). We do accept existence, accepting the existence of the non-existence. If we do not accept, what is non-existence? You too accept existence with existence, as the cause-ness. If you do not accept, then as before, will end up with the defect of giving up the existence (accepting the non-existence as cause) or (if you accept) the defect of regress ad infinitum.*

Ghatta-kutti nyaya – This is a worldly logic. A person trying to escape the toll-tax (or import/export tax), travels throughout the night taking a detour to come to other side of the tax post, un-identified. But finds oneself in front of the tax collection booth, in the end / morning.

The defect of accepting the existence for existence and not accepting the existence for the existence were discussed earlier in the sloka 4.

असत्त्वाविशेषात् कारणनियमः स्यादिति चेन्न। सत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्।

Supporting: *If non-existence is accepted as the cause there will be no order in creation.*

Refuting: *No. It is similar in the case of the existence too.*

The logicians counters; if the non-existence is the cause, then since non-existence is quintessentially common in everything, therefore there will be no order in the creation. When we plant a mango tree we may be reaping oranges etc.

But this problem is common for the people accepting the existence as the cause, since the existence is in everything, when we plant mango we may get oranges.

There is a rule, “samau doshe, parihaare api tat sama” (if the defects are same in both, the solution too is same as the other accepts).

सत्त्वेऽस्त्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानं तस्य तज्जातीयस्य वा। त्वत्पक्षे तु असत्त्वाविशेषाद् व्यतिरेकः। परं सोऽप्यनियतः यदा कारणाभावस्तदा कार्याभावावश्यम्भावानभ्युपगमात्। नित्यासतः कारणस्यासत्त्वं एव कदाचित्कार्योत्पादनात्। अन्वयस्तु न क्वचिदपीति चेत्। न तुल्यत्वात्। अन्वयो नास्तीत्यभ्युपगच्छताऽप्यन्वयोपगमात्। अन्वयस्यापि सत्तान्तर्भावने कथितदोषापत्तेः।

Supporting: *When we accept existence as cause, we have proof of direct-concomitance (co-existence) and indirect-concomitance (co-absence) for the object or its class. But it cannot be same for you as there can be co-absence only, since there is no speciality in the non-existence. And that too is not always true. Since, in the absence of the cause, the effect too is absent, is not accepted, because in the absence of the non-existence too, the effect is accepted. But, there is no possibility of direct-concomitance.*

Refuting: *No. The defect is common (for us both). For we (Buddhist) though say there is no direct-concomitance, too accept the same (even for you (logician) who negate should accept the direct-concomitance). And if the existence is accepted in the direct-concomitance too, there will be the aforesaid defects (in the sloka ‘antarbhavitam’).*

Anvaya – co-existence or direct-concomitance – This is explained as “tad sattve tad sattvam” (if it exists then the other exists). The first is the cause and the second is the effect. If the cause clay exists, then the effect pot exists.

Vyatireka – co-absence or indirect-concomitance – This is explained as “tad abhaave tad abhaava” (if it does not exist, the other too does not exist). If the cause does not exist, then the effect too does not exist. If the clay does not exist, then the pot cannot exist too.

Anvaya is accepted by the logician and the Buddhist too. Since though the Buddhist accepts the voidism, he too accepts the Pratibhasika (transient / temporarily temporary)

एतेन -

आशामोदकतृप्ता ये ये चोपार्जितमोदकाः।

रसवीर्यविपाकादि तुल्यं तेषां प्रसज्यते॥ ४॥

इत्यस्यापि बाधकत्वमाशामोदकायते। सत्तान्तर्भवानन्तर्वावाभ्यां प्रत्यादेशात्। आशामोदकादिनाऽपि च रसवीर्यविपाकादिजननात्।

Supporting: (If the cause is non-existent / if the objects are transient too), the taste, nourishment and the joy one experiences through the original existent sweetmeat will be the same as the experience of the imagined (day-dream) sweetmeat.

Refuting: The above logic is a sweetmeat of daydream. The difference between them is through the existent cause, we gain existent effect and through the non-existent cause, we gain non-existent effect. And through the imagined sweetmeat too, we see the taste, nourishment, and joy taking place.

We see that through the transient cause like food etc. the hunger is appeased in the dream. And in the waking state too, we see person bitten by snake escaping miraculously and the person who thinks himself to be bitten by snake dying too. There is an example in shastra about the monkey finding warmth from the gunja (a seed red in colour with a black edge).

There is a meditation of drinking from an empty cup practiced by some people.

तद्सत्कथं कार्यं स्यादिति चेत्। न। सत्तान्तर्भाव्य कार्यत्वोपगमे कारणत्वकार्येऽपि उक्तदोषस्य अनन्तर्भावे वाऽविशेषस्य पूर्ववदावृत्तेः।

Supporting: But how can non-existent be the cause.

Refuting: No. If you accept the effect-ness with existence then as said in the cause-ness we have to face similar problem, (fearing this) if we do not accept the existence then the effect can as well be non-existent.

The logician's idea is, even before the creation there is existence seen in the non-existent pot etc. objects. The problem persists as in sloka 4, the difference being this is in the case of effect.

तस्माद् -

पूर्वसम्बन्धनियमे हेतुत्वे तुल्य एव नौ।

हेतुत्ववहिर्भूतसत्त्वासत्त्वकथा वृथा॥ ५॥

Refuting: Therefore. – We both are in agreement with respect to the cause-ness having definite existence prior to the effect; therefore the discussion on the existence or the non-existence of the cause or effect is useless. – 5 –

Since, we both (the logicians and the Buddhist) accept the same idea with respect to the cause and effect relationship. The “kaarya–niyata–purva–vrttitvam kaaranatva” (the cause is that which has definite existence prior to the effect) and “(kaarana–niyata–uttara–vrttitvam kaaryatva” (the effect is that which has a definite post existence to the cause).

आस्तां प्रतिबन्धिग्रहाऽऽग्रहः। कथं पुनस्सतः कारणत्वमवसेयम्। प्राक्सत्त्वनियमस्य विशेषस्यानभ्युपगमात्।

असत्त्वस्य चाविशेषादिति चेत्। न। इदमस्मान्नियतप्राक् सत् इति बुद्ध्या विशेषात्।

Supporting: Let us keep the Pratibandhi answers away. How can we understand that the non-existent cause. Since, you (Buddhist) do not accept any speciality (of existence) in the cause. And non-existence is common (not-special).

Refuting: No. The knowledge that, “this had a definite existence before this” is the speciality.

Pratibandhi was discussed earlier, the person answering the same way as the questioner, there is an interesting statement with respect to the pratibandhi person in AdvaitaSiddhi “when the bride / grooms father asks the other, what is your “gotra” (lineage) he / she, eager to please the father-in-law, replies, ‘whatever is your lineage is my lineage too’. The marriage between the same lineages is negated in the scriptures as they will be brother and sister in relationship.

भ्रान्तैवं बुद्धगोचरेऽतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्। न। यादृश्या हि धिया त्रिचतुरकक्षावाधाऽनवबोधविषरान्तया वस्तुसत्त्वनिश्चयस्ते तादृशयैव विषयीकृतस्य ममापि कारणतानिश्चयः। केवलं ततः परास्वपि कक्षासु बाधात् पूर्वपूर्वभ्रान्तिसम्भवेन न तवता सत्त्वावधारणं वयं मन्यामह इति विशेषः।

Supporting: Then there will be over pervasion (ativyapti) in erroneous knowledge with this kind of knowledge.

Refuting: No. As you (logician) understand the existence in the knowledge series after the third or the fourth stage, when the non-cognition ceases to exist, similarly we (Buddhist) too through the definitive knowledge clearly understand the cause-ness. The only difference being, there can be negation of the cognition even after the third or fourth state, therefore we do not accept the existence in the earlier stages too.

परदर्शनसिद्धान्तस्य भूरिकक्षाधाविनोऽपि ततः परकक्षाबाध्यमानत्वेन अतथाभावोपगमात्। अन्यथा एकदर्शनपरिशेषः स्यात्।

Refuting: (There is a rule that there will be no negation, if it is non-negated in the third / fourth stage). The philosophy of the others, though is non-negated in the earlier stages is seen to be negated in the latter stages. If we do not accept this, then there will be no manifoldness in philosophy (all the philosophies will be united).

For example, the purva-mimamsaka accepts the sound to be eternal. But this is not accepted by the logician, who through a syllogory “shabda anitya, kaaryatvaat, ghatavat” (sound is non-eternal, as it is an effect, like the pot) establishes its non-eternality.

एतेन - असत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि कथं कस्यचित्पक्षस्य त्रिचतुरकक्षाधावित्वाधावित्वमास्तामित्यपि निरस्तम्।

Refuting: With this – though the non-existence is same (for the real and superimposed), how does some get negated in three or four stages and some not – is also negated.

Since the Buddhist accept the whole world as Pratibhasika (transient / temporarily-temporary), how can there be a difference of the rope or snake and the snake superimposed on the snake. Since both being Pratibhasika, should be negated.

अनेवं बुद्धिविषयतादशायां को विशेष इति चेत्। यदा कदापि तादृशबुद्धिविषयतैव।

Supporting: But what is that which gives this distinction in the knowledge (between the rope/snake and rope-snake)

Refuting: We say, the knowledge of them being so (some being negated in earlier stages and some in later stages).

अन्यथा कथय कथमन्यदातनतादृशबुद्धिविषयतया अन्यदा सत्त्वं स्यात्। तदा सत्त्वमन्यदास्थेन गृह्यत इति चेत्। अन्यकालिकमेव तर्हि तत् तदातनकारणत्वोपयोगीति समानम्। तदेतत् संवृत्तिसत्त्वमिति गीयते।

Supporting: Please tell me, how knowledge gained in a way can present itself differently. (Since there is no knowledge of existence in the present) How can one understand the existence and from what standpoint?

Refuting: It is not necessary that the knowledge gained in the present period or by the person is what is deciding factor. Even the knowledge gained in different period and by different person is deciding factor, which you (logician) too accept. This is what is called as SamvrttiSattva by us (Buddhist).

Here the knowledge is said to be gained of the cause as that which exists prior to the effect. This knowledge is impossible to gain as the object is accepted as Pratibhasika. Therefore, there is nothing which can decide the existence, even a transient one, in the case of Buddhist.

And there is another problem, even if be accepted that there is some way to gain the knowledge of the prior existence, still there is no way to distinguish between what is necessary cause and what is non-cause. For example, to make a pot we see prior existence of clay, wheel, stick to rotate the wheel, and the donkey used for carrying the clay. The donkey though does not fall under the classification of cause, as it is

accepted as "AnyathaSiddha" (non-cause), still there will be the knowledge in this relation with respect to the donkey as the cause.

The Buddhist accepts the knowledge as Samvrtti and the existence of that knowledge as SamvrttiSattva. The knowledge through its existence envelopes (veils) the non-existence; therefore it is called as SamvrttiSattva.

असती सा न विशेषिका। सती सा नेष्टेत्यभिसन्धानेन संवृत्तिरपि सती नैवेति पृच्छन् प्रतिवक्तव्यः। विज्ञानं तावत् व्यवहारोपपादकतया द्वाभ्यामप्यनुमतम्। तस्यापि जिज्ञासायां त्रिचतुरकक्षाविश्रान्तगवेषणस्य यदि सत्तोपपन्ना भविष्यति तदा सत्ता तेनेदमुपपादितं भविष्यति। अथासत्ता तस्य पर्यवसास्यति तदाऽसत्तैव तेनेदमुपपाद्यत इति स्वीकर्तव्यम्। भ्रमविषयेणैव भ्रमे विशिष्टताव्यवहारः।

Supporting: But the non-existence cannot be the deciding factor and the existence is not accepted by you (Buddhist), therefore you (Buddhist) should answer the state of the SamvrttiSattva, whether it exists or not.

Refuting: We both should accept the knowledge as the deciding factor for all the transactions. If there is a desire to know about its state, then in the third or fourth stage of the inquiry process concludes in the establishing the existence we accept the knowledge of existence as the cause for transaction. In case, the inquiry process concludes in the establishing the non-existence we accept the knowledge of non-existence as the cause for transaction. As in the case of the erroneous knowledge being the adjectified knowledge.

In the case of the erroneous knowledge of "this is snake", you (logician) accept the knowledge of the snake as the reason for the transaction similarly the Buddhist too accepts the knowledge of the non-existence to be the cause for the transaction.

अविचार्यैव तावत्तस्य सदसत्त्वं विचार आरब्धव्यः। अन्यथा प्रथममेव मतिकर्दमे कथारम्भणमशक्यमापद्येत। स्वीकृतं च भवताऽपि भविष्यदादिविषये विज्ञाने विशिष्टव्यवहारनिदानत्वमसतो विषयस्य। कारणशक्तेश्च विशेषकमसदेव कार्यम्।

Refuting: Therefore the best thing is to start the inquiry, without inquiry into the existence or the non-existence of the knowledge. If we start picking our brains in the beginning itself, then there can be no dialog possible. You have also accepted the qualified (adjectified) non-existence with respect to the knowledge of the object of the future (and past), since the cause is non-existent, its effect too is non-existent.

The attributes of the cause is seen in the effect too (karna gunaatmakatvaat kaaryasya). Since the cause is accepted as non-existence the effect will be non-existent too.

न च कालान्तरसम्बन्धिनी सत्ता तस्यैकत्र अन्यत्र नान्यदाऽपीति वैधर्म्यमेतयोरपीति वक्तव्यम्। विशिष्टव्यवहारप्रवृत्तिसमये द्वयोरप्यसत्त्वाविशेषात्। प्रयोजननुपयुक्ते काले तस्य स्वरूपतोऽवस्थानं पाटञ्चरलुण्ठिते वेश्मनि यामिकजागरणवृत्तान्तमनुहरति

Supporting: The knowledge of the objects which has existence in a different time period is accepted as the cause by us, but in your (Buddhist) case the object is non-existence at that point too, this is the difference.

Refuting: The time period when its existence is not required, at that point of time accepting its existence is like the policeman keeping vigil, before and after the loot takes place.

तथापि कालान्तरस्थित्या गटादिकं स्वरूपतः विशेषणतश्च व्यवच्छिन्नं तद्विज्ञानेन स्वभाववत्त्वाद् स्वविशेषणत्वेनोपादीयते। न त्वेवमत्यन्ताऽसद् भवितुमर्हति तस्य स्वरूपतो

विशेषणतश्चव्यवच्छिन्नतयाऽनङ्गीकारात् कुत्र स्वभावतो विज्ञानं सम्बन्धि निरूप्येत।

न। उक्तमत्राऽसतोऽपि तदेव स्वरूपं। तस्य नियतस्वरूपस्यैव नियतविशेषणस्यैवासत्त्वात्।

अन्यथाऽतिप्रसङ्गात्। भ्रान्तिविषयेण दत्तोत्तरत्वाच्च इत्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन।

Supporting: Even though we both may accept the non-existence of the objects during the transactions, but objects associated by inherent nature and adjectives with the existence in other periods, and therefore the knowledge by its nature objectifies it. But in your (Buddhist) case since it is non-existence in all three periods it is not possible to be this way. Since you do not accept the objects being associated by inherent nature and adjectives to the existence, how can knowledge be objectified.

Refuting: No. We have said already. The inherent nature of the object is non-existence. Its definitive nature and definitive adjective is non-existence. Otherwise there will be over pervasion (as said earlier in

sloka 4). Since, you (logician) too objectify it in the erroneous knowledge, as said earlier, this much explanation is enough.

संवित्स्वप्राकाशवादः

3. Dialog on the self-efulgence of knowledge

अपरे पुनः चेतसोऽपि शून्यताऽङ्गीकारे मनःप्रत्ययमनासादयन्तः सर्वमिदमसदेव विशिमत्यभिधातुं
सहसैवानुत्सहमाना मन्यन्ते –

Refuting: Again the others (here it is the Yogachara Buddhist, it may also though be Vedanti) who are not happy about accepting the “chitta” (knowledge) as non-existent (void) too, and who don’t enjoy calling the whole world as void think thus.

There are four schools in Buddhists –

1. Sautrantika – the people following the philosophy as explained in the sutras. Accepts both the internal and external.
2. Vaibhashika – the people who follow the commentary called ‘vibhasha’ upon the sutras. Accepts the internal vignana, and the external as momentary.
3. Yogachara – the people who accept the whole creation as “vignana” (knowledge). Accepts both within and without as momentary.
4. Madhyamika – the people who accept the whole creation as void. Accepts both within and without as void.

They explain these four schools in sync with the basic teaching of Buddha “sarvam dukkham dukkham, sarvam kshanikam kshanikam, sarvam svalakshanam svalakshanam, and sarvam shunyam shunyam” (everything is sorrow, everything is momentary, everything is knowledge and everything is void).

Therefore the yogachara accepts the existence of knowledge (vignana) for the existence of the world and this knowledge is self-efulgent therefore there is no need for another valid proof.

विज्ञानं तावत् स्वप्रकाशं स्वत एव सिद्धस्वरूपम्। न खलु विज्ञाने सति जिज्ञासोरपि कस्यचित् जानामि न वेति संशयः न जानामीति वा विपर्ययः व्यतिरेकप्रमा वा।

Refuting: The knowledge is established in itself. Since, when the knowledge takes place for the one who desires to know, there is no doubt ‘do i know it or not’ or erroneous knowledge ‘I do not know it this way’ or the absence of knowledge ‘I do not know’.

Though the refuter does not accept the ‘jignasu’ (one who desires to know) since the knowledge takes place by itself, there can be no desire. But the desire to know can be due to either doubt for the opponent and the necessity of explaining for the defendant.

तेन जिज्ञासितस्य अतत्त्वज्ञानव्यतिरेकप्रमाणामभावसमुदायः स्वव्यापकं जिज्ञासितस्य प्रमितत्वमानयति। अन्यथा हि जिज्ञासितप्रमितत्वव्यतिरेकव्यापकं जिज्ञासितव्यतिरेकोल्लेखि ज्ञानमविघ्नितजिज्ञासस्य स्यात्। अतः सर्वजनस्वात्मसंवेदनसिद्धमेवास्य बोधस्य स्वरूपम्।

Refuting: Therefore, “vyapaka” (Pervader) of the absence of the group of doubt, erroneous knowledge, and absence of knowledge in the desired object of knowledge will generate the inference regarding it. Otherwise (if the knowledge is not objectified), the pervader of the knowledge of the desired which objectifies the absence of the knowledge of the desired object, the doubt etc. will take place. Therefore, the nature of the knowledge is established through experience by everyone.

Vyapaka – Pervader – “adhika desha vrttitva” (existing in greater place). And Vyapya – Pervaded – “nyuna desha vrttitva” (existing in lesser place). In the famous example of fire and smoke, fire is vyapaka and smoke is vyapya. Though there may be a doubt regarding this, we should understand this properly. Even though the smoke does not exist, the fire exists and therefore the fire has greater existence.

This vyapya-vyapaka is to be understood in contrary in the case of absence. The vyapya is fire absence and the vyapaka is smoke absence.

व्यवसायस्य अनुव्यवसायनियमान्न तत्र संशयादिरिति चेन्न। यत्रैवानुव्यवसाये ज्ञेयता नोपेया तत्र जिज्ञासायामात्मधर्मिकं तत्संशयमारभ्य व्यवसायविषयपर्यन्तं संशयाक्रान्तेर्दुष्परिहारत्वात्।

विषयिसद्भावसंशये तद्विषयेऽपि संशयस्य संभवात्। एवं त्रिचतुरसंवेदनकक्षाज्ञानध्रौवनियमाभ्युपगमेऽपीति।

Supporting: But there can be no doubt in the knowledge since it is followed by a second knowledge.

Refuting: No. If in the second knowledge there is no knowledge-ness, then there will be doubt etc. about the knowledge of the desired object, which will inevitably lead to the doubt about the first knowledge. If there is a doubt about the knowledge then there is definite possibility of the doubt about the object too. This is same even if the knowledge is accepted to be gained in the third or fourth stage.

The logicians accept "vyavasaya gnana" (definitive knowledge) and following it the "anuvyavasaya gnana" (second knowledge (anu means following)). The knowledge "this is pot" is followed by "I know pot". This second knowledge is 'anuvyavasaya'.

If we want to avoid accepting "svaprakasha" (self-effulgence) of the knowledge, accept the first knowledge gets valid by the second and the second gets valid by the first, we end up in the defect of interdependence (atma-aashraya dosha). Therefore, if we accept the series of knowledge then again there will be no end to this series, because there will be no end for this validating, as whenever we stop, we should accept that knowledge as self-effulgent.

To avoid all this complication, if we accept the knowledge is derived, in the third or fourth stage as seen in the second chapter. Then again, the final knowledge to be valid should be accepted as self-effulgent, otherwise the whole series will be devoid of validity.

स्वप्राकाशे तु मानमेयभावव्यवस्थाया अभावादेव तदश्रया दोषाः निरवकाशाः। अन्यथा तु बोधस्वरूपमेव न सिद्धयेत् यदि हि विज्ञानं परतः सिद्धयेत् तदाऽनवस्था स्यात्।

Refuting: But, in the case of accepting the knowledge as self-effulgent; since there is absence of the duality of valid means of right knowledge and the object (subject – object relation), there is no possibility for this doubt. Otherwise (in duality) there will be no knowledge. And if the knowledge is validated by a different knowledge then there will be regress ad infinitum.

न च वाच्यम् - अवश्यवेद्यतावित्तेर्नाभ्युपेयते स्वार्थव्यवहारस्तु स्वरूपसत्तया प्रसूयते इति क्वानवस्थेति।

यतस्तस्यां प्रमाणानुपन्यासे स्वरूपसत्ताऽपि कुतः यया व्यवहारोपपत्तिः। को ब्रूते सति सा वित्तिः असत्येव न कुतः।

Supporting: We do not accept the necessity to have the knowledge of the knowledge. And its transaction (knowledge) takes place due to its inherent existence; therefore there is no place for regress ad infinitum.

Refuting: Should not say so. Since if it is not established through valid proof, how can there be inherent existence through which the transaction can take place. Who is to validate that knowledge is of the nature of existence and why not it be non-existence.

The logician tries to escape the regression by accepting the knowledge getting validated by the transactions itself. But then it should have a valid proof, because without it there can be no definite existence. And if it is accepted through the power of transaction, as the Buddhist accept the objects non-existence, why should it not be of the nature of non-existence, since it is accepted without a valid proof.

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सामान्यतो वित्तेस्तथात्वविधावपेक्षितसिद्ध्या यत्र विशेषरूपायां प्रमाणाऽप्रवृत्तिः तदा तत्र सत्त्वसाधनासत्त्वेऽपि

जिज्ञासायां सत्यां पश्चाद् व्यवहारसत्तैव वा अन्यद् वा प्रमाणमस्त्येवेति चेन्न । तस्यापि कथं सत्त्वमित्यनवस्था वा

स्यात् शेषासिद्ध्या सर्वासिद्धिर्वा प्रसज्येतेत्यर्थाऽसिद्धिपर्यन्तस्य व्यसनस्य दुरुत्तरत्वात् । सेयम् अप्रतक्षोपलम्भस्य

नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिद्धयतीति ।

Supporting: Through the general (common) knowledge though the desired is established when there is no special validity gained, then when there is desire to know its validity arises the special transaction then

the knowledge is established by the transactions itself, or some other knowledge takes place will be the validity.

Refuting: No. When the question is posed about its existence then we will end up in regress ad infinitum. If there is no other knowledge accepted, then since the previous knowledge itself is not valid, the rest before will be non-valid too thus making everything till the object of knowledge non-valid. This is explained (by Buddhist Acharya Dharmakeerti) 'if one does not accept the perception of the knowledge then the object of knowledge cannot be established'.

The general knowledge of the object is 'this is pot' or 'i know pot' and the special knowledge with regard to it is 'whose is it' etc.

When the knowledge is accepted to be based on the experience, then when the doubt about its existence is raised, since it is knowledge it will definitely be dependent upon knowledge too. Since the self-fulgence of knowledge is not accepted.

घटसत्तां हि व्यवहरता प्रामाणिकेन तत्र प्रमाणसद्भावो वाच्यः । यदि प्रमाणमनुपन्यस्य सऽङ्गीक्रियते तदा

वैपरीत्यमेव वा किं न स्यात् । ततश्च घटसत्तायां प्रमाणसत्ता दर्शनीया । तथा प्रमाणसत्ताऽपि

तत्प्रमाणसत्तामन्तरेण प्रामाणिकस्य नाङ्गीकारार्हा । सर्वप्रमाणसत्तनिवृत्तेर्वस्तुसत्तानिवृत्तिनियतत्वात् । अन्यथा

सप्तमरसादेरप्यापत्तेरिति व्यक्तमनवस्थादौस्थ्यमस्वप्रकाशवादिनः स्यात् । यदि विनैव प्रमाणसत्तां परोऽङ्गीकारयेत्

तदा घटसत्तामपि तथैवाङ्गीकारयातामिति घटेऽपि वृथा प्रमाणोपन्यासः ।

Refuting: The people who accept the validity of the transaction of the existence of pot etc. should explain the validity if the existence is accepted without giving any valid proof, then why should it not be otherwise (non-existence). Therefore the validity for the existence of the pot etc. should be said. And then, for the one who accepts the validity, this validity (for the existence) too cannot be valid without accepting a different validity. Since if there is no validity established the existence of the object will be non-valid (cease too). Otherwise (if the existence is accepted without a validation) there will be a problem of accepting seventh taste too. The people who do not accept the self-fulgence are definitely staring at the regression ad infinitum. If one (logician) is interested in accepting the validity without validity, then it is better to accept the existence of the pot etc. without validity too, since it is useless to explain a valid proof.

The logicians accept six tastes sweet, sour, bitter, spicy (astringent), salty and pungent. If we accept things without validity, we may as well accept another taste. This does not end here, the basic rule for realization in logic is to be able to differentiate / classify the different objects as per the accepted classification. This basic rule will be shaken, because instead of the stipulated seven or nine substances, we may start to accept one or more.

अथ नाव्यवधानलघुवित्तितद्विधाराऽभ्युपगम्यते किं नाम कदाचित् कुतश्चित् काचित् वित्तिः प्रतीयत इति सर्वा

वित्तिः प्रमाणसिद्धिवेत्यभ्युपेयत इति चेन्न । स्यादप्येवं यदि घट इति घटं जानामीत्यतोऽधिका

घटवित्तितद्विधाराया विषयभावेन प्रविष्टया तादृग्विशयशतम्भारमन्थरा वित्तिरस्मादादेरुत्पद्यमानाऽनुभूयते ।

Supporting: The knowledge which takes place is without any gap and there is no series accepted for this knowledge. Then what is it, sometime, somehow some knowledge takes place therefore the knowledge is accepted to be established through a valid means only.

Refuting: No. This is possible if the knowledge series is experienced in which there is knowledge, beyond the accepted knowledge of 'This is pot' and 'I know the pot'.

यास्मदादिविलक्षणजन्मनि सा सम्भाव्यते तदाऽपि यस्या चित्तेस्तावद्विषयगर्भिता धीर्विषयः साऽप्यन्यथा

क्याविदुल्लेख्येत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावश्च अनिमोक्षापत्तिश्च ।

Supporting: If it be said that, it is possible for the highly accomplished people (yogi) (knowledge with a gap and slow due to it being loaded with objects of the form knowledge).

Refuting: No. There is no validity (valid proof), for whomever the knowledge takes place that is loaded with objects of the form of knowledge is also dependent upon a different knowledge. If it is accepted to be valid through another yogi there will regress ad infinitum and there will be absence of realization for him.

The logician tries to escape the trouble of regression by using the trump card he always uses, when discussing the things beyond human grasp, the perception of the exalted (yogi). When he is asked for the proof of the creation from the atom to di-atom and tri-atom etc. he says that it is perceived only by the yogis.

If one is not able to validate his own knowledge then there can be no desire for realization.

न हि स्वमन्तर्भाव्य कयाचिद् धिया स प्रवाहो ग्राह्यः तथा सति स्वप्रकाशतासिद्धेः । अत एवान्योन्यविषयता
निरस्ता स्वविषयकान्योन्यग्रहे स्वग्रहापत्तेः ।

Supporting: If we (logician) say, we accept the knowledge that validates the knowledge series also validates one's own knowledge.

Refuting: No. Then since you accept the knowledge validating itself, you will be accepting self-fulfillment. For this very reason we negate the knowledge validating itself and the penultimate knowledge, since there will be defect of interdependence and acceptance of self-fulfillment too.

न च पुरुषान्तरेण सा प्रमास्यते न तु तदभाव इति प्रमा तेऽस्ति तदर्थमपि प्रमाणान्तरसद्भावपरम्परापत्तेः ।

Supporting: It (the final knowledge) is accepted to be validated by another person and not its absence therefore there is no absence of the final knowledge (therefore the knowledge series is not negated as non-valid),

Refuting: You should produce validity for that too, and then the regress ad infinitum remains as before.

न चैवं घटसामग्रीतत्सामग्रीगवेषणेऽप्यनवस्था स्यात् वैषम्यात् । यदि हि घटसामग्रीतत्सामग्रीधारा कुत्रचित्
विच्छिद्येत तदा घटः सदातनः स्यादित्यर्थापत्त्यैव घटः सामग्रीपरम्पराविच्छेदरहित एव प्रमीयते ।

Supporting: Then there will be regress ad infinitum in the case of the inquiry into the material cause of pot and its material cause.

Refuting: No, this is different. If the inquiry series of the cause of the pot and its cause gets broken, then (since remains causeless) the pot will become eternal. Therefore through this "Arthapatti" (postulation) we understand the inquiry series of the cause for pot as unbroken.

The idea behind the question is, since the Buddhist does not accept the object to be produced of an external cause, but because of its thought imprints. As the logician faces the regress ad infinitum, so too, the Buddhist will face it when we inquire upon the cause for pot.

The pot will become eternal if there is no cause established. Since the famous rule of the logician is "yad krtakam tab anitya" (that which is caused is non-eternal), therefore, if we are not able to establish the cause for the pot then it has to be accepted as eternal.

Arthapatti is a special Pramaana accepted by the Vedanti, as it is in Bhatta Purva Mimamsa. This is also called anyatha-aapatti. There are two types of postulation -

1. Drshta-arthapatti – the postulation by seeing. We see person Mr.X to be strong and healthy and does not eat in the day, therefore we postulate he eats in the night.
2. Shruta-arthapatti – the postulation by hearing. We hear from the wife, the husband does not exist, seeing the auspicious pointers we understand he is not in the house but elsewhere.

न चैवं घटसामग्रीतत्सामग्रीगवेषणेऽप्यनवस्था स्यात् वैषम्यात् । यदि हि घटसामग्रीतत्सामग्रीधारा कुत्रचित्
विच्छिद्येत तदा घटः सदातनः स्यादित्यर्थापत्त्यैव घटः सामग्रीपरम्पराविच्छेदरहित एव प्रमीयते । आयदि तु

ज्ञानेऽप्येवं स्यात् तदा स्वस्य प्रवेशात् स्वप्रकाशापत्तिः अप्रवेशादनवस्था अवेदने श्वासिद्ध्या सर्वासिद्धिरिति
व्यसनं दुरुत्तरमेव । ये च मानमेयाश्रयादोषाः कीर्तनीयाः तेऽपि प्रसज्येरन् ।

Supporting: If we accept the knowledge to be validated in the same way.

Refuting: No. Since there is a possibility of accepting the self-effulgence (there can be no postulation). If the postulation is not accepted, then it will lead to regress ad infinitum. If we accept the series to be broken, then as the last knowledge the previous ones too will become invalid. And all the defects pertaining to the valid proof and object of knowledge will be there too.

From here only the Vedanti is accepted as the refuter.

न च तैदोषैर्नास्त्येव ज्ञानमित्यास्थेयम् । स्वतः सर्वसिद्धस्य दुरुपह्वत्वात् । स्वप्रकाशाङ्गीकारादेव चाऽनुभवस्य

सर्वदोषहानेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । प्रकाशात्मतामात्रस्यैव स्वतःसिद्धिसम्भवे जडात्मनां धर्माणां केषामपि

तदन्तर्भावानुपपत्तिः ।

Supporting: Due to the defects said, why not accept the absence of knowledge.

Refuting: No. The knowledge which is self evident for everyone cannot be negated. And we will be explaining later (in sloka 25), by accepting self-effulgence of knowledge all the defects are negated. And since only the knowledge which is self-effulgent, no inert attributes can associate with it.

Knowledge is accepted as it is the inherent nature of the Self "pragnanam brahma" (the knowledge is Self). The Buddhist may ask, if all the other can be negated, as they are associated with the defects, why not negate the knowledge be negated too? No. Negation of the negator is impossible, the scriptures too proclaim "ne ho drshter viparilopo vidyate" (the seer cannot be negated).

What is this knowledge that is self-effulgent? The knowledge that negates the ignorance. Though the Self is accepted to be of the nature of knowledge, it cannot negate the ignorance, as it is the substratum of the ignorance. The knowledge that is associated with the thought function is the negator of the ignorance.

अत एव धर्मोपग्रहप्रवर्तिष्णुवाग्व्यवहाराविषयत्वम् । कालानवच्छेदमादाय च नित्यत्वोपचारः । देशानवच्छेदमादाय

विभुत्वव्यपदेशः । प्रकारावच्छेदविरहनिबन्धनश्च सर्वात्मत्वाऽद्वैतादिव्यवहारः ।

Now when the scriptures explain Brahman it declares "satyam gnanam anantam brahma: (the Self is Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss), therefore the negation of the attributes is not possible, as the scriptures itself declare it with the attributes. To refute this doubt-

Refuting: For this is reason; this Self is not the object of the speech and mind which depend upon the transaction based on the attributes. Taking into consideration that it is not limited by time the Self is termed as eternal. Considering it being not limited by space the Self is described as all-pervading. Considering the absence of the attributes (adjectives / qualities) the Self is explained as the Self of all, non-dual etc.

Any thought function or the speech depends upon the attribute. This is why the scriptures categorically deny the Self being the object of the mind and speech "mano vaacam agocaram" (that which is not grasped by the mind and speech), "yato vaaco nivartante apraapya manasaa saha" (from where the speech returns without grasping it, along with the mind), "na manasaa manute" (it cannot be understood by the mind" etc.

The time and space are two sides of the same coin. The scriptures declare the creation of space "atmana aakasha sambhuta" (from the Self the ether came into existence). Now, this creation is possible only due to the association of ignorance with the Self.

सौगतप्राभाकरादिवद् भावे नैयायिकवच्च अभावे अभावानतिरेकस्वीकारादेव चाद्वैताऽव्याघातः । भ्रमविषयनिषेधवच्च

प्रतियोगिनः सर्वथैवासिद्ध्याऽपि न काचित् क्षतिः ।

Refuting: The absence is accepted to be non-different from the substratum like the Buddhist, mimamsaka (Prabhakara system) etc. in the existence and like the logicians in the absence, therefore there is no

contradiction with the Self being non-dual. Like in the negation of the erroneous knowledge, though the object of absence does not have existence, still there is no trouble.

The Buddhist and the Prabhaakara system of mimamsa (the other system being Bhatta school, of Sri Kumarila Bhatta) accept like the vedantins the absence to be not different from the substratum. The logicians though do not accept this with respect to the existence; still accept the same with reference to the absence. For example, for us the absence of pot on the ground is not different from the ground (substratum). The logicians accept the absence of pot as not different from the absence of cloth.

But, if it be asked, the negation of existence of something pre-supposes the existence of that object elsewhere; therefore, the duality is real. But, we vedantins do not accept the necessity of the existence for it being the object of negation, the knowledge of its existence is good enough.

तदेतत्तु श्रुत्या प्रमाणेनोपलक्षणन्यायात् तात्पर्यतः प्रकाश्यते । तेन परमार्थतोऽभिधानाभिधेयवाविरहे तात्पर्यतः

श्रुतिस्तस्मिन्नविद्यादशायां पराभ्युपगमरीत्या प्रमाणमित्युच्यते । वस्तुतस्तु स्वात्मसिद्धमेव चिद्रूपम् ।

Refuting: This is what is explained by the scriptures as its purport, through the logic of pointer / reference (upalakshana nyaya). Therefore, though in reality there is no word-meaning relationship the scriptures for the people in the state of our ignorance, accept the Vedas as the ultimate means of valid proof from the standpoint of others. In reality the Self is self-evident.

The logic of pointer - Since there is no word and meaning relationship the Self cannot be explained through the words. Since there is no eligibility criteria, it cannot be explained through the statements. These two, through the words and the statements, are the only means to explain it through speech, the Self cannot be explained. Then the whole of scriptures explaining the Self will be redundant, as the others (especially the mimamsaka) would like us to believe. Therefore, the scriptures use the logic of pointer. When we point out to the house with a crow (kaakavad grham), the existence of the crow upon reaching is not a condition, but it serves the purpose of a pointer. Though the crow may not be there, it leaves the pointer which aids in us understanding the house. Or, like the tree, its branches, the moon etc. are used to point out to a star or planet in the night sky. Similarly the scriptures use reference points to explain the Self, where the reference points have no importance. This giving-up of the referrals is called as "bhaaga-tyaaga" or "jahad-ajahad lakshana" (leaving partially).

Since the non-dualists do not accept anything other than the Self as real. And the scriptures too have their existence only in the state of ignorance, are accepted to be non-real. The scriptures declare "yatra vedaa avedaa bhavanti" (where the scriptures become non-scriptures (non-real)).

The Self is accepted as self-evident which does not depend upon any other means for being established. The scriptures declare "yad saakshaat aparokshaat brahma" (which is directly self-experiential (evident)).

From here the logician from the standpoint of grammarian raises the doubts, to be negated by the Vedantin.

ननु च स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्येत्यनुपपन्नमिदम् क्रियाकर्मभावस्य भेदव्यतिरेकेणानुपपत्तेः । कार्या क्रिया हि कर्मणो भवति । कर्म च कारणं क्रियायाः । न च स्वेनैव स्वनिष्पादनं शक्यम् । पूर्वपरवावविशेषस हेतुहेतुमद्भावरूपत्वात् ।

न च तस्मादेव तदेव पूर्वमपरं च सम्भवति । तदनवच्छिन्नकालविशेषस्य तत्पूर्वशब्दार्थत्वात् । तदा च तस्य

सद्भावस्वीकारे स एव कालस्तदवच्छिन्नः तदनवच्छिन्नश्चेति विरोधात् ।

Supporting: But saying, the knowledge is self-fulgent, is illogical. Since the action-activity state is impossible without accepting the duality. The effect of the action is activity, and the cause of the activity is the action (here by action we mean the Accusative). It is not possible to accept, it was created by itself (it came into existence from itself). The cause-effect depends upon the prior and post existence. And one and the same cannot be prior and post in oneself. The time period not associated with the current is termed as prior. And if the existence of effect is accepted in that period. Then it is illogical to accept the association and non-association of that period with the effect.

The different levels in a transaction is called as "karaka" in Sanskrit. We have Kartaa Kaaraka - Nominative (first case), Karma Kaaraka - Accusative (second case), Karana Kaaraka - Instrumental (third case), Sampradaana Kaaraka - Dative (fourth case), Apaadaana Kaaraka - Ablative (fifth case) and Adhikarana

Kaaraka - Locative (seventh case). The sixth case that is Genitive is based in relation, therefore is not accepted as karaka.

मैवम् । क्रियायाः कर्मजन्यतानियमानङ्गीकारात् । सर्वथैव अनागतविषयविज्ञाने तदसम्भवात् । क्वचिज्जनकतामादाय च कर्मणि कारकत्वव्यपदेशात् । करणव्यापारविषयत्वाद् वा परसमवेतक्रियाफलभागित्वाद्वा विनापि क्रियाजनकत्वेन कर्मव्यवहारोपपत्तेः ।

Refuting: Not so. The activity is not accepted to be a product of action. Since, it is impossible with respect to the knowledge of the future objects. And accepting some activity to be cause we explain the level of transaction (karaka) in the action. The transaction of action as the cause of the activity is possible without accepting the definitions for karma as "karana-vyaapaara-vishayatvaat" (it being the object of transaction for the instrument) or "para-samaveta-kriyaa-phala-bhaagitvaat" (being associated with the result of activity associated with the other).

क्रियाकर्मभावखण्डनम्

4. Refuting the activity-action relationship

From here the definition for the accusative is discussed in this topic, by karma we mean the accusative case, which is given the name of karma karaka by the grammarians. This is not to be confused with the other actions or the karma as discussed by the mimamsakas.

किञ्च तत्कर्मत्वं यत् स्वं प्रति विरुद्धयते । परसमवेतक्रियाफलभागित्वमिति चेत् । न । अपादानस्यापि व्याप्तेः ।

अपादानं कर्मापीति चेत् । न । वृक्षात्पतति पर्णम् इतिवत् वृक्षं पर्णं पतति इत्यपि स्यात् ।

Refuting: But, what is this action (karma - accusative) that is contradictory to itself?

Supporting: "para-samaveta-kriyaa-phala-bhaagitvaat" (being associated with the result of activity associated with the other).

Refuting: No. Then it will also over-pervade in Ablative too.

Supporting: If Ablative too is accepted as karma.

Refuting: No. Then instead if "vrkshaat parnam patati" (from the tree the leaf falls) it will be "vrksham parnam patati" (the tree, the leaf falls).

Karma is defined as "kartru ipsitatamam karma" (that which is most desired by the doer through the action). For example, "raama graamam gacchaati" (rama goes to the village) – graamam – village is the accusative case. The result of the activity of going is reaching the village, therefore since the activity is associated with it, the village is in the second case (accusative).

In the case of Ablative, "vrkshaat parnam patati" (from the tree, the leaf falls).the tree to be associated with the falling of the leaf, therefore the tree should also be said in second case.

विवक्षातः कारकाणि भवन्तीति तदविवक्षया नैवमिति चेत् । न । वस्तुतः सतस्ताद्रूप्यस्य यदि विवक्षा स्यात्तदा

तदपि स्यात् । अपादानस्य कर्मत्वं न विवक्ष्यत इति शाब्दिकसम्प्रदायोऽयमिति चेत् । तर्हि तत्र

निवृत्तसत्त्वकर्मव्यवहारेऽपि स्वकृतकर्मलक्षणानुरोधेन कर्मत्वमभ्युपच्छता वस्तुमात्रं कर्मेत्यपि लक्षणं सावकाशितं

स्यात् । कथञ्च लोकोत्तरप्रज्ञेन निवृत्तसर्वकर्मव्यवहारेऽपि स्वकृतकर्मत्वमस्तीत्यधिगतम् ।

Supporting: There is a rule "vivakshaata kaarakaani bhavanti" (the levels of transaction is dependent upon one's desire) and since there is no such desire here (in ablative) it is not said so (in accusative).

Refuting: No. If it is so, then if someone so desires (to put it in ablative) then it will be so.

Supporting: But the Accusative (apaadaana) is not accepted as karaka (levels of transaction), according to the tradition of the grammarians.

Refuting: No. Then for one who accepts the action (karma) in a place where there is no possibility, it is simple to accept the object itself as action. And that can be supported with the rhetoric of tradition. Not just that, for one who is smart beyond the grasp of the world, should also tell how you (logician) accepted the case of accusative (second case) in the place of Ablative (fifth case), which is never possible.

If deciding the case ending is done due to desire, then the place where it becomes fifth case (accusative) and the same fifth case turning into second case (ablative) should be said.

If one gives an excuse of the rule of tradition, than the same rule can be used anywhere and doing anything, even illogical.

Now since the first definition is negated, because it over-pervades the fifth case. The logician to remove it from being karma, tries to do a definition removing it.

Apaadaanetarad idrsham karma.....

Supporting: If it be said, "apaadaana-itarad-para-samaveta-kriyaa-phala-bhaagitvaat" (that which is different from the ablative and being associated with the result of activity associated with the other)

Refuting: No. Even here, in the place "nadi vardate" (the river is swelling) the result will be associated with the bank which has no relation here. And it (the verb) will become transitive verb too.

There are two types of root words – sakarmaka and akarmaka (roughly transitive and intransitive). The root like "gamlru gatau" (gam - to go) is of the former type, there is action associated with the root. But some root words like "shing svapne" (shin – to sleep) or the case here "vrddhi" (to grow) does not have action associated; we cannot do the sleeping, or the growth. The verbal declension of root word, is based on it being sakarmaka or akarmaka, too.

Supporting: Instead of "apaadaana itarad" (other than the ablative) if it be said "kriya-naashaka" (destroyer of the activity).

Refuting: No. Still the defect said earlier stays as it is. And in the case of the "vrddhi" accepted as destruction, it will be impossible too. And in "vrksham tyajati" (gives-up the tree), the separation (to give-up) is not destroyer of karma, therefore will not become accusative, too.

The same defects will stay because, in the case of the result gained through the association of the water and the bank is of the form of destruction of the growth, therefore, the bank that is associated to that will still be declared in second case, as "nadi tiram vardate" (the river, the bank grows).

In the case of "vrddhi" accepted as destruction – In the place the word "vrddhi" is derived from the root word "vardha cchedana-purnayo" (vardha – to fell and to fill) instead of "varshane" (to grow), like "vrksham vardhate vardhaki" (the carpenter fells the tree), here the felling is not destroyer of the activity, therefore will not be accusative case.

Atmaanam jaanaami....

Refuting: In the case of "atmaanam jaanaami" (i know my Self), since there is no "para" (other), to associate the result, it will not be accusative.

Supporting: Even there, with respect to the embodiment (limiting adjuncts) there can be the other associated with the result. As the Self is accepted to be, the one associated with the doer-ship and enjoyer-ship.

Refuting: It may be so, if the Self is dual. Since the knower's of the Truth, who know the un-embodied Self; do not accept the knowledge as the attribute of the Self. And, in the statements like "pacyate phalam svayameva" (the fruit fructifies by itself), what will happen to the ablative.

The knower's of the Truth according to this is only the Vedantin, Though here the author declares it from the viewpoint of the other realized, later on in the text, declares himself as knower, as was said in the invocation verse, with "anu-maya-api" (even by me, following the scriptural teaching).

In the statement "pacyate phalam svayameva" the word "phalam" is declined in second case, even though there is no duality of doer and done, then the correct statements like this will become erratic.

Sarvagnamishwaram....

Refuting: And, for the people (logician) who accept the Iswara (God) to be all-knowing, and accept the knowledge of that Iswara as eternal (like the desire and activity), since there is no destruction of the result accepted the definition will not fit in Him. Therefore, it (karma) should be accepted as one of the

epistemological term accepted by the grammarians to establish the word. And thus, there is no need to use in doing inquiry into it.

The logicians accept the Iswara endowed with eternal knowledge, eternal desire, and eternal action (nitya gnanavan icchaavan kriyavaan ca).

In grammar there are terms, which have no resemblance other than the word-form, which are used to define things. For example, the names nadi, guna or vrddhi will mean in normal language use river, characteristic and growth/interest respectively. But the same words in Sanskrit grammar mean the feminine word ending in E or U; the alphabets a, ae and o and the alphabets aa, Ai and au respectively according to the sutras “yu stryaakhyo nadi”, “adeng guna” and “vrddhiraadaic” in that order. These are used to find a common ground for simplifying the rules for the grammar for understanding the formation of the words and therefore grammar dependent. Similarly, the refuter says, the word karma can also be accepted without any orientation or definition.

Offended by this the logician tries a different route to define the accusative case.
Karanavyaaparavishaya...

Supporting: *The object of the transaction for the Instrumental case is Accusative.*

Refuting: *No. In the statement “raamena hastena sharena hato vali” (By the hand of raama, by the arrow vali was killed). Here since the arrow is the object of transaction of the instrument hand, it should be in Accusative, which will be wrong.*

Refuting: *And not just that. The transaction of accusative (action) can take place with an attribute which is common to all, “kriyaa-janakatve sati vyaapaara-uddeshyatva” (being the producer of activity, that which is the reason for the transaction), without accepting any definition. Will explain the rest in Ishwara-Abhisandhi, under the topic of Sva-prakasha-vada (the argument of self-effulgence).*

Here the author gives an escape route for accepting the karma, by explaining the common attribute without accepting a definition.

But here the logician may ask, since the definition of “lakshana” (definition) is “asaadharana dharma” (special attribute), for example the common characteristic of cow is its cow-ness which is accepted as a lakshana. It is easy to accept this dharma itself as lakshana, if it is acceptable to refuter, and therefore cannot be refuted. Refuter: Not so. The lakshana is one which does not have the defects of “ati-vyapti” (over-pervade), “avyapti” (under-pervade) and “asambhava” (completely off-tangent).

Ishwara-abhisandhi – this is another famous text by the same author. He refers to it in different places in different tense (here in future tense, another place in past tense) in this text. Therefore, many are of the opinion that this is written parallel to this text. But, knowing the authors greatness, it may not be surprise if he has it all in his head, and just has to pen it down, therefore, he uses different tenses.

विषयविषयिभावखण्डनम्

5. Refuting the Subject-Object Relationship

Supporting: *But, the subject-object relationship is impossible in the case of non-duality. Being a Subject means association with the objects. And the relationship cannot exist without the duality. Where the knowledge of the relation is there the knowledge of relationship is too, but the contrary (indirect concomitance) is not possible as it is seen so (where there is no knowledge of relation (in the non-duality) there is no knowledge of relationship).*

Refuting: *No. The subject-object relation is not different from the inherent nature of the object in relation. If it be accepted so (to be different), in the end the relation should have to be accepted as the inherent nature of the object in relation, for the fear of regression ad infinitum. If it is so, then it should be accepted, the knowledge of the subject-object relationship can take place should be accepted as to be not different from the nature of the relation, and is gained without accepting the duality of the objects in relation. Since the nature of the relation of inherent nature is different from the other relations. Therefore, the subject-object relationship is possible even without accepting the duality if the object in relation. And its knowledge too will be without accepting the duality of the knowledge of the object in relation. If so, what is the contradiction?*

Earlier the relationship of the activity-action was refuted. Now, the impossibility of the subject-object relationship is condemned.

Since the general idea is, the subject is that which has object in it. The subject has subjectivity or subject-ness (vishyibhaava or vishiyitaa) and the object has objectivity or object-ness (vishyabhaava or vishayitaa). Though we see, the subject becomes an object or an object becoming the subject, like when the 'i' becomes 'me' it becomes an object etc.

Nacaivam.

Supporting: *As the pot and its knowledge is in the subject-object relationship, if there is even an iota of duality in the subject-object relationship in the knowledge of self-effulgence, then it gets negated in a place.*

Refuting: *The pot and its knowledge superimposed on the "avidya" (ignorance) is definitely negated. Therefore the subject-object relationship too is negated. But in the ultimate reality (absolute reality) that is self-effulgent its (subject-object relationship) too is absolute reality. Therefore, even if there is no common attribute, there is no defect.*

In Vedanta everything is accepted to be superimposed / imagined in the self due to the ignorance.

Athavaa svaatmanaa...

Refuting: *Or. The meaning of self-effulgence is not activity-action relationship or the subject-object relationship accepted in the self (itself). As it is accepted by you (logician), the pot etc. gains existence due to the relation with existence, and though the existence is of the form of existence there is no defect of self-dependence accepted in it. Similarly the knowledge is self-established in itself too.*

As explained in the topic discussing the existence, the pot etc. gains existence due to its association with existence. And when the question of the existence of the existence arises, we have to accept the existence of existence in it without accepting the defect of self-dependence; otherwise we have to accept the cause for existence a non-existence which will make the creation void.

Athavaa bahuvrihi samase

Refuting: *Or. As in the tad-guna-samvignana bahuvrihi compound the primary word meaning is gained along with the secondary word used in the compound word. Similarly, only after gaining the Self that is though not an object of the knowledge, involves one in the transaction of the world (object). This was explained from the standpoint of self-effulgence accepted by Guru (prabhakara mimamsa), accepting the objects as real and not from the standpoint of self-effulgence accepted by Vedanta, since there are no objects (objects are not real). But there is a common ground (similarity), as the bahuvrihi accepts the words 'kuta' ect that are not its object, similarly the knowledge too in the state of ignorance pushes in the transaction of Self, that is not its object.*

Among many "samaasa" (compound word) in Sanskrit there is one calle bahuvrihi. The name is also a bahuvri itself, "bahu vrihi annam yasya" (one who has got lot of food). This is explained by the Panini sutra "anekam-anyapadaarthe" (many words (secondary) are used for the sake of the other primary meaning).

This is of two types 1. Tad-guna-samvignana and 2. Atad-guna-vignana.

1. Tad-guna-vignana - where the secondary meaning also is taken into account along with the primary meaning, when the meaning of the compound word is derived. For example, when we say "pita-ambaram aanaya / bhajasva" (bring / worship the yell dressed), what we mean is Lord Sri Krishna. Here the yellow dress is also taken into account along with Sri Krishna.
2. Atad-guna-vignana – where the primary meaning alone is derived, and the secondary meaning has no use further than denoting. For example, "drshta-saagaram aanaya" (bring the man who has seen the ocean). Here the man is brought and not the ocean or his current sight of ocean is expected.

In the bahuvrihi compound the Panini sutra "gang-kutaadibhyo agniNi gnit" (for that kuta etc. which has gained the replacement of gang, will act like gnit and not as gni or Ni). In this kuta etc., there are root words kuta, puta etc. Though puta etc. are the primary words and not kuta as it is in the bahuvrihi compound, "kuta addi yesham te" (for which kuta is the first); and therefore will denote puta etc., still the wotd kuta is also included.

Tadevam yad yad drshta...

Refuting: *Thus, whatever is the perceived difference comes to a conclusion in the self-effulgent knowledge. This is what is shown through the postulation to prove the self-effulgence, will establish it (the non-duality of the subject-object or the activity-action).*

Tadyatha.....

Refuting: *That is – the knowledge perceived in another place as 'knower is different and the known is different' should be given-up postulating the impossibility of the transaction as 'i'. Similarly, 'knowledge is different and the known is different' should be given-up postulating the impossibility of the transaction of 'i know'. This postulation is definitely powerful than all the valid means (pramaana), which will negate hundreds of logic based only on the perception. This is said (by the great Sri Kumarila Bhatta) – 'in the existence of a valid proof, as many unforeseen object can be imagined'.*

Sri Kumarila Bhatta (another purva mimasaka, the bhatta school, which we vedantin follow) says in his text 'tantra vartika' – many unseen object can be imagined in the presence of a valid proof, and without valid proof even a single one should not be accepted.

This is summarised in the next two slokas by the author himself.

Anyathaa...

Refuting: *If there exists the proof of postulation, to prove the objects knowledge etc., then it will negate all the perceived contradiction, since it is the most powerful valid means. – 6 –*

Refuting: *One should either prove the impossibility of the postulation or should give-up the hold on the perceived. Since, in one and the same place the light and darkness cannot be brought in – 7 – Thus, through inquiry with the definition you accept in the dialog of existence, you (logician) have understood clearly (established) the self-effulgence. But we thorough our own experience have gained the knowledge of the self-effulgence (Self).*

As said earlier, the author declares his experience of the Self.

6. Difference between the Buddhist and Vedanti

As explained earlier there are four Buddhist schools, here the voidist of the madhyamika school is negated through the vedanti. Many people are of the opinion that the Zen Buddhism and non-dual Vedanta are one and the same. This dialog should remove such misconceptions.

Evamsati....

Supporting: *And in this situation, this is the difference between the Buddhist and the Vedanti. The former accepts everything to be in-explicable. This is explained by Bhagavan Buddha in the Lankavatara – When inquired through the intellect, the nature of the object is not determined. Therefore, the in-explicability and existence-less, is taught*

As said earlier, the author has great respect for Buddha and always refers to him as Bhagavan. Though we vedantin too accept the inexplicability of everything, we accept it except in the substratum, the absolute Self.

Lankavatara-Sutra is the text which describes the teaching of Buddha, purportedly after arriving in Sri Lanka.

Svabhava – the nature. Here through the inquiry it is not determined as existence, therefore we (buddhist) determine it to be non-existent.

Vignanavyatiriktam....

Refuting: *The Vedantins accept, other than the knowledge the whole world is different from existence and non-existence. That is – the world cannot be existence, since it is under the grasp of the defect about to be said. It cannot be non-existence too, if it were so then transactions of the worldly and the learned inquiry will be erratic.*

The gnana is knowledge and vignana is experiential knowledge. This is not based on the experience – experience – experienced triad, as the Self is accepted a self-experiential (yad saakshaat aparokshaat brahma). And this vignana is the absolute Self, as it is declared so by the scriptures "satya gnaanam anantam brahma" (Self is existence, knowledge and bliss), "pragnanam brahma" (Self is absolute knowledge)

In Advaita Siddhi the first definition of Mithyatva is "sad-asad-vilakshanatvam anirvacaniyam". And whenever ignorance is described, Bhagavan Bhashyakara defines it as "sad-asadbhyam anirvacaniyam" (inexplicable a existence and non-existence).

When discussing the opponent asks if it is of the third form, which impossible logically. Since it is always in black and white for the opponents, if it is not the black it is white and vice-versa. But in Advaita Siddhi, the

author Sri Madhusudhana Saraswati says, if it is not goat it need not be a cow, it can very well be an elephant or a horse too. Similarly, if it is not a black it may be blue or red or green and need not necessarily be white.

Yadapi...

Supporting: *if you do not have the capabilities then approach a proper preceptor, who will teach you the proper way of explaining.*

Refuting: *This is just useless talk. It is right. If we have not said the inexplicability as the nature of the object of knowledge and also it is because of the defect of the speaker. And the opponents identification (ego) about explaining the objects, he will not be possible to explain due to the defect about to be said.*

Na ca te doshaa...

Supporting: *The defects which you (vedanti) is about to say, how will it not be the defect of Jati (self-contradictory) which will destroy you.*

Refuting: *No. Since, the defects through which we negate the explicability, is inexplicable too. Only through the inexplicable defects we do the transaction (of refuting the objects of knowledge), therefore where is the question of self-contradiction. And the Jati which you are saying cannot be explained and established.*

Since everything is accepted as inexplicable, the defect of JAti the opponent throws upon the vedanti cannot be explained too, and since it cannot be explained it cannot be established too. And without= establishing the defect, it cannot be called as a defect.

Nanu sadasatpaksha...

Supporting: *Since you seem the defects in both the existence and non-existence stance, you say it to be inexplicable. Is it a doubt about the existence and non-existence or is it due to acceptance of the things to be different from existence and non-existence. In the first, it should be accepted to be either an existence or non-existence, and the other stance will be just non-real (illusion). And the defect (of being non-real) should be accepted in the stance of the existence since it is necessary. If the existence is accepted stance, then how can the defects relating to the stance of existence be possible? If the stance is accepted of be non-existence, then since everything is accepted to be non-existence, how can be the defects gain existence. And the second (different from both) is not possible either because of being self-contradictory. (Both cannot co-exist), since "if it is contradictory (existence and non-existence) either of the one should be existent"*

In the third, they cannot co-exist, as explained in sloka 7, the darkness and light cannot co-exist. If it is accepted as being different from existence and non-existence, that too is impossible. Since, if it is not existence, it should be non-existence and of it is not non-existence it should be existence.

Tadaetadanaakalita...

Refuting: *This is an answer without understanding the others purport. For one who says everything to be inexplicable as existence and non-existence, how can he be controlled by the existence of inexplicability? Since that (inexplicability) too comes under the blanket of the pronoun 'sarva' (all), this includes everything in the world.*

Parasyaiva vyavasthaa...

Refuting: *From the standpoint of the opponent, and by negating the explicability the inexplicability is established. As he accepts, in the scheme of the existence and non-existence, when wither one is negated the other is as well established. Therefore we explain from the standpoint of the others, that the whole world is inexplicable.*

Vastutastu...

Refuting: *In reality, we are relieved from establishing the existence and non-existence of the world, and are accomplished and experiencing the bliss by being established in the self-established knowledge principle the non-dual absolute Self. For those who desire to know the reality through the inquiry, based upon the self imagined rules of do's and don'ts, to them we say – this is not a proper method, since you are bound (refuted) by your own imagined rules.*

Ata evaasmad...

Refuting: For this reason, we cannot be bound by the rules regarding the existence of the defects which we are going to say. Since, we are refuting your standpoint using your own standpoint.

Na copanyasa...

Supporting: Since you use it (our rules), that itself binds you (to accepting its existence).

Refuting: No. We have already said the possibility of the dialog regarding the inquiry should be done without being bothered about the existence and non-existence of the inquiry.

Yadi tu vicaarasya.....

Supporting: Without accepting the existence of the inquiry (dialog) you cannot do an inquiry.

Refuting: No. Without establishing the (inquiry) through a pramaana (valid means), accepting its existence is impossible. Since it is improbable, we accept the inquiry as the object of another inquiry, it will lead to regression ad infinitum, we will even not be able to start an inquiry.

Any establishment of a valid means for the existence of dialog can be done only through another inquiry.

Now, if it is not done there can be no rule for acceptance of its existence.

Therefore, if we accept it (this inquiry) as an object of another inquiry, then it will also be an object of another, this way it will lead to regression ad infinitum.

Na ca purvapurva...

Supporting: The inquiry is established through the people of the older days (by the older generation teachers), therefore, there is no need to dependence for one dialog to start another dialog.

Refuting: No. If it be accepted the dialog is already established since it is dependent on an object of inquiry, then the object of the dialog is as well established, therefore there is no need for the inquiry process to start.

Atha Vicaaryavisheshasya...

Supporting: The special knowledge of the object of inquiry is not established earlier, therefore to gain that we need to start an inquiry no.

Refuting: No. Then, the special knowledge of the inquiry is also not established earlier too. This is useless dry logic.

Yadi ca tvaddarshana...

Refuting: If you (logician) negate the refuting statement we (Vedanti) give, accepting your philosophy, still it is only negation of the philosophy you accept. If you refute whatever we establish, through the method of refuting (as established here), still we are the victor. Since, you are following our standpoint of 'the refuting logic is negatron and the supporter logic is negated'. Therefore, you should establish using supportive logic and we should refute it, only if you follow a dialog of this form will you be able to win not otherwise. Thus, the world of duality is inexplicable. And brahman is the only non-dual absolute reality is established.

7. The inquiry of valid proof in the non-duality

Supporting: What is the valid proof for Advaita (non-duality).

Refuting: It is impossible to pose such question, for someone who does not accept Advaita. When you (logician) ask about the validity of advaita, if you do not know (cognize) it, how is such a question possible.

The logic reminds of the comic book story about this learned witty man who was asked to speak in front of the public, which he was reluctant to do. Therefore, he went up on the stage and asked the people, "do you know what i am going to say" they replied in negative, he answered "if you do not know there is no point in talking". For this when they said that they knew about the subject matter then he said "if you already knew what i am going to say, there is no point to talks". When the immediately said that they know partially he replied "in the same way you can know the rest too", saying this he came down the platform.

Pramaana should be understood as the means of right knowledge. The knowledge is of two types yataartha and ayataartha. The former is called as pramaa and the latter is called as bhramaa. And the instrument for this knowledge is pramaana – pramaaya karanam (instrument for tight knowledge).

Nahi pramaana maatram....

Supporting: We are not just asking about the Validity, but relating to the specifics (speciality / base).

Refuting: That is possible if that kind of knowledge takes place (regarding the advaita). Since the question is a transaction of speech, and transaction is dependent on the knowledge for it to take place. Otherwise if the knowledge which is definite cause for the transaction does not exist, then all the transactions become impossible.

Any transaction is based on the desire for the transaction, which in turn depends upon the knowledge. The rule is "gnana – iccha – pravrtti" (knowledge – desire and transaction). If we accept a transaction without knowledge, then there can be no transaction possible.

This is dependent on a concomitance – wherever there is transaction there is knowledge – direct concomitance. And where there is no knowledge there is no transaction – indirect concomitance.

Here the knowledge is vyapaka (pervade) and the transaction is vyapya (pervaded).

Yadi caadvaitam prashnavishaya...

Refuting: If you accept the knowledge of advaita, then you should say whether it is Pramaa (right / valid knowledge) or apramaa (wrong / invalid knowledge).

If it is the former (right knowledge), then whatever be the means for that right knowledge, is the validity in the advaita, this you also accept. Therefore the question regarding this is useless.

Na ca vaacyam...

Supporting: Though we have the general knowledge of the validity, we are interested (the question) in the special knowledge of the validity.

Refuting: Since the general knowledge is the specific knowledge. This is useless like the research about the number of teeth a crow has.

Since the Advaita (Brahman – Self) is non-dual, there cannot be different levels of general and specific. There can be general knowledge or specific knowledge regarding the objects of the world, like the general knowledge of the pot that it is pot and the specific knowledge is pot is red, is short, is beautiful etc. But the Self is attributeless, therefore there can be no general and specific.

Saamaanyasiddhireva....

Refuting: The general knowledge will bring in by the bringing an expectancy the specific knowledge too, therefore there is no need for this question. If you are still interested in understanding the pramaana, among the pramaana you accept that which does not have any defect. If among the pramaana types you accept, if you find everyone to be defective, then find another pramaana and end this search.

There is a rule the logicians accept "saamanyam vishesham prati unneyaat" (the general will naturally lead to the specifics).

The pramaana the logician accepts is Pratyaksha (direct perception), Anumaana (inference), Upamaana (comparison) and Shabda (verbal testimony). And the additional pramaana the vedanti accepts that is the Arthapatti (postulation) is included in the inference itself as indirect inference (vyatireka anumaana), and Anupalabdhi (absence) is accepted in the perception as one of the six relations (sambandha) called visheshana-visheshya-bhava sambandha (the relation of the adjective and the adjectified).

Among these pramaanas (validity) the perception is invalid as the Self is not an object of the sense-organs, as said in the scriptures "yat tad adreshyam agrahyam.." (that which is not seen, not grasped...), by this all the knowledge and action sense-organ (gnaana and karma indriya) is specified.

It cannot be gained through the inference, since it is dependent upon perception. And for an inference there should be a linga (pointer), and Self has nothing that can be taken as a pointer (as the smoke for the fire). It cannot be gained through the comparison as there is nothing similar to the Self.

It cannot be gained through the verbal testimony also, as the verbal testimony accepted by the dualist is not the same as the verbal testimony accepted by vedantin. Though, we accept this as the only validity, other than the experience.

The final answer was regarding an inference, which the logician is good at, through which he can find a solution.

Yadi ca kaa pramaanavya....

Supporting: The doubt is regarding the individual pramaana among the many (which we need to find)

Refuting: It is impossible to express all the individual pramaana (nor can anyone grasp all and compare it) therefore even if we do not specify any, there is no loss for us.

Yadi ca dvitiiya...

Supporting: We accept the second (the knowledge of advaita as apramaa (wrong knowledge)).

Refuting: For the one who accept the non-validity of the advaita knowledge, the question of 'what is the validity for the wrong knowledge' is self-contradictory.

Atha saa mama mate...

Supporting: We in our system accept it as wrong knowledge, but you (vedantin) accept it as right knowledge, therefore we ask about its valid means.

Refuting: This too is not acceptable. There is no rule that binds me to give you the validity for the advaita knowledge that you have gained.

Refuting: But, we (vedantin) accept the advaita always and that does not mean, the means for your advaita knowledge too is definitely a valid proof. In reality, in the mountain that has fire, for someone who sees (mistakes) the vapour (or dust) as the smoke and through that infers the fire. Just because of that does the knowledge of vapour seen as the smoke become a means of valid knowledge?

Refuting: Accepting this question as it is, we say the Shruti (scriptures) are the means of right knowledge. And indeed it is seen (heard) "ekam eva advitiam" (one alone and non-dual), "neha naanaa asti kincana" (there is no multiplicity). And scriptures are validity even in the established objects (Self); this will be explained by us in the text Iswarabhisandhi.

Shruuyate – as it is accepted "shravanaat shruti" (it is called a shruti as it should be heard). The tradition does not accept the method of studying from a book by oneself, but should be learnt from a Guru by listening to him.

The purva mimasaka people accept, "aamnaayasya kriyaarthatvaat aanarthakhyam atadarthaanaam" (since the scriptures are for the actions (prescribed karmas), the other text not dealing with the karma is to be considered as praising statement). Though aanarthakhyam means useless, if we accept it to be so, then the some logician who does not accept the scriptures as validity, will derive a syllogory saying, the whole of scripture is useless, like this statement.

Siddharthaanaam..

Refuting: If be accepted, the scriptures dealing with the Self be accepted to mean something else, even then when the corroborating (synchronizing) the words dealing with it, the non-dual meaning which is gained of them without getting negated, negates the other meanings. The knowledge that is self-effulgent can only be removed by negation (and there is no powerful pramaana to negate it).

The meaning for the statements even if is understood to establish the eligible person for performing the karmas. Or is understood to establish the Self for the purpose of meditation, still with the words like one, non-dual etc., negates the other meanings, and establishes the non-dual Self.

The scriptures too can be negated through the perception. As it is done in the case of "aadityo yupa" (the post is the sun) or "yajamaana prastara" (the master is a broom). Now, youp (post) is part of the fire oblations, where the fig tree trunk is cut and after removing the bark and applying oil over it, it is planted just outside the place of the fire oblation. When the sun rays fall over this, since the trunk is smooth and oiled, shines brightly like the sun. Therefore, it is said to be sun, since this cannot be true, the post being sun, we understand it in this way, similarly with the other examples too. But, there is no powerful pramaana, as we will discuss here, to dismiss the advaitic scripture.

Nanu naadvaitashrutiinaam riju...

Supporting: But the Advaitic text cannot be valid proof for the simple meaning (the word meaning / literal meaning). Since that (literal meaning) is negated by the direct perception. Therefore, we should imagine a different purport (as explained earlier).

Refuting: No. The perception etc. pramaana, that is accepted to negate the advaitic texts, they are always associated with its object of duality pot, cloth etc.

Na tu pratyakshaadikam

Supporting: But the perception etc. that is gained by us, grasp the objects duality of past, present and future, that is how it is seen.

Refuting: No. Through that kind of knowledge your omniscience can be accepted and trusted, only if you are able to tell us what we think now.

Here the logician wants us to accept one of the types of knowledge through which he gains the perception. There are three types of association for gaining the knowledge –

1. Saamaanya-lakshanaa sannikarsha/pratyasatti – The knowledge gained by the simple association, like the samyoga (seperable relation), samavaaya (inseperable relation), samyukta samavaaya, (first samyoga is gained and then samavaaya), samaveta samavaaya (first samavaaya is gained and then another samavaaya), samyukta samaveta samavaaya ((first samyoga is gained and then samavaaya and later another samavaaya), and finally visheshana-visheshya (adjective and adjectified). The samavaaya associated with anything cannot be gained, and we vedantin do not accept samavaaya.
2. Gnaana-lakshanaa sannikarsha/pratyasatti – The knowledge gained by combining two different perceptions. The eyes see the sandalwood and the nose (ole-factory) smell the frangance, and we get the combined knowledge of the sandalwood is fragrant.
3. Yogaja lakshana sannikarsha/pratyasatti – The knowledge gained by the accomplishment of yoga. This is accepted by the vedantins too.

There is a problem here, even if one accepts the yogic knowledge, the knowledge cannot be (according to the commentary (bhashya) of Sri Vyaasa on Yoga Sutra of Sri Patanjali), particular knowledge of the thought function, but a general knowledge. That is, the yogi can understand there is a thought of happiness or sorrow, but cannot understand the reason for that.

Yadi ca pratyakshaadi..

Supporting: *If the perception is accepted to be limited scope.*

Refuting: *Then the other objects which is targeted by the advaitic text cannot be negated it (perception). Since, the right knowledge is negator of another, only if it is contrary to it. Otherwise there will be over-pervasion. Therefore, the injunction of “agnishomiye pashum aalabhet” (the cattle in the fire oblation called agnishoma) will not make the scripture “na himsyaat sarvaa bhutaani” (do not trouble (torture) any living being) redundant.*

Only the knowledge in the same scope will be contradicted by a different knowledge in the same scope. Like the lamp kept in a room will dispel the darkness pertaining only to that room. Otherwise, even a small lamp in a remote corner should remove the darkness of the whole universe.

The statement pertaining to the cattle killing is limited to the fire sacrifice, and not in general. Therefore it will not be contradicting the general statement preventing of troubling the living beings.

Yada caivam tadaa...

Refuting: *Since it is so, the perception that is negator and the advaitic scripture that is negated, when there is no obstacle in the knowledge of advaita, will give rise to the knowledge of advaita. Therefore how can the perception negate itself.*

Ghatena patena

Refuting: *The knowledge having for its object the pot, cloth and its duality and with the scriptural text establishing the advaita, how does it (perception of duality) not establish the validity in the Advaita, because it is not refuted by any pramaana.*

Na hi tasya

Refuting: *And the object of knowledge is not of the Self or the Self along with the duality of pot and cloth etc. Because the perception takes place is of the form of “the pot and cloth are different” and not of the form “i am different from the pot and cloth” or “pot and cloth are different from me”.*

Svapraakaashta api..

Supporting: *The knowledge is self-effulgent, therefore it will be objectify itself and the other,*

Refuting: *Still, it is not so, that the intellect, wherever the knowledge is different from (the pot etc.) objects there it will not objectify its difference too. Otherwise, the duality will also be of the form of knowledge, therefore how it will not end in Advaita.*

The syllogory to prove this is, the pot etc. is not different from knowledge, since it is gained together, like the nature of knowledge.

Na ca taya dhiya

Supporting: *The self-effulgent knowledge will objectify itself and its object (pot and cloth). And therefore the duality knowledge of the type of inherent nature will be illumined.*

Refuting: No. It cannot be (the inherent nature of duality). If it be so, then in the erroneous knowledge of "this is silver", if the knowledge of the form of this and the form of silver be illumined, then it will be grasped separately (and not combined leading to error).

If it be the inherent nature (form) of the knowledge to grasp the duality, then in the case of the erroneous knowledge, one should be able to separate the knowledge and then there will be no erroneous knowledge.

dharmavisheshamantarbhaavya

Supporting: By including the pertaining attributes the form (the duality is distinguished)

Refuting: No. The knowledge too can be so (as the knowledge associated with knowledge-ness) and the same knowledge cannot illumine it (cannot be self-effulgent). Therefore, there is expectation of the different relations (samyoga etc.) and this is impossible prior to the knowledge.

The only possible relation with the attribute is Samyukta-Samaveta-Samavaya. And this too, the mind in samyoga with Atma (as it is accepted the mind and knowledge seperable association to be necessary for any knowledge). And with this the knowledge is in samavaya, with which there needs to be knowledge in samavaya. And this is impossible, because the relation itself has a knowledge, which it has to prove. And this cannot be there prior to the knowledge.

Atmavadatmadharme..

Supporting: As the knowledge, its attributes too are self-effulgent. Therefore there is no dependence upon any relation.

Refuting: No. Then the knowledge-ness, the remembrance-ness and the valid knowledge-ness too will become knowledge.

If the valid knowledge-ness too is self-effulgent, and therefore gained along with the knowledge. There can be no doubt regarding the validity of the knowledge. Every knowledge right or wrong will become valid.

Tadevam saa buddhi

Refuting: In this way the perceptive knowledge of pot, cloth etc. is established as non-dual by the scriptures. And therefore, how can this knowledge be valid for establishing the duality. When the perception which is the negator, through which the scripture clearly establishes the non-validity of the knowledge of the pot, cloth etc. Since there is no opposition (obstacle) without any hindrance and through the power of being independent validity (self-validity), supported by the postulation, the knowledge that arises of the non-duality cannot negate / oppose and therefore without an opposition will establish the validity of the non-duality of everything.

Bhedapramaanyathanupapattya

Supporting: The knowledge of duality too, through the postulation can possibly negate the non-duality.

Refuting: No. By the non-dual scripture there is a doubt which is planted in the perception of duality, therefore there is no possibility of it being valid. And any knowledge of the duality will eventually be negated similar to the knowledge of two-moons.

When there is doubt regarding any knowledge / valid proof, then it will not be able to produce a proper result.

But, the logician asks, since both the knowledge of duality and non-duality is gained by different pramaanas and since both are not negated during its transaction, why not accept by to be true, as dual - non-dual. This is called as bheda-abeda vaada.

Ekam ityupaadaya..

Refuting: The scripture after saying "ekam" (one) follows it by "eva" *only) i the form of "ekameva" (one only). Therefore, we understand the scripture is beyond doubt establishing the non-duality. Therefore, the duality – non-duality cannot be accepted, and so the perception of the pot, cloth etc. is not valid proof.

Buddherviramya

Supporting: How can it be so, since the knowledge cannot take place sequentially?

Refuting: No. The scripture will though give the knowledge of the non-duality of everything in an instance. Still, our intellect takes time to process it in sequence of stages, since it is objectifying manifold objects, therefore processes it in order. This will be explained later.

The doubt here is with reference to the idea established in the paragraph "tadevam saa buddhi", where sequence is established as - first, the scripture will establish the non-duality with the perceived objects; second, will establish the identification with them both through the help of postulation.

There is a dictum in logic, "shabda-buddhi-karmanaam viramya vyaapaaraabhaavat" (the word, meaning and the knowledge cannot take place in sequence). They are accepted to be gained instantly. Shri Kalidasa also writes "vagarthaviva samprktau" (Siva and Parvati are inseparable like the word and its meaning)

Nanu yadi

Supporting: *Though the knowledge of perception the duality of the pot and cloth are gained. It does not differentiate the duality of pot and cloth from itself (knowledge). Then how can the shruti establish the validity with itself and the objects. Since, through a different knowledge of the form of the perception of duality of pot and cloth cannot be pot and cloth, will definitely negate the advaitic scripture.*

Maivam tarhi tasya

Refuting: *No. Then the knowledge of it too finally, giving up its objects (duality); through whichever other knowledge of the pot and cloth to be different and that too being different from the pot and cloth; with it the scripture gaining validity will establish the non-duality. This way the knowledge of duality of pot and cloth with the other knowledge will establish non-duality, and thus will end in establishing the non-duality of everything.*

Evam ca sati

Refuting: *If the second knowledge is differentiated through the third knowledge so on and so forth, eventually wherever this knowledge series gets cut, due to the fear of not gaining another knowledge or due to the fear of regression ad infinitum. In that stage the advaitic scripture will gain a leverage (finding this gap) and establish the non-duality of all the objects and the objectifying knowledge series. And this cannot be negated by any pramaana in any knowledge.*

This is summarised by the author in one sloka

Tasmaad – suduradhaavanashranta..

Refuting: *Therefore, after being tired due to running for long, the series of knowledge of negators (perception etc.) is negated / dismissed by the advaitic scriptures, which follows it (knowledge of duality) gains victory. – 8 –*

Na ca yatra tasya pratipattu..

Supporting: *But wherever the knowledge series of the cognizer stops, there the other person's knowledge of that final though of duality becomes valid proof.*

Refuting: *No. You should have to give validity for establishing that duality, through another duality.*

Supporting: *That (other person's knowledge) will be validated by someone else. Or the knowledge 'this will be validated by another person', this will validate the other knowledge.*

Refuting: *No. In that knowledge of the validated, the advaita scripture will establish itself, and thereby decimate all the past validity. And the future reference cannot be accepted as a reason for validation, since it will be illogical. And if that knowledge is also validated by another, will be staring at regress ad infinitum.*

If to avoid the pitfall as explained in the sloka 8, the logician should accept the validity of knowledge series as validated by another person. But still, that validity again should be validated, therefore we come back to regress ad infinitum or establishing the non-duality there.

If the knowledge with reference to future is accepted as the reason to validate the duality, then in the case of the logician there will be over-pervasion. As the possibility of the existence of smoke without fire, will lead to it being eternal, since smoke is without any cause. Therefore, this possibility can also not be accepted as a validity to negate the scripture.

Atha brushe...

मैवम् । किं कियतीषु बुद्धिषु व्याप्यव्यापकौ कावप्यवलम्ब्य व्याप्तिग्रहरूपयैव धिया शेषबुद्धौ बाधं

व्युत्पादयसीत्थमदैतश्रुतेः किं वा बुद्धयन्तरदृष्टव्याप्तिनाथया पक्षधर्महेतुमुल्लिखन्त्या बुद्ध्याऽन्तिमबुद्धिविषयया ।

Supporting: *If it be said – The advaitic knowledge is negated by the perception of duality, for a period of time. Accepting the concomitance gained from it, therefore the final thought will not be able to an object of another knowledge. Thus the advaitic scriptures will be negated permanently.*

Refuting: *No. For a period of time accepting some pervade-pervaded state, whatever concomitance is gained is that the knowledge that negates the advaitic scriptures or is it the concomitance thus gained*

along with the PakshaDharma (attribute of the thing to be established in the place of establishment) and the Hetu (reason).

Through the knowledge gained in a series of limited period, where the duality negates the non-duality, one can gain the concomitance, the advaitic scripture knowledge will be negated by dualistic perception. Here the logician is attempting to prove this through a syllogory – the final thought, is either different from itself or negator of the advaitic knowledge, since it is knowledge of duality, like the first knowledge. Through this logic, the regression is avoided, and the knowledge is validated.

The logicians accept the knowledge gained through Paraamarsha as the means for inferential knowledge. And Paraamarsha is defined as “vyaapti-vishishta paksha-dharmataa gnaanam” (the knowledge of the concomitance along with the PakshaDharma). Paksha-dharma is the dharma (attribute) seen in the Paksha (the place of contention). For example – Paksha (place of contention) – mountain, Dharma (attribute / pointer) – smoke, Sadhya (thing to be established) – fire, Hetu (reason) – smoke, Drshtaanta (example) – kitchen. This is used in a syllogory to establish the Sadhya along with the concomitance.

Here the logician is given two choices – 1. Only comcomittance and 2. Concomittance along with the paksha-dharma, hetu etc.

नाद्यः । व्याप्तिबुद्धिर्यदि विषयविशेषेऽपि स्वातन्त्र्येण बाधात्मकोपेयते तदा सैव विशेषबुद्धिरपि स्यादिति

गतमनुमानकथया । अथानुमितिमभ्युपैषि तदा सा नाऽऽत्मानमपि धर्माकृत्य प्रवर्तते इति तत्रैव दत्तपदा

सर्वामद्वैतश्रुतिः परम्परामालम्बते इत्युक्तमावर्तते ।

Refuting: No it cannot be the first. If the concomitance itself is accepted to be the negator of the scriptural advaitic knowledge (or anything), independently, then there is no use for inference. Therefore, if you accept the inferential knowledge, then since it cannot be an object of itself (cannot establish the duality of itself (inferential knowledge) with the objects), therefore as said earlier gaining an entrance here, the advaitic scripture will establish the non-duality of everything.

In the perception both the means (pramaana / validity) and the end (knowledge) are both called as Pratyaksha. In inference it is Anumana and Anumiti respectively.

अथ सर्वा विवादाध्यासिता बुद्धयः स्वविषयेभ्यो भिन्नाः बुद्धित्वात् घटपटबुद्धिवद् इति सामान्याकारेणाऽऽत्मानमपि

धर्माकृत्य आत्मनोऽपि स्वविषयाद्भेदं साधयिष्यत्यनुमेति मन्यसे । मैवम् । एवमपि विषयिणो विषयस्याऽभेदम्

बोधयन्ती श्रुतिरनुमानमप्यनवकाशयति ।

Supporting: If it be accepted, syllogory “all the object of contention knowledge’s are different from its object, since it is knowledge, like the knowledge of pot, cloth etc.” is accepted as the proof, for the inference to establish its duality accepting itself (inferential knowledge) too in the logic.

Refuting: No. Here too, the scripture which by establishing the non-duality of the knowledge with the objects will negate the existence of the inference.

Through the said inference, the duality between the object and the knowledge is though established. The duality of the knowledge with the object is not established. This is what the mathematician’s debate; **A** though maybe equal to **B**, but this does not naturally prove **B** is also equal to **A**.

विषयिविषययोर्मिथो भेदेऽपि साध्ये अस्तु हेत्वनुयोगः । परबुद्धिस्तद्विष्यांश्च प्रति निरावाधा सती श्रुतिरेकस्या

बुद्धेर्विषयादपरामपरस्याश्च विषयात् परामभेदबोधाय धावन्ती सवद्वैते एव पर्यवस्यतीति ।

Supporting: If the inferential knowledge “the subject and object are different from each other”, which will be a utility in establishing the reason.

Refuting: No. Since the scripture will without any obstacle establish the advaita, with respect to other knowledge and its object. First starting from one knowledge and its object, then the next with its object, so on until the scripture establishes the non-duality completely.

The scripture will negate it without any obstacle, because; when you (logician) said ‘from each other’ in the statement, this first of all should be established. Secondly, both the knowledge or its object cannot exist in Paksha, leading to the defect Assidhi (non-establishment).

न च शक्यमनुमातुं सर्वस्या बुद्धेर्विषयात् सर्वा बुद्धिभिन्नेति मा भूदन्यबुद्धिविषयादात्मनोऽपि बुद्धिभिन्नेति । न

चाऽऽत्मव्यतिरिक्तादित्युक्ते निस्तारः स्याद् अद्वैतवादिना सर्वाभिदमिच्छता क्वचिदपि तदसिद्ध्या

विशेषणाप्रसिद्धेरिति ।

Supporting: It can be inferred "all the knowledge is different from its entire object".

Refuting: No. Then the knowledge will become different from itself.

Supporting: We will leave 'itself (the knowledge)' out of this (as, every knowledge, except the knowledge is different from its entire object)

Refuting: No. Since for the advaitin, one who does not accept anything different from the Self, there is the defect of the non-famous-adjective.

With reference to the penultimate knowledge, which itself becomes the object to the final knowledge of duality, there will be a defect. This is either with the knowledge or the objects which are accepted to be the reason (Hetu), when they do not exist in the Paksha is called as Asiddhi.

Here the adjective "other than itself" is not accepted by non-dualists. Therefore is a defect.

एतेन सर्वं भिन्नम् इति वाक्येन विना बाधं स्वतःप्रमाणेन सत्प्रतिशब्दा सेयमद्वैतश्रुतिरित्यप्यन्वकाशं प्रत्यवस्थानं

मन्तव्यम् । यस्मात् कस्मादपि भेदेमिथ्यातः सत्यभेदोपगमेन सिद्धसाधनात् सर्वस्मादिति स्वतोऽप्यापत्तेः

स्वव्यतिरिक्तादिति चाद्वैतवादिन्यव्यवच्छेदकम् । तदेवम् -

Supporting: The statement 'Everything is different', without any hindrance will negate the advaitic scripture, through its self-validity, which will be make the advaitic scripture redundant.

Refuting: No. If it is accepted as 'everything different from anything' there will be Siddha-saadhana defect, as the advaitins accept the duality of Self from the illusory world. If it is accepted as 'everything is different from everything, then there will be a situation of itself being different from itself. Therefore, if it is accepted as 'everything is different from everything, except itself', then as explained earlier (previous para), being different from oneself is impossible in advaita, therefore the defect of non-famous-adjective.

Prati-shabda – is the contrary statements. When there are contrary statements or multiple statements made at the same time, then neither will give a valid knowledge.

Siddha-saadhana – if something already accepted is being established again.

हेत्वाद्यभावसर्वज्ञये सर्वम् पक्षयताऽऽस्थिते ।

किञ्चित्तु त्यजता दत्ता सैव द्वारद्वयश्रुतेः ॥ ९ ।

Refuting: By accepting 'everything' as the Paksha, there will be absence of Hetu (reason), Drshtaanta (example) etc. Fearing this if you leave something from 'everything', the advaitic scripture will gain an entry through this given space.

As explained, a syllogory needs different things. And in this the place in which the to be established is accepted (called Paksha) to be 'everything', then there is no scope for the Reason (Hetu) or the Udhaarana -/ Drshtaanta (example) possible, as everything includes everything.

अत एव च -

आद्यधीवेद्यभेदीयाऽप्यन्यथानुपपन्नता ।

स्वज्ञानापेक्षणादन्ते बाधते नाद्वयश्रुतिम् ॥ १० ॥

Refuting: The first knowledge (the knowledge of pot and cloth are different) and the first object (the duality of pot and cloth) too depend upon another knowledge, therefore does not negate the Advaitic scripture.

A postulation that is clearly, without any doubt, known is accepted to be the opponent of known. As said earlier, the postulation made, established the duality of pot from the cloth, but does not establish thesef

from its knowledge. Therefore, the final duality is negated through the advaitic scripture, thus completely negating all the duality.

न च संस्कारारूढदृढान्वयव्यतिरेकान्वयव्यतिरेकान्वयप्रतिपत्त्युत्पत्तिपत्तिबन्धः शक्यशङ्कः । यतः -

अत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्दः करोति हि ।

अबाधात्तु प्रमामत्र स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिश्चलाम् ॥ ११ ॥

Supporting: The knowledge that arises because of the strong though imprints gained by their experience many a time, which is of both the direct and indirect concomitance; will negate the advaitic knowledge.

Refuting: No. Because – Even though an object is eternally non-existence the word generates the knowledge. When the knowledge thus gained (by the words) is negated, the self-evident knowledge gets established without any wavering.

Here the direct and indirect concomitance gained is, the knowledge of 'the pot and the cloth is different' and 'the blue and pot are non-different'.

The Yoga Sutra too says 'shabdaartha-gnaanupaati vastu-shoonya vikalpa' (The thing which though may be an object of the knowledge, devoid of the object itself, it is called as Vikalpa). Like the 'mare's hor' or 'barren women's son' etc., gives rise to the knowledge, though are devoid of their objects.

असंसर्गाग्रहस्यापि मन्ता संसत्यबोधिते ।

अत्यन्ताऽसदसंसर्गाग्रहं संसर्गलग्नकम् ॥ १२ ॥

Refuting: Even the people (mimamska) who accept the "asamsarga-agraha" (non-cognition of the non-relation – in other words it is cognition of the relation), as the reason for the knowledge of teh words, in the place where it is not negated. Therefore the cognition of the relationship is accepted in the form of the non-cognition og the non-relationship, still the non-duality is established as it is not negated by the other pramaanaas.

अनौचित्याऽपि तर्केण दुर्बधैवाऽद्वयश्रुतिः ।

अनारोपितमूलत्वाद् बलवत्त्वादतादृशा ॥ १३ ॥

Supporting: By the advaitic scripture can (will) be negated by the logic of being improper.

Refuting: No. Since the scriptures are not based on the super-imposition, they are powerful pramaana with respect to the logic.

The logic of being improper is 'the duality is experienced by everyone, therefore it is not proper to negate it'.

The word "tarka" (logic) is explained in the nyaya philosophy as "vyapya-aaropena vyaapaka-aaropa" or "aapaadya-aropena aapaadaka-aaropa" (by superimposing the effect the cause is established). For example, by superimposing the smoke the fire is expressed. Smoka is vyaapya and Fire is vyaapka.

The scriptures are not based on any superimpositions, therefore is accepted to be a powerful pramaana.

प्रवृत्तेनाप्यनौचित्यमूलं येन न लूयते ।

तत्राऽनौचित्यसाम्राज्यं वैपरीत्यात्तु नात्र तत् ॥ १४ ॥

Supporting: (Then there will be no scope for the logic of improper).

Refuting: No. Wherever the logic of improper is not negated; there it gets its due respect. But, here the advaitic scripture has negated the root of the logic; therefore it has not effect here.

In the silver the knowledge of silver is proper cognition, but in the mother-of-pearl the knowledge of silver is improper, therefore is negated using this logic.

ननु यधदेवोदाहियते त्वया - 'नेत इतोऽस्य भेदो गृहीतः इति ततोऽस्याद्वैतान्नायैरभेदबोधने तद्द्वारा सर्वाऽभेदो पर्यवसातव्यमिति, ततस्ततस्तस्य भेदस्तदैवगृह्यते मया । तस्मादुदाहियमाणतायामनुदाहियमाणतायां च कस्यचिदेतत् प्रत्यवस्थानमस्थाने इति । मैवम् अन्तिमबुद्धेरद्वैतश्रुतिजबुद्ध्यादितो भेदो न त्वया प्रमित इति मयोच्यमाने यस्तदीयस्ततो भेदः प्रमातव्यः, स न तावत् प्रत्यक्षेण, तत्कालमन्तिम बुद्धेरनुपस्थितेः ।

Supporting: Whatever example you (advaitin) present in all that places, as 'there is no duality perceived of this from this', and therefore the advaitic scriptures will enter the frame (in the last thought) and through that will establish the non-duality of everything, we (logician) will display the duality. Therefore, in all the places explained or non-explained (for the fear of negation), establishing the non-duality is impossible.

Refuting: No. You (logician) have not yet established the validity of the duality of the final cognition with the knowledge generated by the non-dual scripture. Therefore you have to establish the validity, which cannot be gained through the direct perception, since the final cognition is not of the present then.

The logician desires to display the duality between the last thought (cognition) and the object of cognition.

To establish anything through the perception, it is generally accepted the sense-organ should meet the sense-object. But here during the state of negation, with reference to the advaitic knowledge, the final cognition is of the previous moment, meaning of the past. And therefore the perception cannot perceive, as it can perceive only the objects of the present.

यदि च केनचिद्धेतुना वा कयाचिदनुपपत्त्या वा तथा स्यात्, तदानीमद्वैतवादिनं प्रति हेतो साध्याविशिष्टतया

अनुपपत्तेश्च, येनविना सा तदविशिष्टतया, तत कथमाभासात् प्रमोदयः स्यात् ।

Supporting: If through some Hetu (reason) or through some postulation we establish the duality.

Refuting: No. Because the Hetu (reason) that you (logician) give is for us (advaitin) similar to the Sadhya (the object established / effect). Without this speciality there is no difference, therefore cannot establish anything. Therefore how can there be a doubt of the duality through an erroneous logic.

For establishing the pot is the pot is itself given as the reason, this is called as Saadhya-sama defect. It is explained as one of the defects in Assidhi (non-established), when the cause is not different / special from the effect (saadhya-avishishta).

न च वाच्यं स्वयं मया स भेदो ज्ञायते इति नास्ति पाक्षिकोऽपि मां प्रत्यसिद्ध्यादिरिति, यतोऽस्य त्वद्वचनस्य

वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः, वचनस्य परार्थत्वात् । मोनमवलम्ब्यावतिष्ठमानश्च भवानप्रतिभातो न मुच्यते ।

Supporting: We cognize the duality clearly through the Svaartha-Anumaana, therefore there is no defect of Asiddhi (saadhya-sama) etc.

Refuting: No. Since the statement you make will be useless (since the statement using five limbs are used only in the case of establishing the inference for others).

Supporting: We will not say anything, and will follow silence.

Refuting: (If you do not use the five limbed statement), in silence you cannot establish anything therefore will fall in the Nigrahasthaana (pitfall) defect called Aprathibha.

Through the given logic we perceive the duality. There are two types of inference accepted – 1. Svaartha-anumaana - an inference for oneself. And 2. Paraaartha-Anumaana – an inference for establishing for the other. In this second type, the syllogory using the five limbed statement is used to establish the object.

Aprathibhaa is a defect when the opponent cannot answer to the other party. Since the answer he expresses through silence cannot be understood by the opponent, he loses.

Different types of Nigrahasthaana were discussed in the beginning.

न च स्वयं मया प्रमितो भेदः परं प्रति वचसा केवलं बोध्यते इति वाच्यम्, त्वद्वचसि परस्याप्रत्ययात् । विजिगीषुं

परं प्रति विजिगीष्वन्तरवचनं हि तत्रार्थे तज्जिज्ञासोत्पदनद्वारेण तस्य

स्वतस्तदर्थप्रमित्युत्पादनपर्यवसायितयोपयुक्तम् । न च अद्वैतवादिनं प्रति कथा कर्तुं शक्यते, तं

प्रत्यन्यतरासिद्धेरुक्तत्वात् ।

Supporting: What we cognized through the inference, for your benefit we express through words.

Refuting: No. It does not give any knowledge to anyone (since you are not considered as a speaker of truth / we (advaitin) do not believe you).

Supporting: When For a person desiring the victory (in a dialog), the opponents statement by creating a desire to know / understand, will through inquiry into it, will conclude in gaining the right knowledge pertaining to the statement.

Refuting: No. Still you cannot do a dialog with us (advaitins), since for us the reason you gie is laden with the defect of asiddhi.

न च वाच्यं मम वचनात्सदेहेनापि श्रुत्या तत्र संदिग्धबाधितभावया नाभेदप्रदिपादनं ते घतते इति, यस्मादद्वैतं

मन्यमानेन भेदाऽसिद्ध्या सर्वत्र साध्याविशेषादिदोषप्रतिसंघायिना संशयस्याप्यन्वकाशीकरणमेव स्यात् । तस्मात् -

Supporting: If through my statement (regarding duality the final cognition is different from its object), and therefore there is doubt about it negating the duality, therefore it cannot establish the non-duality.

Refuting: No. Since, for us who accept the non-duality the duality is completely non-accepted. Therefore, there is no difference of the reason with the object of establishment, and therefore the defect of Asiddhi etc. follows you (logician) since there is definitely no place for the doubt.

When there is doubt, there cannot be clear knowledge, therefore, if we (logician) succeed in creating the doubt of duality in the minds of advaitin, then clearly the scriptures cannot establish the non-duality.

एकं ब्रह्मास्त्रमादाय नान्यं गणयतः क्वचित् ।

आस्ते न धीरवीरस्य भङ्गः सङ्गरकेलिषु ॥ १५ ॥

Refuting: For the Advaitin who is holding on to the Brahma-Astra, and therefore there is no possible existence of the other. For that one with discrimination and dispassion, there is no defeat in the game of battle.

Brahma-astra – is the most powerful weapon described in the mythology. There is no one or power to oppose it. Or it can be accepted as “brahma eva astra” (the non-dual Self is the weapon).

Dhira – knowledgeable one or a person with a lot of mental strength. This should be accepted to be the discrimination power.

Vira – discrimination. It also means a person with valour, And here the valour is the strength to give-up this world for the sake of the realization.

अपि च -- प्रतीयते तावदिदं सामान्यतो यन्नाम किञ्चित्परश्चेतसा चिन्तयन्नस्तीति, किञ्चित्वा विवक्षुरित्यादि । तत्र

परस्य बुद्धिविषययो विवक्षाविषयो वा विशेषतो विनिगमनं विन नैव् प्रतीयते । ततोऽन्तिम्बुद्ध्यादिभेदो न भवता

शक्यप्रमः, परेण तच्चिन्तनादेरपि संभवात् । स्वस्मात्स्वस्य भेदस्याभावत् । ततस्तत्रलब्धपदा

कथमद्वैतश्रुतिर्विश्वाभेदे पर्यवस्यन्ती त्वया शक्यवाधा स्यात् । तस्मात् --

Refuting: Ad moreover, we do understand in a general way that the other person is thinking about something and / or he is interested in saying something. But without some special lead, we will not able to understand what the other person thinks or desires to speak. Therefore the cognition of the final though function is impossible to establish as valid knowledge, because it is possible the other person too is thinking about the final thought validity. And therefore the final though cannot differentiate itself from itself. Therefore the advaita scripture which has gained a foothold thus and will establish the non-duality of everything, therefore how can that be negated. Therefore -

As explained already the though function can be deciphered in general, even by the yogi, and not specifically. Therefore this general knowledge cannot have any strength to negate the non-dual knowledge.

कथं सामन्यतो ज्ञाते नैव ज्ञाते विशेषतः ।

पदरोधस्त्वया कर्तुं शक्यः स्यादद्वयश्रुतेः ॥ १६ ॥

Refuting: How can that which is cognized generally and not specifically possibly negate / obstruct the advaitic scripture which has gained the foothold.

ननु भेदमनङ्गीकुर्वतो भवतः कथं तत्तत्पदार्थवैचित्र्यव्यवहारो न व्याहन्यते? कथं व्याहन्यते? प्रतिवक्ष्यते हि तत् ।

किं च योऽयं त्वया व्याघात आपादनीयः, सोऽपि कस्माच्चिदापादकात् । न च आपाध्यापादकमभिद्यमानमापत्त्यै

प्रभवेदिति । तस्मात्--

Supporting: If the duality is not accepted by you, then how can the different transactions of word-meaning take place, without falling in the defect of Vyagata (self-contradictory).

Refuting: How can it be self-contradictory, since we are going to negate that (vyagata defect) too? And also, the vyagata that you superimpose, that too should be an effect (or should have a cause, either way regression ad infinitum). And there is no cause-effect relationship that we (advaitins) accept (this will be refuted later). Therefore -

Vyagata – is the defect of self-contradiction. Like, saying explicitly 'i do not have a tongue to speak'. As speaking self-contradicts the absence of tongue.

If the superimposition is causeless, then anyone can also superimpose anything on anybody.

Aapaadya and Aapaadaka are the vyaapya and vyaapaka, that is seen as the cause-effect in the concomitance. And this relationship is refuted in a later chapter.

नानात्वमवलम्ब्यापि वदत्यद्वैतवादिनि ।

असिद्धभेदाद्याघातः पतेदापादकात् कुतः ॥ १७ ॥

Refuting: Even by accepting the manifoldness / duality, the transactions done by the advaitins, still how can there be the defect of self-contradiction, when we do not accept the duality that is not established yet.

8. Refuting the four types of duality

८. चतुर्विधभेदखण्डनम् ।

Before entering this chapter, we should understand clearly We Advaitins do not accept the duality to be real, by transient existing only in the transactional reality. As nothing other than the Self is eternal.

इदमपि च विचारमर्हति -- यद्वैतश्रुतीनां बाधकमुपन्यस्यते प्रत्यक्षादि घटपटप्रभृतिभेदग्राहि, तदपि कीदृश्यर्थे

पर्यवस्यति? तथा हि प्रत्यक्षेण योऽसौ भेदो गृह्यते स किं स्वरूपभेदः ? किमन्योन्याभावः ? किं वैधर्म्यम् ?

किमन्यदेव वा ?

Refuting: This is also to be inquired – the perception etc. negators that you (logician) impose on the advaitins, that which cognizes the pot, cloth etc. How does it objectify the world of duality. That is, the perception etc. which cognizes the duality, is it of the 1. Inherent nature, 2. Absence of one on the other, 3. The contradictory (differentiating) attributes or 4. Something else.

(१) यदि तावत् स्वरूपभेदः, स नाम घटपटयोर्हि स्वरूपं यत् परस्परस्माद् भेदः, तत्परस्परमनन्तर्भाव्य न सम्भवति । भेदो हि भवन् कस्मादपि भवति, अन्यथा स्वरूपं भेद इति पारिभाषिकं नाम स्यात् ।

Refuting: If the duality is accepted as inherent nature – the nature of the pot and cloth is it being different from one another. And this cannot be possible without accepting the other as inherent nature. The duality takes place for anything from anything. Without accepting the other as inherent nature, 'the duality accepted as the inherent nature' will just be an epistemological statement (sans proof).

It should be accepted that the other object is the inherent nature of this object; otherwise there will no possibility to establish the duality between them. If the inherent nature as duality is not proven, then it will be another kind of epistemological term like the 'guna' or 'vridhi' accepted by the grammarians, as explained earlier. And the dictum of logic is "na pratigna maatrena vastu-siddhi, tat ca lakshana-pramaanaabhyaam" (just by naming the object cannot be established, it is done by defining and valid proof).

यदा च 'घटाद् भेदः पटस्य इत्येतावानेवार्थः पटादेः स्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते, तदा घटोऽपि पटात्मन्येव प्रविष्ट इति पटघटयोरैक्यात्म्यमेव भेदग्राहिणा प्रत्यक्षेणाऽवगाहितमिति विपरीतमापद्यते ।

Refuting: If the duality of cloth from the pot is of the nature of cloth (the duality having as its object the pot) as the inherent nature, then the pot is also accepted to the inherent nature of the cloth. The non-duality is what cognized by the perception objectifying the duality, therefore this is completely contradictory.

ननु यथेयं प्रतीतिरभेदोल्लेखितया व्याख्यायते, तथा भेदोल्लेखित्वेऽपि दीयतामस्यां दृष्टिः । अभेदे हि 'घटः' इत्येव 'पटः' इत्येव वा बुद्धिः स्यात्, न तु 'घटाद्भिन्नः पटः' इति चेत् । स्यादप्येष पर्यनुयोगो यद्यविद्याविद्यमानभावं भेदं पारमार्थिकमभेदमिच्छन्तोऽपि प्रत्यादिशामः । तस्मात् --

Supporting: As this cognition is explained in terms of non-duality, see it from the angle explaining the duality too. In the non-duality, the knowledge should be as 'pot' or 'cloth' and not as 'cloth is different form pot'.

Refuting: No. This kind of taunting can be possible, if we negate the duality imposed by the ignorance and the non-duality as the absolute truth. Therefore -

We accept all the transaction including the transaction of the Shastra, Guru, God etc. in the realm of ignorance.

अभेदं नोल्लिखन्ती धीर्न भेदोल्लेखनक्षमा ।

तथा चाद्ये प्रमा सा स्यान्नान्त्ये स्वापेक्ष्यवैशसात् ॥ १८ ॥

Refuting: Without accepting the non-duality we will not be able to cognize the duality. Therefore the former is right knowledge and the latter is different from its cause non-duality.

The knowledge of the form of 'pot, cloth' takes place even before/without the knowledge of 'this pot is not cloth'.

अथ भेदः इत्येतवन्मात्रं पटस्य स्वरूपं घटादिति च तद्धटेन प्रतियोगिना अन्येनैव निरूप्यते; तदपि नोपपद्यते, निष्प्रतियोगिकस्य भेदस्य प्रमणागोचरत्वात् । नित्यम् प्रतियोगिघटित एव तस्मिन् प्रमाणप्रसरात् । का चेयं वाचो युक्तिर्यदन्यासाकाङ्क्षं पटस्य स्वरूपमन्येन प्रतियोगिना निरूप्यमाणं ततो भेदो भवतीति । न हि यत् स्वरूपेणैव नीलम् तत्पीतेन निरूप्यमाणं नीलं भवति ।

Supporting: The inherent nature of the cloth is duality and that as in the case of 'from pot' will be established by the object of absence, which is different from the pot.

Refuting: No this too is impossible. The duality devoid of the object of duality is not cognized by any pramaana. And it is always (as a rule) validated only along with the association of the object of absence. And how can this be logical, the inherent nature of the cloth is not dependent of anything, and that is differentiated by the other object of absence, will establish the duality with the it (pot). That which is naturally blue, cannot be blue because it is established through something that is in yellow.

The absence is always dependent upon the object of absence. Therefore only after establishing the non-duality, the duality can be established. When we say 'ghata-abhaava', we understand the object of absence pot is absent. And this cannot be the same in the case of 'abhaava', where the absence devoid of the object be cognized.

यदपि चोक्तम् -- 'प्रतियोगिना घटेन निरूप्यमाणं पटस्य स्वरूपं भेदः इति तत्रापि पटं प्रति प्रतियोगित्वं घटस्य

किं स्वरूपं किं वा धर्मः कश्चित् ?

Supporting: The duality is the nature of the object cloth established through the object of absence that is pot,

Refuting: For the cloth, the object of absence that is the pot, is it the inherent nature or the attribute.

यदि प्रथमः, तदा पटं प्रति प्रतियोगित्वमित्येतावानेवार्थो घटस्य स्वरूपं भवद् आत्मन्येव पटमपि प्रक्षिपतीति कथं

नाद्वैतमेव पर्यवस्यति ?

Refuting: If it be the first (inherent nature), then the object of absence that is the cloth should be accepted as the inherent nature of the pot. Then the cloth too will be in the self (pot), if so, how will it not end in advaita.

The cloth that is the object of absence for the pot will be an adjective for it. And therefore cannot have a separate existence from the pot, will be the inherent nature of the pot.

तत्रापि यदि प्रतियोगित्वमात्रं घटस्याऽऽत्मा, 'पटं प्रति' इति च पटापेक्षित्वमन्यदेव । तदप्यनुपपन्नम्

अकिञ्चिदपेक्षस्य प्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रमाणाविषयत्वात् । 'पटं प्रति' इत्यत्रापि च स्वरूपतदन्यविकल्पे दोष एव ।

Supporting: Just object of absence that is cloth is the nature of pot. The one as 'for the cloth', (for the pot established by the object of absence that is cloth, which is not its inherent nature), it will be something different.

Refuting: No this too is not possible. The object of absence (pratiyogi) cannot be pramaana independently. Even in the case of 'for the cloth', the same choice of is it its inherent nature or its attribute, kind of defect will follow.

If the **pratiyogi** (object of absence) is of the nature of duality, then since that too is inherent nature of the pot.

Note: We will use Pratiyogi (object of absence) and Anuyogi (place of absence), from here on, to avoid confusion.

नापि द्वितीयः, योऽसौ धर्मः पटं प्रति प्रतियोगित्वं तस्याऽऽत्मनि पटोऽपि प्रविशतीति तेन सह पटस्याद्वैतं स्यात् ।

यदा च पटो घटस्य धर्मतामापन्नस्तदा घटोऽपि पटस्य धर्मतामनेनैव न्यायेन गच्छेत् । न हि पटप्रतियोगित्वस्य

घटेन प्रतियोगिना निरूप्यमाणत्वे घटस्याऽन्या गतिरस्तीति परस्परमाश्रितत्वमाश्रयत्वं च स्यात् । न च कस्यचित्

प्रमाणस्य विषयो घटारूढः पटस्तत्पटारूढश्च स एव घट इति ।

Supporting: The second choice, the pratiyogi cloth existing in the pot, is the attribute of the pot

Refuting: This too is not possible. Since the attribute of pot 'pratiyogi that is established through the cloth, will also exist in the pot, Thus the cloth will be non-dual with the pot. That is, when the cloth is the attribute of the pot, similarly the pot too will be the attribute of the cloth, will be logical.

Supporting: The pot pratiyogi if is established through the cloth pratiyogi, it will be different.

Refuting: No. They will both be attribute for each other, and they will be also base (aashraya) – dependent (aashrayi) for each other. And it cannot be established through any pramaana, that the pot exists in the cloth and the cloth exists in the pot.

किञ्च धर्मस्य तस्य धर्मिणा सममसंबन्धेऽतिप्रसङ्गः, सम्बन्धानन्त्येऽनवस्था, प्रथमतोऽन्ततो गत्वा वा स्वभावसम्बन्धाभ्युपगमे सम्बन्ध्यन्तरस्यापि तत्त्वभावप्रवेशादभेद एव पर्यवसानम् स्यादिति । एवमन्यस्मिन्नपि धर्माविकल्प इति । तस्मात् स्वरूपभेदे प्रमाणं भवत् प्रत्यक्षमद्वैत एव प्रमाणं भवति ।

Refuting: Another point is, if the attribute is not related to the attributed, there will be chaos (as all the attribute will exist in all the attributed). If the relation is accepted, as multiple, then it will lead to regress ad-infinitum. Finally in the beginning or in the end, if the inherent nature is accepted as the relationship, then the other previous relations too will follow suit therefore will lead to non-duality. Similar is the case for the other attributes (of pot-ness etc. in pot). The perception that is accepted as pramaana by you, instead establishes the advaita.

Chaos - Since there is nothing that guides the attribute – attributed relation, there will be chaos, of all / any attribute existing in any / all the attributed.

ननु घटादिकमेव यदाऽन्यानपेक्षं तीक्ष्यते, तदा घटादिकमित्येव प्रतीयते । यदा पुनः पटादिना निरूप्यते, तदा ततो भेद इति प्रतीयते । मैवम् घटादिकमित्येवंभूतप्रतीतेस्तावद्भेदप्रतीतिर्विलक्षणा, सा च न घटादिमात्रेण स्वविषयेण अन्यथाकारा भवितुमर्हति ।

Supporting: If the pot etc. is accepted in independent form, then the cognition will just be pot etc. But when it is established through the cloth (in relation to cloth), then the duality is cognized too.

Refuting: No. The cognition of but is different from the cognition of the duality. And that (duality cognition) cannot differentiate itself from the knowledge that objectifies just the pot etc.

न च पटादिकमधिकं तदा प्रकाशत इति विशेषः स्यात्, घटपटविषयप्रतीतितोऽपि वैलक्षण्यात् । न नि 'घटः पटश्च' 'घटात् पटो भिन्नः' इति प्रतीत्योरेकार्थकत्वं कश्चित् प्रत्येति । तत् कस्य हेतोः ? पञ्चम्या प्रथमया च वैकल्पिकं निर्देशमसहमानयैव प्रतीतिकलहनिरासात् । न हि घटः पटश्चेति प्रत्येतव्ये कश्चिद् घटात् पटो भिन्न इति प्रत्येति । तस्माद् घटस्य न स्वरूपनिरूपणे पटप्रतीत्यपेक्षा ।

Supporting: But there is a speciality of the cognition of cloth too, therefore is different.

Refuting: No. The cognition of the 'pot and cloth' too is different from the 'pot different from cloth'. And no one equates the knowledge of 'pot and cloth' with the 'from pot cloth is different'. What is the reason? The words in the Subjective (first case) and Ablative (fifth case) cannot be interchanged (do not mean the same). No one cognizes 'pot is different from cloth' instead of 'pot and cloth'. Therefore, when there is no expectance for the cloth knowledge in gaining the knowledge of the pot.

न च यत्प्रतीतिर्यत्प्रतीतेः कारणं स्यात्, तत्र तस्याः कारणभूतायाः प्रतीतेर्योऽर्थः तस्माद् 'अयम्' इति कृत्वा कार्यभूतायाः प्रतीतेरर्थः प्रतीयते । माभून्नैर्विकल्पकार्थदिवं सविकल्पकार्थस्य प्रतीतिः । मा च सादृश्यादेरेवं स्मर्यमाणादेः स्यात् । 'पटो घटाद्भिन्नः' इत्याद्याकारेण घटादेर्भेद एव भेदावधिवृतघटादिसंघटितः स्फुटं सर्वलोकसाक्षिकः प्रतीयमानो नैकप्रतीतेरन्यप्रतीत्यपेक्षामात्रेण समर्थयितुं शक्योऽतिप्रसङ्गादिति ।

Supporting: For the knowledge of something that which becomes the cause / reason, there whatever becomes the object for the causal knowledge, 'because of that, this exists', in this way the knowledge of the object of the effect is gained.

Refuting: No. From the unattributed the knowledge of the attributed or from the knowledge of the similarity the knowledge of the memory, which is the cause – effect, let it not take place. Just because; the knowledge of the form of 'cloth is different from pot', which is associated with the pratiyogi pot, will establish

the pot and is accepted by all the learned people, and one knowledge being the cause for another knowledge; does not establish the cause-effect relationship, as it will lead to chaos.

The cause – effect relationship is accepted between the unqualified and qualified, and similarity and memory (understood in the sense of remembrance, here and hereafter). But, this does not necessarily involve the knowledge like, from the 'cow-ness' the knowledge of 'cow' and from the similarity the memory, will also be correct, but it is not accepted to be so.

Ata evaanyonyaabhaavam ?????

Refuting: *For this very reason, the perception of Anyonyaabhaava (absence of one in another), too cannot establish duality to negate the advaitic scripture. By the aforesaid logic, with which the anyonyaabhaava is to be accepted in it the other will exist too.*

Anyonya-abhaava is an absence among praag-abhaava (prior absence), pradhvamsa-abhaava (post absence), and atyanta-abhaava (eternal absence). And is the fourth and final in this absence list. Through this, the absence of pot in cloth and cloth in pot is established, that in turn will refute the advaitic scriptures, as it has established the duality, is the contention of the logician.

Kinca ghatapatayostadvadanyayosca..

Refuting: *Moreover, in the pot, the cloth, and its absence of one another, the taadatmya (tad atmane bhava – identity) should be accepted as the object of absence (pratiyogi) for the absence of one on other (anyonya-abhaava), and if it is not accepted, then the one associated with it or referred by it cannot be established through the pramaana. Nowhere is the something associated or referred by mare's horn can be validated.*

Taadaatmya – identity, is a relation accepted by the vedantins, the logicians accept a similar relation called svaruupa, and therefore do not accept the taadatmya.

Tad kasya heto

Supporting: *What is the reason for not validating?*

Refuting: *Since, a pramaana that tries to objectify that is differentiated by the association or the referral with respect to the mare's horn, without objectifying the adjective or the referral cannot be able to validate the adjectified. And in that non-existent object the pramaana cannot validate anything.*

Na ca vaacyam patapratyogika

Supporting: *We accept the the anyonyaabhaava associated with the pot to be the one associated with cloth as the pratiyogi, and not the atyantaabhaava (eternal absence) as the pratiyogi, therefore the defects pertaining to it will not affect.*

Refuting: *No. Then what will be difference (speciality) of samsargaabhaava (absence in association) and anyonyaabhaava. And you do not accept – the pot absence to be associated with the cloth, therefore the pot samsargaabhaava in the cloth, similarly, the pot absence is of the nature of the cloth therefore the identity of pot absence in the cloth. Therefore, accepting the taadatmya (identity) and samsarga (association) in the state of pratiyogi, you have to differentiate the anyonya and samsarga abhaava. Then, you cannot escape the defect of the aforesaid, accepting the eternal absence to be the pratiyogi.*

The logician wants to accept the anyonyaabhaava is not a pratiyogi in identity (taadaatmya) with the pot, cloth etc. But it is in one-another, the anyonyaabhaava of pot in the cloth and of that of the cloth in the pot. There is no natural difference between the samsarga and anyonya abhaava, but the difference is due to the pratiyogi (object of absence) and anuyogi (place of absence).

Na ca vaacyam ghate patatvam naasti

Supporting: *The anyonyaabhaava can be explained by just accepting the absence of the pot-ness in cloth and cloth-ness in the pot.*

Refuting: *No. Then since there is no such different attributes accepted between the pot-ness and cloth-ness. If it is accepted to be bound to each other, therefore the identity between them is accepted. Then again, there will negation of pot-ness in the cloth and cloth-ness in the pot, thereby the pramaana that validates will cognize the absence of pot-ness and cloth-ness. Thus there will be no duality of Svaruupa (inherent nature) or of the Vaidharmya (contradictory attributes), therefore what will the anyonyaabhaava objectify as the pratiyogi or as the object, thus validating the pot and cloth as duality.*

After negating the svarupa and the anyonyaabhaava, the third type of duality that is, vaidharmya (contrary attributes) is refuted next.

Refuting: For this very reason, the vaidharmya will also not be able to establish the duality and thus not capable in negating the advaitic scripture through the direct perception. Even in accepting the vaidharmya between the pot and cloth, is the vaidharmya accepted in itself or not. If it is accepted in itself, then there will be no end to this thus leading to regression ad infinitum. And this will lead to the non-cognition of anything. And therefore, if the vaidharmya is not accepted in itself, then how can it differentiate itself, since it has become non-dual with its substratum.

If vaidharmya is accepted in itself, there will be atmashraya-dosha (defect of self-dependence). If it is accepted in relation with the other, then there will be anyonya-ashraya dosha (defect of inter-dependence). If the next is accepted to validate the previous there will be anavastha dosha (regression ad infinitum). And as vedantin accepts anaadi (beginningless) state, if the logician too accepts the anavastha as not defect, then there will be no cognition.

Kin ca ye te vaidharmye

Refuting: And moreover, the vaidharmya that is accepted by you, do you accept it in the cloth etc. that are different entity than the pot or in the same entity. Since there is no other possibility, for that which are opposites to each other.

The vaidharmya can either be in the one or other, as there is no third state. Since, they cannot exist in both, since it is contradictory or the absence of both, since it is impossible.

Aadye yena bhedena

Refuting: If the vaidharmya is accepted in a different entity, that too will be uncontrolled (existing in a different entity), therefore will end in regression ad infinitum.

Santu ananta eva bheda

Supporting: Let there be multiple dualities in the entity.

Refuting: No. If it (multiplicity) is accepted in a order (chronological), this cannot be possible in an entity that is limited (with beginning and end).

Yadi jaayamaanam vastu

Supporting: Let all of it (duality) be there in the entity produced in one instance (moment).

Refuting: No. Then what is the rule that establishes what should be endowed with what duality and what not. And what should enter first or what not, since there is no kind of such rule, there will be chaos in between them.

caramacarama

Refuting: The final duality will be the cause in establishing the former duality, thus leading to the situation of the student who forgets the previous lessons while remembering the current lesson. And therefore, what will this series of duality objectify. In similar way, one should see in other places too.

Here the similar places said is the class etc. This the author has explained in one-off sloka while refuting the opponent logician who called the author a donkey. "does the donkey-ness exist in only the donkey or in other places too, if it is the former then that donkey-ness does not exist in me, so it does not suit me, and therefore if it is accepted to be the latter, then it exists in you too, so you cannot single me out".

Sloka 19

Refuting: If there is no rule accepted in establishing the duality, there will be three defects 1. Praaglopa (the destruction of the previous) – the latter duality establishes the former duality, making the former duality redundant. 2. Avinigama (chaos) – which duality exists in which, since there are multiple dualities accepted. 3. Pramaana-apagama (absence of the pramaana) – if there are multiple dualities in one, where and how can it be validated.

As in the medicine (ayurveda shastra), there defects are accepted if the timing of the food is not properly followed (anavasthita aasthanu). They are vata (gas), pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm).

Yadi ca kvacid gatva

Supporting: We (logician) accept the duality is established by the svarupa (inherent nature), that differentiates them both.

Refuting: No. The inherent nature will also be differentiated from them (pot or cloth), thus there will be left without any nature.

Atha ca svarupamaatram

Supporting: The common nature will not be the differentiator, then what will? The special nature is the differentiator.

Refuting: No. If the special nature is the differentiator, then the general nature will become non-dual. Or you (logician) should say there is a different special nature that is differentiator (that is different from the common nature), this is not possible too.

The special nature to be different from the common nature is not experienced by anyone, like the pot nature exists in the pot and only has pot-ness, and nothing of different nature is experienced here.

Atha na svarupam nama

Supporting: We do not accept any common nature to exist in everything, but accept the special (differentiator) nature in the individual entities, and that too has different meaning.

Refuting: No. This very logic negates any desire in you (logician) to establish the cow-ness etc. class. And there will be no common knowledge of cow or its class (as it is multitude).

Jati (class) is accepted by logicians as "ekam ityam anekanugatam" (one, eternal and existing in many), which we Vedantins do not accept for obvious reasons, as we do not accept anything other than the Self to be eternal and non-dual,

Yadi svarupam bheda

Supporting: The svarupa (inherent nature) itself is the duality.

Refuting: Then, if the entity is perceived, the duality too will be perceived along with, there can be no doubt or erroneous knowledge.

If the duality is perceived along with the entity, as it is its inherent nature. There can be no doubt regarding any object 'is it a person or a tree' or the erroneous knowledge 'this is a person and not a tree'

Therefore finding oneself in trouble by accepting the first option bhinna (different), if the logician accepts the other option of abhinna (in the very entity).

Yadi ca abhinne

Supporting: The duality is accepted in the non-dual (itself).

Refuting: No. Then whatever pot etc. is perceived, will be differentiated from itself. Since, there is absence of even one entity, there cannot be multiple entities.

Etena na bhedaavacchinne

Supporting: (if it be accepted) we do not accept the duality to be differentiated by duality or non-duality, but by being not bothered about the duality or non-duality association.

Refuting: No. Because there will be defect of itself being in itself.

The logician tries to apply the logic of the Khandana, as seen in the case of the existence and non-existence of the dialog. He says, we are not bothered about the duality or non-duality association in establishing the duality. As there can be the duality in itself, there can be the non-duality too.

Ata eva ca bheda

Supporting: The duality is something that is different from svarupa, anyonya-abhaava and vaidharymya (as accepted earlier) but is of the different type called prthaktvam (separate-ness).

Refuting: This also is negated as earlier. For in the case of prthaktva, will it exist in itself or not, then will have the same defects as earlier.

The logician accepts an attribute called prthaktvam which is opposite to the samyoga. Samyoga is the attribute which takes place between two separate things. And when this which is in samyoga is separated it is called prthaktvam.

Svaashrayena ca svasminnabheda

Refuting: For the fear of non-duality in accepting the duality existing in itself as substratum, if that itself is accepted as duality, then the defect of self-dependence will occur. If for this reason the duality is accepted to be due to different, then for it another and then another, this way it will lead to the defect of regression ad infinitum. If the non-duality is accepted in the end finally at some point, between the duality and its substratum, then starting from there till the beginning there will be non-duality established.

Sloka 20 - 21

Refuting: Negation of the scriptures establishing the non-duality is dismissed by the direct perception, and therefore you too cannot accept it being negated by the inference etc. The arthapatti (postulation) battalion does a nice service to the advaitic scriptures by completely destroying the opponents of duality.

Since the perception itself cannot establish anything, the logicians too cannot accept the inference etc. which are based on the perception to negate the advaitic scriptures.

Nanu advaitashrutayo varnapada.

Supporting: But the advaitic scriptures establish the non-duality based on the alphabets, words, suffixes, and its meaning without accepting the duality cannot establish its meaning (purport), how can the advaitic scriptures negate its cause; since the upajivaka (effect) is weaker than the upajivya (cause).

Refuting: No. We do not accept the absence of the duality completely. Then what, we establish the non-existence of it in absolute reality. We do accept the illusory existence of the duality and that is useful in the cause-effect relationship.

Etena ekamevetyevakaara

Refuting: Thus, the adjunct 'eva' (only) in the scripture of 'ekam eva advitiam' (one and non-dual); duality in the 'advitiam' (non-dual), multiplicity in 'nana neti' (not multiple), by 'kincana' (anything) without the multiple is not possible, therefore it is self-contradictory, is also refuted.

Shrutibhuicaadavaitarthibhi

Refuting: The scriptures for the person desiring the non-duality, establishes the non-duality as the absolute reality. And the absolute knowledge be negated by the non-absolute (illusory) knowledge. By the negation of the mother of pearl – silver, the real mother of pearl cannot be negated. But, wherever the knowledge of the 'fire is cold (non-hot)' which is based on the knowledge of it to be hot, therefore by the knowledge of the heat the knowledge of the non-heat is negated, in these places both of them (knowledge) are a product of the ignorance therefore it being negated is proper.

Nany tatrapa tarhi

Supporting: The why not accept the non-heat too as the reality, and not to be negated.

Refuting: No. The non-heat is seen in the examples like the water etc. which is not different from the nature of cold etc. are accepted to be a product of the ignorance. If it is not accepted to be so, then the advaita is accepted in a different name (cold is synonym for Self). Therefore, since the duality of object of knowledge and knowledge has to be accepted, there is no possibility of the logic that refutes the existence of the world to not be in its grasp.

Advaita ca dvaitaashrayasya

Refuting: In the advaita, since there is no place for the negation that is based on the duality to be reality, it being a non-reality (absolute) is refuted from far-off.

Nanu kimadvaitaparamaarthataabhyupagamena

Supporting: What is achieved by establishing the advaita to be absolute? Since, by the negation of the cause (upajivya) the scriptures cannot establish the valid knowledge in the advaita.

Refuting: No. The advaita which is absolute can only be negated by an absolute duality and not by the illusory duality. Therefore the duality that is based on the illusory and its knowledge that is an effect cannot negate the cause of all that is absolute non-duality.

Yadi shrutijanya

Refuting: Even if the cognition of non-duality be accepted to be gained by the scriptures that is in the state of the ignorance, but still the object of knowledge is absolute reality that is advaita. And only if there is something that is contrary, there can be negation of it (advaita), and there is no such contrary state.

Since whatever gained is limited, the advaita will also be limited, therefore will be non-eternal, is the idea behind the logician's question.

Sloka 22

Refuting: The scripture taking refuge in the absolute non-duality will not be afraid even a little bit from the duality that is the effect.

The scripture too says this, 'dvitiyaad vai bhayam bhavati' (from duality there is fear).

Tacca advaitam

Refuting: And that advait (thus gained) is identical with the Brahman (Self), as explained by the scripture "brahmaiva idam sarvam" (all this is verily the Self). And by the scripture 'vignanam aanandam brahmanam' (the Self is knowledge and bliss), the Self exists as the absolute knowledge and bliss. Thus the advaitic knowledge that is gained by the scripture, will establish only in the advaita that is knowledge itself.

Though the knowledge gained is through the thought function, and therefore there will be duality, the thought function has for it the Self as the object and does not objectify the Self (there is only vrtti-vyaapya and no phala-vyaapya – when we gain the knowledge of pot, the thought function has for its object pot, and there is the knowledge of the object that is pot, but this is not so in the case of the Self, as it has no form etc. to be objectified).

Nanu katham shrutya janyatvam

Supporting: How can it (advaitic knowledge) be accepted as to be created by the scriptures.

Refuting: True. This question is valid, if the created knowledge of the scripture too is accepted as absolute. But, the creation aspect is accepted from the standpoint of the ignorance transaction. From the absolute, the Self stands as non-created and therefore there is no contradiction.

Ata eve shrutya idam eka sadhyate

Supporting: But the oneness as established by the scripture, what is it – is it absence of duality, or is it the number, or is it the form of knowledge, or is this oneness a synonym for the attribute of the non-duality – that is accepted. All these will not stand the test of self-contradiction.

Refuting: If so, let that knowledge of the oneness too along with the 'created', not able to withstand the onslaught of the advaitic scripture get refuted.

Yattu taadrshasyaadvaitasya

Refuting: Whatever remains as cognized as the attributed for those types of non-dual attribute, that which remains as non-refuted will be the absolute. The mother of pearl that is absolute (worldly) seen as silver, when is refuted will only remove the knowledge of it being silver, and that does not because of its defect of identification negate the mother of pearl (attributed) too.

Seyam advaita shruti

Refuting: And this knowledge of non-duality (advaita) should not be refuted by the learned, presenting hundreds of logic (illogic). This is said by the scriptures 'naisha tarkena matiraapaneya' (this knowledge should not be refuted through logic).

The Katha scripture can be interpreted in two ways, if the final word is accepted as 'apaneyaa' it means refuted if it is accepted as 'aapaneyaa' it means gained.

Sloka 23

Refuting: Therefore – you those who are blessed with knowledge! (logician), Should apply your intelligence to negate the non-duality, only when you desire to throw the precious stone Chintamani in the hand into the ocean.

Chintamani is a wish-fulfilling precious stone.

Seyamadvaitadrshiti drshtaarthaapi

Refuting: And this vision of non-duality gives experiential result. This is said – 'svalpamapyasya dhamsya traayate mahato bhayaat' (this knowledge even in small measure (or gained through past virtue), will rescue us from greater fear).

There are two types of result for anything – drshta (seen) and adrshta (unseen). The karmas produce results like 'swarga' (heaven) which are unseen type. Here, we experience the result of advaitic knowledge namely the 'ananda' (bliss), 'abhaya' (fearlessness) etc.

Svalpam means normally small, even in small measure, knowledge cannot be gained in parts, therefore should be accepted as the knowledge gained through the previous virtues without performing the inquiry properly.

Sloka 24

Refuting: Therefore – only by the grace of the Isvara (God) the advaitic knowledge is gained by two or three persons, that which saves from the greater fear.

Sloka 25

Refuting: *This is strange, this advaita as accepted (perceived) by the non-dualists, that is gained by the scriptures will fructify as self-effulgent absolute Self, through the inquiry without any obstacle.*

Tadidam etabhiratma

Refuting: *This well-meaning teachings laden with strong right logic to establish the Self (or) ones non-dual philosophy) that which we have been establishing, you (logician) one who heavily depends upon logic interested in establishing the world of duality, have conviction (faith) in it. Following it for the one having complete faith on the teachings based on the Upanishads desiring to know the absolute truth, ones true Self, in time through a mind devoid of the thought functions, will cognize the self-effulgent witness principle, which is sweeter than the sweetness of the honey.*

Whatever maybe the teaching, whether it be based on the scriptures or not (theist or atheist), the one common link is to cease the mind of its thought functions. This is verily said by the Yoga Sutra as 'yoga chitta-vrtti nirosha' (yoga is cessation of thought functions). Or the Buddhist talking about the 'No Mind'.

Yatha ca pariharta

Refuting: *These methods for the mind to be relieved of its wandering nature and enjoying the bliss of being immersed in that ocean of absolute Truth without effort, is explained in the canto of 'paramapurusha-stuti' (extolling the absolute self) in our text Naishadiya-charita.*

The methods of devotion to Iswara, repetitive practice and the complete dispassion coupled with the shrabana, manana and nidhidhyaasana (listening, contemplating, and meditating) is discussed there.

9. Applying the refuting logic as desired

This chapter is devoted to discussing the usefulness of this refuting logic. Though the refuting logic on face-value seems to be for gaining victory in a dialog with unwanted jugglery of dry-logic, still the main purpose of the text is for the true seeker to gain the establishment in the Self, as explained in the concluding portion of the previous chapter. Though as a by-product this logic can also be used to refute the opponents and gain victory in any type of dialog.

Or if the final portion of the previous chapter is taken seriously, then it leads to the defect of Pratigna-haani (loss of the declaration in the beginning), as the text started with 'lokeshu dig-vijaya' (gain the victory over the world), which literally means to gain victory over the world of duality. This negates the other side of the possibility, which is to use this logic in a dialog with the desire to win.

Sloka 26

Refuting: *The refuting logic used by us to establish our desired object of non-duality is not negated by you (logicians) similar to the order of a king. Therefore, why not use this very logic as desired to establish your own philosophies in the respective dialogs.*

Tadetadrshishy sarvaasvapi

Refuting: *These refuting logics of ours can be used as desired in establishing based on any philosophy. Without the order of the Iswara (or the King) who rules this world, these logics cannot be negated, so to show this text is done.*

Though the real Khandana-Khanda-Khadya text is over here. The application portion is to be started from here, to show these logics are irrefutable, without a powerful obstacle in the form of a decry from the iswara 'let these refuting logic explained here be fruitless' or the king 'no one is to use this refuting logic'.

Tathahi - yadi

Refuting: *If you are following the philosophy of Shunya-vaada (Buddhist voidism) or the Anirvacaniya-vaada (the philosophy of inexplicability / advaita), then these logic will be applicable everywhere without any trouble.*

As the voidist and the vedantin do not have anything to establish, they are difficult to refute using this khandana logic. Still, the voidist can be refuted by the vedantin as explained in the earlier chapter explain the difference between the voidism and Vedanta.

Yada tu pramaanabhyupagantrnaam

Refuting: *If this logic is used by the people, both of whom accept the existence of the pramaana, than each of them should apply the logic refuting the definition should be applied to refute the others special (different) definition and the logic refuting the defined to refute the others pramaana etc.*

Na ca sautraadilakshana

Supporting: *If we refute the definition of the sutra (aphorism) etc., then we will be facing the defect of Apa-siddhanta (losing our base philosophy).*

Refuting: *No. Since we are going to refute only the definition if the type explained in the sutras etc.*

If the dialog is between two people following the different schools of the same philosophy, then by refuting the other there will be negation of the base philosophy itself, if be said, this is negated. Since, we only refute the definition based on the other school there is no trouble, as there can be a different definition for it.

Na ca vaacyam lakshanavishesha

Supporting: *But by refuting the other schools special definition, pramaana etc. and the commentary then we should supply with a different irrefutable definition, pramaana etc. and the commentary.*

Refuting: *No. Since we are refuting the others based on the dialog of the type of Vitanda (refuting). And in this type of dialog, where there is no necessity to establish one's philosophy, there cannot be any pressure to do so.*

In the three types of dialog as explained earlier (in the first chapter), we are going to use our logic in the dialog of Vitanda. Therefore, our prime job is only to refute the others and not establish anything, as the definition for the Vitanda states 'svapaksha-staapana –hino vitanda' (Vitanda is a dialog where one's own standpoint will not be established / stated).

Evam ca sati vaadidarshanamaashritya

Refuting: *Thus, based on any philosophy of the party, these khanda logic is applicable without any obstacle, as even among them one can present it like a Ekadeshi (follower of a school in the same philosophy). As in the case of the grammarians regarding the question about the proper word form, though both belong to the same philosophy, there is a possibility of countering each other.*

There are different schools in the Sanskrit grammar, like Aindra, Chaandra, Paanini etc. With regard to the word-form of a particular word, there can be debate over the methodology. This is the case with the Logicians too, where there are different schools like Gadaadara or Jagadisha . Or in Mimamsa, where we have Bhatta and Prabhakara (Guru) schools. Or in Vedanta we have Vivarana and Bhaamati schools.

Vastusthitim

Refuting: *For the one who wants to know the reality (the follower of Vaada Katha), should definitely present this refuting logic. Otherwise the truth of the object will not be established, therefore the Khandana logic are useful in the Vaada type of dialog too.*

In vaada dialog 'tattva-bubhukshunaam katha' (two people desiring to know the truth) too this logi should be used other than the Vitanda dialog.

Jalpastveka kathaa

Refuting: *But there can be no individual (pure) dialog called as Jalpa, since it is a conglomerate of two Vitanda dialogs. Otherwise, even by mixing two Jalpa dialog why not imagine another new dialog. In the topic discussion on the Jalpa dialog, we will discuss this in detail.*

Since in the Jalpa too, the opponents try to defeat the other by showing the error in the other dialog (defintiion or the pramaana etc.), it should be accepted as a combination of two vitanda dialog.

Jalpa dialog though is said as to be discussed in a different portion, is not discussed here, but in the other text called Iswara-abhisandhi by the same author.

Jalpakathayaapi

Refuting: *Even if the Jalpa is accepted as a different form of dialog, when the opponent to escape being defeated presents a logic which is agains one's own school, that should be refuted using these Khandana logic. Therefore, the khandana logic are not totally useless even in the Jalpa dialog.*

This is the speacility of the Jalpa, where the Chala (deceitful) logic will be used. Sometimes the illogic will be presented in the garb of a right logic, when the opponent is able to present the defect he wins otherwise

the other wins. Therefore, here if the opponent is able to dismiss this illogic showing the flaw, using the khandana logic is possible.

10. Refuting definition – in general

Supporting: *How should the refuting logic is used.*

Refuting: *Let us explain. Any object of experience is dependent on the definition, and this definition is impossible. Since they are laden with the cyclic defect etc. through the definitions of the knowledge, substratum etc.*

Any object is understood or differentiated from the other through the known definition. Here the question arises, 'what is the knowledge' the answer will have to be 'that which has knowledge-ness', as the cow-ness, goat-ness, pot-ness or human-ness, that differentiates itself from others by giving its knowledge, we have the knowledge-ness. Because, knowledge is that which is endowed with knowledge-ness. Now we have another question, 'what is this knowledge-ness', this will have to be answered as 'a special type of class', this again will have to be questioned as 'what is this class', the answer invariably will be, 'that is interlude in all the knowledge'. When the knowledge is established the knowledge (interlude) is established defect of self-dependence (atmashraya dosha). When the knowledge is established the knowledge-ness is established, and when vice-versa is the defect of inter-dependence (atmashraya dosha). And the classical cyclic defect (chakraka dosha), when the knowledge (interlude) is established the class is established, when the class is established the knowledge-ness is established and when this knowledge-ness is established the knowledge is established.

11. Refuting definition – in specific (prama – right knowledge)

Since all the transactions of the world based on the prameya (the object of knowledge) and pramaana (means of right knowledge) is based on the Prama (knowledge), this is taken as the first special definition to be refuted in the application portion.

Supporting: *Among the definitions first we take, Prama (knowledge) is defined as 'tattva-anubhuti' (experience of the reality).*

Refuting: *It is also impossible. Since the term 'tattvam' cannot be expressed. Tattvam is explained as 'tasya bhava' (its state), and 'tat' (that) means the current topic of discussion. And we don't see anything as the current topic, which can be referred to with 'tat'.*

The definition of prama is done by Sri Shivaaditya Mishra ji in his text called 'Lakshana-maalaa'. Tattva here means, the reality of the object.

Atha Anubhootya

Supporting: *The experience (anubhuti) always expects a related object, and thus associated that object with the intellect, and this is referred to as 'tat' (that) here. The meaning of the word 'prakarana' (current topic) comes to a conclusion with the idea of the speaker and the listener. Thus, whatever be the idea (purport) of a word-meaning, that is what is called as 'tattva' (reality).*

Refuting: *No. The non-silver (mother-of-pearl) too has the possibility of being experienced as the silver, the definition over-pervades in these illusory experiences. The knowledge that takes place is not the reality, therefore in the dharmi-part (the object mother-of-pearl) and the endowed part (mother-of-pearl endowed with this), though is prama (right knowledge) will be invalid (wrong knowledge).*

In a super-imposition there are three parts, the part of this, the part of the endowed with super-imposition and the substratum.

Athocyate - avayavaarthavintayaa

Supporting: *Stop showing the defect here accepting the parts since it is not proper, as the word 'tattva' means the inherent-nature.*

Refuting: No this too is not proper. What is this svarupa (inherent nature), is it a class (jati) or an embodiment (upadi). It is impossible either way, if it is accepted in itself or not. The inherent nature is not a common factor, and is different from each object (pot, cloth etc.), therefore there can be no definition possible, and there will be under-pervasion (avyapti).

If it (svarupa) is accepted in itself, then we have the defect of self-dependence (atmashraya) and it does not exist in itself then this will be proper, as the nature itself does not exist in itself, than how can it be called nature.

Kathanca tattveti

Refuting: Moreover, if the tattva is the inherent-nature how can the wrong knowledge (or the over-pervasion) be negated. That is, the knowledge is the silver in the mother-of-pearl too is the inherent-nature. We cannot negate the attributed or the silver-ness as it is the nature too, and the association which is in-between them is also the inherent-nature.

Supporting: True. The association between the silver and the silver-ness though is samavaaya, the association between the mother-of-pearl and the silver-ness cannot be samavaaya, since it does not exist.

Refuting: Not so. Though it (silver-ness) does not exist, the inherent-nature (of the relation) cannot be dismissed. Just because 'Devadutta' is not in the house, does not make him devoid of svarupa (existence).

Like the right knowledge or the existent knowledge is the inherent nature, the wrong or the non-existent Knowledge too is the inherent nature, as it was established during the discussion of existence and non-existence of pramaana in a dialog.

Any object has three parts – the attribute, the attributed, and the association. In the case of a pot, the pot is the attributed, the attribute is the pot-ness, and the relation between them samavaaya-sambandha (the inseparable relation) is the association.

Na svaruoamattam tattvamucyate

Supporting: The svarupa in itself is not the reality, but the knowledge of the object in relation with the time and space, is its reality (tattva) in relation with that time and space.

Refuting: No. There can be no existence of time and space in itself, therefore, will the definition will under-pervade (avyapti)

Supporting: Their (time and space) inherent-nature is itself the reality (there will be no relation of time and space in itself).

Refuting: No. If the meaning of the word 'tattva' is non-unified (multiple) the definition will not pervade the defined.

If the definition of the tattva is seen to be in association with the time and space elsewhere and without its association in itself, to avoid the defect, then the definition changes colour in different places, that is, its has multiple meanings, which will not be proper for defining anything properly.

Athavam brushe

Supporting: Therefore if it be said, whatever object seen is in reality endowed with the very same attribute, then that is called as the tattva.

Refuting: No this too is not right. Whatever is seen in whatever way, that object if in a different time becomes so (as perceived), then that too will become its tattva. For example, the pot that will become red after the baking, if is seen due to red-biliusness as red during the unbaked state, that will become tattva too, and that knowledge too will become right knowledge.

Red-biliusness is a kind of defect (disease) which will like jaundiced vision, make one see everything in red.

Yada tadeti visheshanaprakshpens

Supporting: When the knowledge is qualified with 'yada' (when), 'tada' (then), then there will not be the aforesaid defect.

Refuting: No. The one endowed with time cannot be related to the time.

If the knowledge gained of the object as seen as it is, is qualified with the when and then, as, in whatwver time the object is seen with its real attributes, that if is seen as it is in the same period is tattva.

As seen earlier, the time cannot be endowed / associated with itself, since the existence of itself is not accepted in itself. And if it does not have any association with time, the time qill nit be qualified to be time.

Anyonyupadhi

Supporting: *One embodiment being the embodiment of the other is possible.*

Refuting: *No. Then the Devadutta with a staff will be substratum for the Devadutta with the ear-ring.*

Here the logician tries to present the idea – in space the space embodied by the room is the substratum for the space embodied by the pot or in time the time embodied by the year is the substratum for the time embodied by the month, fortnight, day, hour etc. Similarly can one time be the substratum for another time in embodiment.

But this is not tenable, as one person devadutta if is seen as different due to the embodiments, and the very same becomes the reason for one embodiment being the substratum for the other.

Upaadhibhede api upadheyasya

Supporting: *But, though the embodiment is different, the embodied is the same.*

Refuting: *No. The situation here too is the same.*

The situation here, with respect to the time, is the same too, though the embodiments differ.

Etena kaarana

Refuting: *(With this the cause is reality is negated too). The cause is not accepted as the reality.*

Because the cause is defined as “kaarya-niyata-poorva-vrttitvam” (that which has a definite prior existence to the effect). And the time cannot exist prior to its existence, and time cannot be accepted in itself, for the fear of the defect of self-dependence.

There are three reasons given for refuting the cause as the tattva they are –
Sarvasya tathaatve

Refuting: *All of them are not seen to be the same (as having a cause).*

In this first case, the supporter's logic is, though the others have a prior existence before the effect, in the case of the time it just exists, and does not have to have a different prior existence. But this is not acceptable, as the logician accepts in the case of the atom, the size as parimandalya (this is the state of no mass and no size), and in the case of the final effect, which is not a cause for anything.

Atmaashrayena Ca

Refuting: *And for the reason of the defect of the self-dependence.*

If the cause is accepted to be the object, then what is it? It should be explained as that which has cause-ness. Now, does the cause-ness have cause-ness or no. If it is no, then that itself is devoid of cause-ness. And if we accept the cause-ness, then one is dependent on the other, and since both are same (cause-ness) there will be defect of self-dependence. If it is accepted to be different cause-ness then what will it have cause-ness, if it is the first cause-ness, then it will lead to the defect of inter-dependence. If another is accepted it will lead to the cyclic, and finally regression ad infinitum.

Pratikshanavishishta

Supporting: *As everything is momentary, the previous moment association will be accepted as the cause for the latter moment association.*

Refuting: *No. If the cause is accepted to be the non-negatable momentary existence, then since you (logician) have surrendered to the followers of Buddha, therefore will face the defect of Nigrahasthana (falling from one's philosophy called ApaSiddhanta).*

Buddha is referred to as Jaina too according to the Amarakosha (dictionary).

12. Refuting definition of the experiential-ness class

After negating the first portion of the definition of the Prama (valid knowledge) that is 'tattva' now the author goes on to refute the next part 'anubhuti' (experience) as in-explicable.

Kinca

Refuting: *Again what is this anubhuti (experience-ness). Is it 1. The class of the pervaded for the knowledge-ness, or 2. Knowledge-ness being different from the memory, or 3. Knowledge-ness devoid of the memory, or 4. The knowledge-ness of the special cause that has definitive existence just prior to the creation.*

Vyaapya is Prevaded – having existence in lesser place, for example smoke and Vyaapaka is pervade – having existence in greater place, for example fire. The smoke may not exist, but still the fire exists therefore it is vyaapaka. Here the class is the vyaapya for the knowledge-ness. The experience 'anubhava' is explained as the second choice as given here in the texts of logic.

Na taavad aadya

Refuting: *It cannot be the first. How did you (logician) come to a conclusion of accepting the class for the experience.*

Since the experience itself is in question, there cannot be experience-ness, prior to the proof if it. If the experience is prove through experience-ness (as that which ha the other), the there will be the defect of inter-dependence (anyonya-aashraya) etc.

Anubhavaami

Supporting: *I came to the conclusion because of the knowledge 'I experience'.*

Refuting: *No. With the strength of the scriptures that declare taking bath in the confluence of the Sita (Ganga) and Asita (Yamuna) (in Allahabad) in the month of Magha (jan – feb), will lead to the Heaven, even though one takes bath does not have the knowledge 'I am experiencing happiness', on the contrary gains the knowledge of the experience due to cold. And similarly, the one who is a believer but is inflicted by the desire, even though the scriptures declare copulating with others wife will lead to the worst of the Hell, still does not have the knowledge 'I am experiencing the pain / sorrow', but on the contrary gains the knowledge 'I am experiencing the currently greater happiness'.*

The logician explains that in all the four different types of knowledge's through the four valid means, pratyaksha (perception), anumaana (inference), upamaana (comparison) and shabda (verbal testimony), there is the knowledge of the experience of, I perceive, I infer, I compare and I hear, with respect to each of the different pramaana.

Yadi shabdopadarshita

Supporting: *The knowledge gained by the verbal testimony and the knowledge of the inference gained through the concomitance is experience.*

Refuting: *No. If so, then the knowledge gained thus will be 'i am experiencing happiness / sorrow'.*

Atha manyase

Supporting: *Though with reference to the general experience (of the layman), the knowledge of 'experience' takes place only in the perception, even then for the learned the knowledge of 'experience' takes even in the knowledge of inference and verbal testimony.*

Refuting: *No. In the knowledge of the perception if the knowledge of the experience is accepted, there is no reason to accept the experience-ness class and there is no proof to establish it. There will be the defect of Ananugama too.*

The defect of ananugama is – if we accept the meaning of the experience-ness in the whole (inference, verbal testimony, also the perception), then there will be no need to accept it only in the perception and if it is accepted only in the perception then it (experience-ness) will not be there in all of them.

Atha smrtivyaavrttena

Supporting: *The knowledge which is different from memory (smrti-bhinnam gnanam – anubhava), that is experience is seen all the pramaana (perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison). And there (in others) there cannot be the perception-ness. Thus, we have to accept the experience-ness as something different, seen as the special perception and the common non-perception difference.*

Refuting: *No, this too is not possible. In the knowledge with reference to differentiating other substance (smrti-bhinnam – different from memory), the differentiating factor that is common thread is the cause and the class with reference to it (experience-ness) should not be imagined. Otherwise, even in the pot etc.; which are not the eye, seen as different from it like the scare-crow etc. too; there will be the necessity of imagining the eye-ness.*

The logicians accept the experience as "smrti-bhinnam gnaanam" (the knowledge different from the memory).

Itopi nanubhutitvam smrti

Refuting: *For another reason too, the experience-ness is not a class that is different from the memory. That is, in the Pratyabhignaa (recollection) of 'this is that pot' takes place, is it (pratyabhignaa) accepted as*

two knowledge of memory and experience, or is it one knowledge with memory and experience parts, or is it only memory or is it only experience.

In the recollection of 'that is this ...', we have two portions 'that' and 'this'. In this 'that' is the object associated with a different (past) time and place and 'this' is the object associated with current (present) time and place.

In this recollection the Vedanti gives four choice for the logician – 1. Two knowledge each of the form of memory and experience. 2. One knowledge of the form of memory and experience combined. 3. Of the form of memory only. And 4. Of the form of experience only.

Aadye ya esha

Refuting: *In the first (two knowledge of the form of memory and experience), the non-duality that shines between the object associated with the past stage and the object associated with the present stage, cannot be included in the memory, as it is not experienced earlier and therefore cannot have the thought imprint.*

The knowledge of duality cannot be included in the memory portion. Because the memory is accepted as "samskaara-matra janyam" (that which is generated only by thought imprints). This is why, the logicians accept a dictum, "ya ya smrti sa sa anubhavapoorvikaa" (whatever is memory is gained through a previous experience). And this knowledge of non-duality does not exist in the previous stage.

Ata eva na tritiya

Refuting: *For this very reason it cannot be the third (memory only). And it (non-duality) cannot be included in the experience, since during the time of recollection the object of the previous stage does not exist for experience. If it is accepted as experienced, then it will be accommodated in the fourth choice (experience only), and this will be refuted later.*

Ata eva na dvitiya

Refuting: *For this reason the second choice (one knowledge with two portions of experience and memory) too is not possible. If the non-duality is accepted between the previous stage and this object as experience. The one with the adjective of previous stage, too will be an object of experience, thus will enter the fourth choice.*

Atha praagavasthaavishishtaadabhinna

Supporting: *The non-duality of the object associated with the previous stage too has different parts, The portion associated with the previous existence is memory-ness and the portion associated with the non-duality is experience-ness.*

Refuting: *No. Then through the memory and the experience the knowledge of the non-duality of the object associated previous stage with the object associated with the current stage is gained. But as the substratum for the object associated with the previous stage, the non-duality is not illumined by any means, and therefore the recollection of the form of 'that which is associated with the previous stage is verily this object' will not take place.*

Atha anubhavena

Supporting: *Through the experience the non-duality that is experienced as based on the dharmi (object), this experience (of non-duality) is impossible without accepting the other Pratiyogi (object of absence), since it is seen that the non-duality takes place for something in relation to something. Therefore, that which is gained through the part of the memory, due to its close proximity, the Pratiyogi will be that which is associated with the previous stage. Thus the non-duality is established to be based on the Pratiyogi in association with the previous stage.*

Refuting: *This is impossible. By saying that, it will be dependent on the Pratiyogi, what is said, is it (the non-duality will be) generated based in the form of Pratiyogi of the object in association with the previous stage or is it that (the non-duality) will be cognized based in the form of Pratiyogi of the object in association. It cannot be the first (generated), If the non-duality is accepted to be generated based in the form of Pratiyogi of the object in association, then there will be definite duality between the object in association with the previous stage and the current stage. And in the second (cognized), the non-duality that is cognized based in the form of Pratiyogi of the object in association cannot be accepted in the memory and nor can it be accepted in the experience, thus we have the aforesaid defects..*

The Pratiyogi and Anuyogi are co-existents. The Anuyogi is the place of the absence (need not always be the absence), and the Pratiyogi is the object of absence. Here in the current stage that is the anuyogi, there will be the absence of the previous stage, which is the pratiyogi. The Anuyogi cannot exist without accepting the Pratiyogi.

In the first since the Pratiyogi and Anuyogi are established as duality before the non-duality is generated. It cannot be the cause for the recollection.

In the second, the non-dual knowledge cannot be accepted as the memory as it is non-existent before and there was no thought imprint of it before. And it cannot be accepted as experience too, as the previous stage object does not exist now for the perception.

The second choice of accepting partly the memory and experience in a single knowledge is discussed.

Kinca yada pratyabhignanam

Supporting: *In the recollection there can be one knowledge that has in the part of 'that; is memory and the part of 'this' is experience.*

Refuting: *No. Then you cannot escape the Sankara (mix-up) of the memory and experience with reference to the Dharmi (object).*

Sankara is one of the five defects accepted by the logicians that is an obstacle for understanding the class. Sankara is the defect that is explained as "vyadhikarana-dharmayo ekatra samaavesha" (accepting the different conflicting attributes in a same plane). The attribute that which does not exist in A exists in B, and vice-versa. When these different attributes are seen in the same place C, this is the defect of mix-up, this prevents the attributes seen in C to be understood as a class (jaati).

Tathaa hi samskaarena

Refuting: *That is – is the 'that' accepted to be carried forward in the form of thought imprint or is it accepted to be the object in association with 'that'. In the first, the recollection cannot be of the form of 'that', since the 'that' is carried forward in the form of thought imprint. And it cannot be the second, in the experience if the 'this' too the object (that) should shine should be explained. Otherwise, if only the 'this' is illumined the recollection cannot be if the form 'is this'.*

The Pratyabhigna (recollection) has two parts as we know, associated with the 'that' and the other associated with the 'this'. The form of the knowledge will be 'that is this'. The object associated with the 'that' is called as 'tatta' (that-ness) and the with the 'this' is 'idanta' (this-ness). Therefore the knowledge will be of the form of 'tattaa idantaa avagaahi gnaanam' (the knowledge understanding the that as this).

Evanca samskaarasya

Refuting: *The both cause for cognizing the object which is the thought imprint and the sense-organ is accepted, then will there be two knowledge with reference to the object be accepted or will there be only one knowledge due to the combination of the means. In the first, there will be contradiction in accepting the knowledge of the recollection to be one. And the defect explained for the duality (of the knowledge not being the object of memory or the experience) will be there. In the second, the recollection of the attributed object will be of the form of memory-ness and experience-ness, there will be mix-up of the memory and experience, thus the rule of unmixed knowledge of experience will be negated.*

Athocyate ma bhut vishayopadhi

Supporting: *Let there be mix-up with respect to the object with the embodiments (memory-ness and experience-ness), but with a different embodiment there will be no mix-up. Thus, accepting the embodiment 'samskaara-jatva' (generated by the thought-imprint-ness) the memory-ness and the embodiment 'indriya-jatva' (generated by the sense-organ-ness) the experience-ness. Thus there will be no mix-up (a way out of the contradiction).*

Refuting: *No. Since the Pramaa-ness is not accepted individually (as there will be mix-up with the perception-ness in the perception). If the samskaara-jatva and the indriya-jatva are accepted as the embodiments for the memory-ness and the experience-ness, still the memory-ness and experience-ness are mixed-up in the same object, the pramaatva and the apramaatva (the right knowledge-ness and wrong knowledge-ness), will be in the same object.*

Separating the object with respect to an embodiment is a famous method applied by the logicians. In the pot on the table, the existence and non-existence can be proven by accepting the different embodiment of relation (sambandha) namely the samyoga and samavaaya (seperabke and in-seperable) relationship. But the object can be said to be existence and non-existence in the same relationship but a different place., like the left side of the table or the right side of the table. This is explained by showing the existence and non-existence of the monkey in the branch and the root as the embodiment.

The right knowledge and the wrong knowledge will be in the same object because, though the experience is accepted to be right knowledge, the memory is not accepted to be right knowledge.

Kinca - gnaanavikalpaanam

Refuting: *There is another problem – the choice of knowledge as existence (of the attributes of experience-ness etc.) and non-existent are experience of the mind, if the recollection based on the memory-ness and experience-ness are not accepted to be based on that object (of mind), there will be the confusion of memory in the 'this' and experience in the 'that'.*

Yadi ca samskaarajatvena

Refuting: *If the memory-ness is accepted to be generated by the thought imprint, when asked about its differentiating factor, that will itself be the limiting adjunct, and thus will not be understood by anybody.*

The statement generated by the thought function really means memory, since the memory is generated by the thought function. And its limiting adjunct will be memory-ness as for the memory. Therefore, it will be dependent upon itself, the defect of self-dependence (atmashraya).

Athaanyat naama smrtitvam

Supporting: *The memory-ness is something different, a class.*

Refuting: *Still it is defective. That is – generated by thought imprints means that which has existence after the thought imprints (as its effect). And being an effect is impossible without accepting the class that is one and which exists in many, and therefore the limiting adjunct for that generated by the thought imprint is memory-ness. Thus the limiting adjunct for that generated by the thought imprint is memory-ness and for the memory is that generated by the thought imprint-ness, and thus will face the defect of inter-dependence (anyonya-aashraya). Thus the mix-up if the memory and experience is non-refutable.*

Api ca smrtyanubhavayor

Refuting: *And also, the cause materials for the memory and experience (though imprint and sense organ), will they be accepted in the recollection or not. If the answer is no, how can the memory-ness and experience-ness be even in a small part of the recollection. If the (thought imprint is not accepted for the memory or the sense organ not accepted for the experience) there will be overpervasion of the other (memory or experience), thus there will be mix-up of the memory or experience. In the first (if yes), the effect will take place before, as each of them is capable of producing its respective effect. The difference in the cause is established as the cause for the difference in the effect.*

Atha yatra te prtak

Supporting: *But where the cause is different the effect too is seen as different, is the general rule. But in the recollection they take place at the same time therefore, they will produce the variety effect collectively. Though this is not seen so in the cause for the pot, cloth etc., still this being of a different type will produce differently. It is not a rule, that whatever is the nature of an object it will be the same for all the other too. Otherwise, there will be no variety in the world.*

Though the cause for the pot and cloth do not come together to produce a thread pot or a clay cloth. Still we see, the earthly wick, the fiery fire, and the watery oil coming together to produce the effulgent light.

Naitadasti, yatra hi

Refuting: *No this is not so. When you (logician) say collectively should we accept it as, they both supporting each other produce the effect or should we not. If the answer is no, accepting it to be complementing each other is useless, because if they are not supportive to each other then there is no use in accepting it for producing the effect. Therefore, since there is no speciality the effect takes place independently. If they are accepted to complement each other, then in the experience part too, there will be the transaction of the thought imprint and in the memory part there will be relationship (transaction) of the sense organ, and since the cause is common for both of them, in the memory part there will be experience and in the experience part there will be memory. Thus, there will be a very strong mix-up of the memory and experience in the recollection.*

Now after negating the second choice of one knowledge and two parts memory and experience), the fourth choice, as referred earlier, is refuted.

Naapyanubhava

Supporting: *(Recollection) is only experience.*

Refuting: *No. If so, (as said earlier) in the non-duality associated with the 'that', there is neither thought imprint nor sense organ association, thus (non-duality) will not be an object of recollection.*

Na hi samskaaradvaaraa

Supporting: *Through the thought imprint associated with the special relation of the type of knowledge, it (non-duality) will be grasped.*

Refuting: No. In that case there can be no doubt regarding any knowledge of recollection as 'is that him or not'.

The special relation here discussed is one of the three types of relation accepted by the logicians. They are – 1. Saamaanya lakshana sannikarsha / pratyasatti (the general form of relation) – this is accepted in gaining the knowledge of the pot and the pot-ness. 2. Gnaana lakshana sannikarsha / pratyasatti (the special / knowledge form of relation) – this is accepted in the case of the knowledge gained through two sense organs. For example the fragrance of sandalwood – the fragrance is gained by the olfactory (nose) and the form is seen through the eyes, but still the mind mixes both the knowledge and understands to be one. and 3. Yogaja lakshana sannikarsha / pratyasatti (the yogic form of relationship) – the knowledge of the size of atom, the combination of atom (di-atom, tri-atom etc.) etc.

The relation accepted is samyukta-samyukta-samaveta-visheshana-vishenataa. The samyukta as we know is the samyoga sambandha (separable relationship), and samaveta is the samavaaya sambandha (inseparable relationship). The sense organ is in samyoga with the mind. The mind is in samyoga with the Atma (Self) as the Self is accepted to be the substratum for the knowledge. The Atma is in samavaaya with the thought imprint. And the thought imprint is of the pot, which is its visheshana (adjective). And for this pot, the non-duality of the 'that' is the visheshana. Thus sense organ – samyoga – mind – samyoga – Atma – samavaaya – thought imprint – visheshana – pot – visheshana – non-duality of 'that' is the special relation.

If the object is experienced through this (distant) relationship, then there can be no doubt about the object, when there is a recollection. But, we have doubt about the particular recollection, as whether it is the same person or not, or same pot or not etc.

doshavashat

Supporting: Due to the defect the wrong knowledge gets illumined, and not due to the special relationship.

Refuting: No. Then even without the defect there will be this wrong knowledge. But in reality, the idea about the defect is wrong, since the defect cannot illumine the object.

If the defect is accepted to be the cause of wrong knowledge, then even without the thought imprints and the aforesaid relationship, there will be the doubt, 'is it that or this'. And, the reality is, the defect will only hide or obstruct or veil the right knowledge and never illumine the wrong knowledge.

Kvapi tasya

Supporting: Sometimes the defect too does illumine the non-object.

Refuting: No. Then why not accept the sense organs to be defective too.

In the case of the 'this is silver' in the mother of pearl, the defect too illumines the non-object of silver in the object, the mother of pearl. This non-object is illumined by the sense organ; therefore it should be accepted as the defect.

visheshanatve

Supporting: Since the sense organ is in association with the defect, the defect is always of the adjective.

Refuting: No. In the current situation there may be the defect in association with the sense organs, therefore the situation is similar. Since the non-object cannot even of the defect cannot illumine without accepting the adjective (sense organ).

In the case the defect is that of the association with the sense organ, then the defect is that of the adjective as accepted, therefore the sense organ will be the defect.

Satyapiarthe

Refuting: Even though there is object, if due to the defect the non-object gets illumined, then for the intelligent on-lookers there will not be the possibility of the involvement in it.

vastuvishayatve

Supporting: Though the involvement is of the object, there is an inconclusive-ness due to the defect.

Refuting: No. Since in reality there is no mixed state in the object, if it is illumined then the same object is illumined in the state if the doubt too, therefore where is the question of inconclusive-ness (caused by doubt).

The object that is illumined in the case of the doubt too as, 'is it pillar or person', here too the knowledge of non-object, whether it be of the pillar or the person, is inclusive in the doubt, therefore where is the

inclusive-ness, that is accepted to be caused by the doubt. Now, if the knowledge of the doubt is of the form of, 'the pillar-person or person-pillar', then there is a mix-up of the object.

Niscayarthasya

Refuting: *The conclusive knowledge of the object is not refuted, therefore though the doubt is of the non-object (the absence of the object). The conclusive nature of the doubt is there without any obstacle. And the absence is accepted to be established (exist) in greater place than the other.*

In the knowledge of mixed quality (samuhaalambana gnaana) which takes place, as in the case of 'this table has pot and its absence', the absence is accepted to be illumined more, than the existent pot.

Jati samshayatvam

Supporting: *The doubt-ness (the speciality in the doubt) is accepted to be a class and defect is its cause.*

Refuting: *No. In the doubtful knowledge of 'is it this or not', when the 'vaa' (the word of doubt / choice), there will be no transaction of knowledge with respect to the word in relation to the doubtful meaning. If the 'vaa' (doubt / choice) is associated with the knowledge, then the knowledge would be of the form 'do I know this or not'. Even if the word 'vaa' (doubt / choice) is associated with the conclusive knowledge, still there will be no possibility of the doubtful knowledge of 'is this pillar or person', with respect to the pillar and person. Thus, if the meaning of the word 'vaa' (choice or doubt) is accepted to be an attribute of the knowledge, there will be no syntactical connection with the object as in the case of the perception-ness and valid knowledge-ness.*

Na ca pratyasatti

Supporting: *Though there is the relationship (samyoga-samyoga-samavaaya-visheshana-visheshana), since it is discarded due to the defect, it is not grasped by the mind.*

Refuting: *No. Though there is defect, the object with the thought imprint, the thought imprint with the Self, and the Self with the external sense organs, the knowledge will take place only when there is the existence of the relationship. Then what is this discard of the relation which you accept. If you (logician) accept the doubt recollection, without accepting the relationship with the thought imprint. Then without having the experience or only by memory (remembering) one can have such doubt (without any logic).*

vastutastu

Refuting: *In reality, by the mind which does not grasp the thought imprint, and the sense organ that do not grasp the Self (Atma), there is no possibility for that type of relationship to be grasped. Through the sense organ that always does not grasp the Pratiyogi of 'that' associated thought imprint, one cannot grasp the knowledge without the aforesaid special relationship.*

When the mind does not grasp the thought imprint and the sense organ does not grasp the Self, there can be no possibility for the relation to be established. As these non-connection do not meet anywhere in a common ground. Therefore, there is no possibility for the knowledge of the non-duality between 'that' that is triggered by the thought imprint and 'this' that is perceived by the sense organs to take place. As the thought imprints through the mind associated with the Self, and the sense organs again through the mind also is associated with the Self, though, they do not have the common object of knowledge for the non-duality to take place.

Anyathaa

Refuting: *Otherwise, the atom of the water, the absence of the atom of the earth etc., is not grasped through the eyes, as it is grasped in the other places (like pot etc.). The sense organ of seeing etc. grasps the objects that do not have the absence of any type of eligibility to be grasped by it.*

The rule for the sense organ to produce the knowledge is, it should be the object for that particular sense organ, otherwise there can be no relation / connection possible, and therefore there can be no knowledge.

Na hi indriyaviraha

Refuting: *It is not logical to accept, that there is absence of the atoms in the path in which the sense organs travel.*

In the path of the sense organ, always there are the atoms of the four elements, as the logicians accept the atom only for the elements earth, water, fire and air and do not accept for the space as it is all pervading. Therefore, wherever the sense organs travel, it has to come into contact with one or more of these atoms, definitely.

Tad-indriya-agraahya-aashrayaka-pratiyogika-itarasya-grahane – through the sense organ that grasp the object that is not grasped which forms the substratum for it, and that object of this type which becomes the

pratiyogi (object of absence) for the absence, for grasping this object. This rule is accepted for the sixth type of relationship which is based on the adjective.

Shaabdaabhava

Refuting: *The people (among logicians) who accept the perception of the absence of the sound, there is a seventh type of relationship which is accepted called 'shrotriya-visheshanata' (a special attribute associated with the sense organ of hearing). This absence is not grasped by the special relation (which is the knowledge of the adjective associated with the object of sense organ), thus there is no contradiction.*

There are six types of relationship accepted, generally the samyoga (seperable) and samavaaya (in-seperable) individually or in combination, other that the 'visheshana-visheshya-bhaava' (the relationship grasping the adjective and adjctified), this last type is accepted for the perception of the absence. But, for the sound, which is accepted to be in in-seperable relationship (samavaaya) with the space inside the ears, the absence also is accepted to be grasped by a special seventh type of relationship.

Na ca aatmasamyuktamana prati

Supporting: *For the Self in association with the mind, the thought imprint that is of previous experience in the relationship (pratyasatti) for the Self, thus it being Atindriya (beyond the sense organs) is not a defect.*

Refuting: *No. If the relationship is beyond the sense organ, then accepting the sense organ connection (with respect to 'that') is useless.*

In case of the atoms, they are not accepted to be the object for the sense organs, but are accepted to be perceived by the Yogis like Sri Gautama or Sri Kanaada (the proponents of the logician schools), in their trance. But to establish the recollection to be an experience (anubhava), the logician has accepted a distance relationship for making the 'that' too to be perceived. In case the relationship is beyond the scope of sense organs, then there is no place for the cooked-up relationship.

Tatha sati sa ityamshe

Refuting: *If that is so, then since in the portion of the 'that' there is no relationship the recollection will become non-perceived. Thus, if it is said, let the portion of 'this' be an object of the sense organ, and the portion of the 'that' be an object of the mind, then their non-duality is not be grasped by any means, thus the defects aforesaid presents itself again.*

If the 'that' is grasped my mind and 'this' is grasped by sense organ (perception), then since the non-duality is not grasped either by the mind or the perception, there can be no recollection of the form of 'that is this'.

Etena samskaara

Supporting: *The thought imprint is just an aiding cause (not generating cause) for the sense organs, thus there is no over-pervasion. In the recollection the object not in contact is projected as in the case of the wrong knowledge (of mother of pearl – silver). For the sense organs which grasp the object in contact, this (thought imprint) is only necessary aid. And that (thought imprint) being aid is accepted by the contact with the 'this' portion and need not be for all the objects, everywhere.*

Refuting: *This too is refuted. There cannot be the recollection of the doubt 'is he or not' as said earlier.*

Since the cause for the recollection is established, the recollection will be established too, without any doubt. Thus there can be no recollection of doubt. And the cause for the doubt that was accepted to be the defect was already refuted.

tadarakshamiti

Refuting: *The memory of 'i saw it' too will be an experience. The memory of the object that is gained through the relationship of the mind with the Self aided by the thought imprint too is accepted to be generated by the sense organ – object contact. Since there is no speciality of the knowledge gained through the mind in separable relation with the Self in in-separable relation and that of the object of the memory.*

The memory of 'i saw it' too will be experience as it is not different from the experience gained through the mind in relation with the Self.

Etena tattavacchinna

Supporting: *The non-duality is accepted to be of the form of the absence or of the inherent nature of the absence of one on the other associated with the 'that'.*

Refuting: No. The form of the absence of the one on the other (anyonya abhaava) too is the form of one on the other (anyonya). And that is of the form of the object associated with 'that' and 'this' and thus cannot be grasped as one non-dual. Similarly the non-duality of the inherent nature too is not grasped without understanding their nature as non-dual.

The opponents idea is that, the inherent nature or the absence of the 'that' is if the nature of the 'this'. Thus with whatever the 'this' is grasped, the same cause will be useful in grasping the 'that' too. Whether we accept the non-duality as the absence of one on the other or the inherent nature, both ways, it is of the nature of absence of one on the other. And the nature of the absence of one on the other is not an object of the sense organs.

Samskaropanite ca vishaya

Refuting: If the knowledge pertaining to the object which is gained by the thought imprints is accepted as an experience, then how is the memory not an experience too.

Atha na samskaaropanitamatarena

Supporting: The memory-ness is not just defined by it being dependent on the thought imprints, but as that generated by the thought imprints not associated with the cause for experience. Thus the recollection based majorly on the sense organ and object relationship will be experience-ness and not memory-ness.

Refuting: No. Why not define the experience-ness as that generated by the cause for experience not associated with the thought imprints. Thus why should it not be the contrary, the recollection too being generated by the experience aided by the thought imprint is memory too.

Anyatra na smrtiranubhava

Supporting: Except the recollection in the other places the memory is not seen to be generated by the thought imprints associated with the cause for experience.

Refuting: No. Then the experience too is not seen in any other place other than the recollection to be generated by the cause for experience associated with the thought imprints. Thus we will have a tie, and thus cannot be dismissed.

Tadeva vinigamanaayam pramaanabhaavat

Refuting: When there is a situation of tie, since there is no valid proof to accept any one position, since it is impossible to accept any imaginary proof, since the recollection is associated with both the causes, it should be accepted both as memory and experience. Thus there is no place for the desire to accept the class of experience devoid of the memory.

Na ca vishayaamshe

Refuting: It is not possible to establish the non-duality accepting the parts of the memory-ness and experience-ness in the object, as we have refuted it earlier (in the second option). That is, there will be a mix-up of the memory-ness in experience-ness and experience-ness in the memory-ness. If you do not accept the contradiction (caused by mix-up) in the knowledge, then why not accept the right and wrong knowledge too in the same object of the recollection.

Etena virodhaapattya

Refuting: As there is a contradiction, accepting the class of experience-ness by the strength of the experience, of the common intertwined nature of experience-ness as defined by, that which is different from the memory, as it is seen as common in the experience of inferential knowledge etc.; too is dismissed as there cannot be the mix-up of both (experience and memory) in the recollection.

The experience of 'i experience' that is seen as the common connection between the perception, inference etc., too cannot guarantee the existence of the experience-ness class; as there is the mix-up of the experience and the memory in the recollection.

Nanu anubhava eva sharanam

Supporting: But our only refuge is experience, since there is the experience of only the experience-ness in the recollection and not the memory-ness and thus, though it is generated by the thought imprints, as it is more dependent upon the sense organ – object contact it is more dependent on the experience-ness, and thus the tie (of both memory and experience carrying equal weight) is also resolved. Otherwise there will not be the knowledge of the experience in the recollection, thus will have to face a contradictory state.

Refuting: No. Since there is the knowledge of experience and memory in the 'this' and 'that' respectively, accepting by singling-out only the experience portion as valid proof is impossible.

Etena smrtianubhava

Refuting: Thus, since there is a situation of mix-up of both the memory and experience, accepting the recollection as the differentiating factor (vyavachedyā) for the experience (in the definition 'tattva-anubhūti pramaā') too is refuted.

As there is both the experience and the memory, it cannot be singled out as the differentiating factor.

Na ca vaacyam pratyabhignanam

Supporting: Let the recollection not be accepted as the differentiating factor, but a different memory will be.

Refuting: No. Since you too definitely accept it to be experience. That is – in the memory of "the pot was there", the pot associated with the past is remembered. This past 'that' is not experienced earlier, for it to be generated by the thought imprint. Thus, the present existence in the past was grasped by the experience. Therefore, presently there is a mix-up of the experience of the past, thus the experience of memory too is like the recollection of 'that is this' having both memory and experience.

Here the different memory, is the memory associated with the memory-ness, in other words the uncontaminated / pure memory / remembrance (smṛti). The memory not contaminated by the experience. In the recollection the present is experience and the past is memory, and in the remembrance the past is experience and the present is memory. Thus, both are mix-up of the memory and experience.

Etena anubhavasamagrisahita

Refuting: Thus, in the choice of accepting the cause of experience as the thought imprint along with the material for experience, this is another defect which should be understood. If it be so, there will be nothing called as memory. Because, there is no memory where there is no knowledge of the experience, thus there will be complete negation of memory.

Until now, the opponent was the logician and from here we have the prabhakara school of Mimamsa for the opponent.

Yadapi kaischiducyate

Supporting: Some opine, because of the defect there is confusion of the 'that' which is memory takes place.

Refuting: That is not possible too, as there is no proof to validate it as memory.

Here the knowledge of 'this' in the 'this is silver, as seen in the mother of pearl, is experience and the silver is memory. But, this is not differentiated as substratum and superimposition here due to the defect.

Na ca anubhavaśāmagryabhavat

Supporting: Since there is absence of the materials necessary for the experience, by deductive logic it is established as memory.

Refuting: As there is no transaction of the sense organs contact in that is the material for the experience, by deduction the inferential knowledge too will become memory.

sarvanubhavasamagrya

Supporting: Since there is absence (impossibility) of all the materials necessary for the experience (in the memory).

Refuting: How did you wise old one decide, that the cause for knowledge of the silver devoid of the 'that' portion is not material for experience.

The opponents contention is that, the knowledge of silver in the mother of pearl is memory, since it has no connection whatsoever with the perception. But in the case of the inference or comparison or even the verbal testimony there is connection with the perception in some way or other. In the inference there is perception in the portion of the pointers like the smoke etc., and in the comparison there is connection with the perception in the knowledge of the similarity and in the verbal testimony too there is connection with the perception for the knowledge of the word.

Pancapramāṇikāraṇa

Supporting: Due to the absence (impossibility) of the material of the five means of valid proofs (memory is not perceived).

Refuting: No. Seeing the absence of the material of the four pramāṇas, why not accept the fifth knowledge through deductive logic as memory. And how did you come to the conclusion, that the knowledge gained in the absence of the materials of the five pramāṇas will be memory, as we had established the knowledge gained through the memory 'pot was there' etc. as to be experience.

We have to remember the opponent is Prabhakara Mimamsa school and not Bhatta Mimamsa school, as we similar to the Bhattas accept the six valid proofs. The Prabhakara school accepts only five valid proofs (Pramaana) they are Pratyaksha (perception), Anumaana (inference), Upamaana (comparison), Shabda (verbal testimony), and Arthaapatti (postulation). Here the opponent opines as there are no material with remote relation to the five said pramaanas we by deductive logic, come to the conclusion that the memory is not anubhava or the memory does not have any connection to any material of experience.

Atha manyase pratyakshaadi

Supporting: *The experience of the silver is due to the thought imprint of the silver, that is gained in the absence of the materials for the perception etc. As its thought imprint is possible it is accepted as the cause, and no other cause is imagined. The knowledge taking place in the absence of the connection between the sense organ and the objects, the inference etc. are not experienced prior, therefore is not possible to be generated by the thought imprints, thus the pointers (linga) (of smoke) etc. are accepted to be the cause. Thus the knowledge generated by the thought imprint-ness not aided by any pramaana or that which is produced by the thought imprints is class called memory-ness.*

Refuting: *Not so. Why not accept the cause for it (silver) to be the sense organ itself, why should it be established (that the cause) as the thought imprints.*

Tenarthena saha tadakshasya

Supporting: *The 'silver' does not have any contact with the eyes then, and without the contact accepting it to generate the knowledge is illogical, therefore it is not generated by the sense organ.*

Refuting: *No. Even accepting the thought imprint for generating it (knowledge) will be illogical too.*

In the case of mother of pearl – silver, since there is no contact with the eye contact, the knowledge cannot be accepted to be produced by the sense organs as questioned by the Vedanti. If this is said, then the situation with respect to the thought imprints too is not different, as it will be overlapping with the memory, which too is accepted as a product of the thought imprints.

sahacaritadharmadarshanaadina

Supporting: *But the thought imprint is accepted to be aided by the knowledge of the common attributes, to produce the knowledge, thus there is no over-pervasion.*

Refuting: *No. Since, if it is accepted to be generated by the sense organ aided by the same common attributes, there will still be no over-pervasion.*

The opponent (Prabhakara) wants to accept the thought imprint as the cause, but the vedanti wants to accept the sense organ to be cause, for argument sake. If the wrong / erroneous knowledge is accepted to be generated by the sense organ aided by the common attributes, still there will be no overpervasion.

Ananubhute api tarhi

Supporting: *Then in the case of the non-experience too, it will be seen.*

Refuting: *No. Even for you, for the silver associated with the attributes (of shining), experienced earlier is seen here (in this place of similarity), through the thought imprint as the memory, we too accept the same.*

The question of the Mimamsaka is - Is the thought imprint accepted to generate the knowledge or not? If it is accepted then the knowledge will become memory as it is generated by the thought imprints. If not, then since there is no dependence of the thought imprints, the blind or deaf too who have not experienced the object, can have the wrong knowledge.

If the opponents accepts the wrong knowledge of silver to be produced by the memory generated by the thought imprints in association with the shining associated with the silver, we vedantins too accept it as produced by the sense organ in association with the the shining associated with the silver.

Luptatatsaahacarya

Supporting: *When the thought imprints generated by the knowledge of similarity is lost, then too there will be a situation of the knowledge of silver generated by the eyes in association with the knowledge of similarity.*

Refuting: *No. Since even in your philosophy, there is a situation of the knowledge of similarity being lost, for the one with the thought imprints of the silver, there will be the memory of the silver. And in a place where the thought imprints generated by the knowledge of similarity) is lost in the gap in time etc., if that absence too is accepted as the aiding cause then there is no defect.*

As in the Mimamsaka view if it is accepted, thought imprint in association with the absence of the time etc., there will be no said defect. For us too, sense organ in association with the absence of time etc., accepted to be the cause for the silver, thus there will be no defect.

Sloka 28

Refuting: *Thus, the knowledge of the similarity is accepted as the cause for the generating the knowledge of the thought imprints, for us the same is the aiding cause for the sense organ, thus there is no defect.*

Tatsadrsha

Refuting: *The recollection of the similarity too is possible when the object of the memory is first remembered; this too is same in our case.*

The opponent wants to accept the memory in the case of the erroneous knowledge, the recollection of the similarity is possible, when the object of memory is remembered. But, this is the same in the case of the sense organs too; as the recollection of the similarity is possible only when the sense organs come in contact with the substratum of the erroneous knowledge.

Tathaapi anyatra

Supporting: *But again. Nowhere are the sense organs are seen to be the instruments for knowledge, without coming in contact with the objects.*

Refuting: *No. In a special way in the case of the erroneous knowledge we accept it that way (no contact with the object). Or it can be accepted to be in relation through the contact aided by the power of defect.*

Though the right knowledge depends upon the sense organ – object association for generating the knowledge, still the erroneous knowledge does not need any such conditions. Or it can be explained in the terms as the logicians accepted in the case of the recollection, the contact of a different type was accepted to establish the relationship with the sense organ and the object of the past, similarly the contact of the type of defect can be accepted for the erroneous knowledge.

Kinca samskaarasyapi

Refuting: *And also, the thought imprints are not seen to produce the knowledge without the aid of any of the pramaana, therefore how is it imagined here individually (the thought imprint to produce the erroneous knowledge).*

Pratyabhignana eva

Supporting: *In the recollection itself, the thought imprints aided by the knowledge of the similarity to produce the knowledge, without the necessity of the sense organs.*

Refuting: *No. In the recollection itself it was seen, both the thought imprint and the sense organ (for past and present) are the cause, as not different from here, being aided by the knowledge of the similarity.*

In the case of the erroneous knowledge the object is in association with the present and the imagination through the thought imprints is for the past. And in the recollection the object is in association with the present and the thought imprint is in association with the past.

Atra sadrshana darshanasahakaritvam

Supporting: *As in the recollection, if the knowledge of the similarity is accepted as the aid (for the erroneous knowledge), then the thought imprints too should be accepted as the aiding cause.*

Refuting: *No. Then as accepted there (recollection), we should have to accept the 'that-ness' here too. If aided by the knowledge of the similarity, we accept the 'that-ness', there will arise the 'upadi' defect of the 'generated by thought imprint-ness'.*

Upadi defect is a kind of Hetvabhasa – a defect of the proof. This is explained as “sadhya-vyaapakatve sati saadhana-avyaapakatvam” (having existence in the Sadhya (the object to be established), non-existing in the Sadhana (the means)).

For example in the syllogory “parvato dhumavaan, vahne” (the mountain has smoke, due to fire), here the smoke is to be established, and the proof is the fire. For this syllogory, “aardhra-indhana-samyoga” (association with wet fuel wood) is the Upadhi. Since the existence of the wet wood is the cause for smoke – first condition, and there is no need for the wet wood for the smoke – second condition.

Similarly – Wherever there is 'that-ness' specified it is produced by the thought imprint – first condition. And, wherever there is knowledge of similarity, it is not produced by the thought imprint – second condition. Thus the logic is having the upadi defect.

Na ca sadrshanasahakaari

Supporting: Let the knowledge of similarity be the cause for the knowledge of the 'that-ness', therefore we can give it up here (in the silver), and not the thought imprint.

Refuting: No. Thought there may be the thought imprints, on the absence of the knowledge of the similarity there will not be the knowledge of the silver.

If there is thought imprint, but not the knowledge of the similarity we do not gain the erroneous knowledge.

Tathaapi sadarthe

Supporting: Even then, in the existing object the sense organs are accepted to gain the knowledge, and that cannot be discarded.

Refuting: No. As we already said, the sense organs being in association through a contact, generates the knowledge, likewise, the thought imprint too aided by the valid proof (pramaana) generates knowledge, therefore it cannot be given-up too. And the thought imprint is accepted to be the association for the sense organs, and therefore we cannot do without it.

As the sense organ is accepted to be in contact with the 'that' in the recollection through a lengthy relationship of 'samyoga-samyoga-samavaaya-visheshana-visheshana', similarly we accept the contact of thought imprint with the sense organ in the case of erroneous knowledge. Thus, we do not entirely refute the contact of the sense organ with the object even in the place of the erroneous knowledge.

Tattamshamoshanam

Refuting: Moreover, giving-up the 'that-ness' portion in the case of people accepting the thought imprint individually to produce the erroneous knowledge, will be greater defect.

In the case of the people (us) who accept the sense organ for the erroneous knowledge, there is no problem of the 'that-ness' portion to be illumined. But in the case of the thought imprint is accepted to be the cause, the 'that-ness' portion too will, invariably be illumined.

Kutascayam tattamshamosha

Refuting: How is this 'that-ness' portion given up, should also be inquired. Since the knowledge of the silver as seen earlier in relation to the 'this-ness' portion that is experienced earlier produces the thought imprint, then it is logical that the erroneous knowledge produced by this thought imprint, too will be endowed with 'that-ness' portion. And it is seen to be so in the case of recollection.

Doshavashat tattamshamosha

Supporting: But due to the defect the 'that-ness' portion is given-up.

Refuting: No. As it is in nature (of the thought imprint) the 'that-ness' to be with the object, and this cannot be given-up by the thought imprint.

Doshavashat smrtau tatheti

Supporting: But still in the memory, it ('that-ness' being given-up) happens due to the defect.

Refuting: What is this defect? Due to which there is erroneous knowledge in the other, silver superimposed in the place of mother of pearl, as 'this is silver'. This is what is seen as 'this is the object silver' or in 'that is the same silver manifest here' in such erroneous recollections, the silver in general is recalled, where the 'that-ness' portion should be given-up, as there is the defect. Otherwise, even in the portion of the erroneous knowledge of 'this is silver', the 'that-ness' should not be given-up. Here we bring this discussion (of refutation of 'that-ness' in the refutation of recollection in the refutation of the definition of the right knowledge).

NA ca pratyabhigna

Supporting: Let the recollection be something of a different type, from the memory and experience.

Refuting: No. Since it is non-experiential it will be invalid knowledge.

Since all the choices are extinguished, like, the memory and experience as two knowledge, as one knowledge, as pure memory and as pure experience. The only option not discussed is it being different from the memory and experience.

Na caivamastviti

Supporting: Let it (recollection) be so (not valid knowledge).

Refuting: No. People who accept the non-momentary-ness, to establish it to be permanent explain (accept) it as right knowledge. And giving-up such universally accepted definition, if we accept a new definition then there will be chaos.

The logician to refute the momentary-ness accepted by the Buddhist, accept the recollection as right knowledge.

Tasmaad jaativaaci

Refuting: *Therefore claiming; the term experience which is a class, is accepted to differentiate the memory from it; is completely impossible.*

Since through the logic, the experience is established as memory. It cannot be claimed the term experience that is a class is used in the definition 'tattva-anubhuti pramaa' to differentiate it from the memory is improper.

13. Refuting definition of the experience as different from memory

After refuting the definition of the experiential class the most direct way of defining it, now the author goes on to negate the only other possibility to define the experience, which is to define indirectly. To define indirectly means, to define it from the memory. As we saw earlier, the experience is defined by the logicians as "smrti-bhinnam gnaanam anubhavam" (the knowledge different from memory is experience). To refute if

Naapi smrtyanyatvam

Refuting: *The definition of experience cannot be 'different from memory' or 'that which is devoid of the definition of memory'. As explained earlier, there will be the mix-up of memory and experience, and there cannot be any differentiating factor.*

As the knowledge is of the form of experience, memory cannot be its differentiating factor.

Now, if that indirect method is refuted in a single line, citing the same logic as earlier; we should move on to the next chapter, and there need not be a special chapter for refuting this. To remove the above doubt -

Itopi na

Refuting: *For a different reason too, experience cannot be defined as to be different from memory. That is - what is meant by being different from memory, is it 1. Different from any memory, or 2. Different from all the memory, or 3. Devoid of memory-ness.*

Prathame tu

Refuting: *In the first, as one memory will be different from the other, it will become experience. As one memory that is different from another memory cannot be said as 'it is not a memory', because of which the other will not become something that is not different from memory.*

From the view of memory A, memory B will become experience, as it is different from memory A.

Naapi dvittiya

Refuting: *It cannot be the second too. As how did you come to understand that the right knowledge is something different from my memory, as all those memories are difficult to be understood (cognized) by you. That is - For people like us, it is not possible for perceiving the others knowledge. And (the knowledge) cannot be gained through inference and postulation too, as there is no pointer or impossibility which can be grasped by people who are extrovert. And not through the verbal testimony too, as it is not possible everywhere. The impossibility of the comparison too is very clear. Therefore, how can the knowledge be understood to be different from all the memory, thus as it is not cognized the definition cannot be established.*

The general pramaana accepted by mimasakas are 5 as seen earlier. All of them are not eligible to establish the knowledge of others. In Yoga Sutra Bhashya, it is clearly said, the yogis too can see the type of thought function (vritti) in general of the others mind and cannot decipher about the kind of thought functions taking place there.

The others knowledge (OK) cannot be perceived, as we are not Yogis, even if it is accepted they can do it. It (OK) cannot be gained by the inference, as the inference depends upon the pointer (linga) like the smoke for the fire.

It (OK) cannot be gained by postulation, the logicians accept the postulation as a type of inference, since there is no impossibility perceived. In the postulation, for example, if we see the person 'devadutta', not eating in the day but is health and energetic, we postulate him eating in the night, as it (healthy and energetic) is impossible without eating.

It (OK) cannot be gained by verbal testimony, as if a person is maintaining silence (mauna) or is physically challenged to speak.

It (OK) cannot be gained by comparison either, as it takes place between two, and the knowledge gained through it is of the named and the name, which is impossible here.

Na ca vaacyam smrtitvena sarvaa

Supporting: As it is 'memory-ness', for a person perceiving ones memory will be able to perceive the memory associated with everyone, in every time. As it is done during the period one gains the concomitance, through the 'saamanya-lakshana-pratyasatti' (the generic defined association), the knowledge of the vyaapya and vyaapaka (less pervasive and more pervasive) in everyplace

Refuting: No. The example and the exemplified are defective. If it is so, by the knowledge of an object perceived, since we have gained the generic knowledge of all the objects, we will be gaining the knowledge of the whole world. And if you still accept it (as you were ready to accept the experience of recollection as non-valid, earlier), we too will trust your omniscience, if you do know what is happening in my mind.

Saamanya-lakshana was explained earlier. When we see the pot in one place, the knowledge is gained along with the pot-ness. Therefore, the knowledge of all the pot is as well gained. Similarly, the knowledge of the memory, when one perceives one's own memory, is also perceived along with the memory-ness, thus all the memory is as well gained.

Vyaapya is 'nyuna-desha-vrttitva' (that which has existence in lesser place), smoke and Vyaapaka is 'adhika-desha-vrttitva' (that which has existence in greater place), fire. The smoke cannot exist without fire, lesser existence, but the fire can exist without the smoke, greater existence.

In the case of the concomitance, we gain the knowledge in a place and find the generic nature in the other places too. For example, we find the smoke associated with the fire in the kitchen, similarly we generalize this knowledge elsewhere too.

For the vedanti this is not acceptable, as the knowledge of the fire in association with the smoke is seen in the kitchen, therefore the knowledge of the fire has the kitchen as the limiting adjunct, and therefore cannot be made generic.

Naapi triiya

Refuting: It cannot be the third too. What does this devoid of memory-ness mean, is it absence of the memory-ness, or is it of the inherent nature of absence of the memory in a substratum, or the knowledge of the absence of the memory in a substratum.

Na taavadaadya

Refuting: It cannot be the first (devoid of memory-ness). That is – the absence of one on the other of the memory too will be absence of memory, and that exists in the memory too. And thus the memory too will become right knowledge (experience). And since it cannot be differentiating, there will be the defect of useless adjective. On the other hand without the adjectified, it will be over-pervading the desire etc.

From the experience the memory cannot be differentiated, is the defect of useless adjective, since they are one. Thus if we do not use the adjectified portion of anubhuti in the definition 'tattva-anubhuti pramaa', then it will lead to the definition over-pervading the desire etc. Since the desire etc. too have an object.

Smrtitvasys samsargaabhaavastatra

Supporting: We accept the absence pertaining to relationship here.

Refuting: No. When you say, absence pertaining to relationship of memory-ness what do you mean; is it absence of relationship in association to memory-ness or is it absence of memory-ness in association to relationship or it something else that is here through this flowery words.

The absence is broadly classified in two ways – samsarga-abhaava (absence pertaining to relationship) and anyonya-abhaava (absence of one in the other). This samsarga-abhaava is again of three types – praag-abhava – (prior absence), pradhvamsa-abhaava (post absence) and antyanta-abhaava (eternal absence).

Aadye smrtitva

Refuting: In the first (absence of relationship in association to memory-ness), the absence of one on the other of the memory-ness relationship is there even in the memory, therefore the defect still persists. And the memory-ness relationship is not accepted as memory.

Ata eva dvitiyo api

Refuting: For the same reason it cannot be the second too (absence of memory-ness in association to relationship). The memory-ness associated with the relationship is not the same as the individual memory.

And therefore the defect of absence of the one on the other exists between the memory-ness associated relationship and the individual memory, exists as it is. And therefore, in each of these places if we throw the absence pertaining to relationship (in the place of the absence of one on the other), then either the defect stays as it is or there will be defect of regress ad infinitum with respect to the adjectives that are thrown in.

The same defects as said for the first one is said in a reverse order here, by showing the first defect latter and second defect first.

Na ca vaacyam smrtivasamsargasya

Supporting: *The relationship of the memory-ness is not associated with another relationship, but is accepted as inherent nature, therefore where is the inquiry of the regress ad infinitum possible.*

Refuting: *No. To escape the defect pertaining to the relationship of the memory-ness, there will be no possibility then. And the statement of adjective of the other relationship does not end in a different meaning (therefore the error still exists).*

The logicians accept the attribute and attributed to be in samavaaya-sambandha (inseparable relationship). And this relationship is of an inherent nature, and therefore does not depend upon another relationship to bind itself to the attribute or the attributed. Similarly here too, the relationship of memory-ness is accepted to be of inherent nature.

The idea here is, if the inherent nature is accepted as the relationship for the relationship of the memory-ness, then what is meant by it is nothing but inherent nature of the absence of the relationship. And this is same as the absence of the relationship; therefore the defect pertaining to the absence of one on the other still exists.

Kinca Tadubhaya

Refuting: *And also, for the one who does not accept a different relationship other than it being in either as its inherent nature and so if the memory-ness relationship and the memory are of the nature of relationship, how can the relationship be negated in the experience? Does not the experience have a nature or is it the relationship of the memory-ness. And what is negated (if they have a nature).*

Arthaantarabhutasya

Refuting: *If some other relationship other than the nature is negated, the defect with respect to the memory persists. Since, you do not accept the different relationship in the memory. And the relation is accepted as of the inherent nature in those two (relationship of the memory-ness and the memory).*

Athocyate

Supporting: *Though there is a possibility of the relation of inherent nature between the experience and the memory-ness, they do not possess the ability to generate knowledge by complimenting each other. Wherever that is possible (as in the case of relationship of memory-ness and memory), there their relationship is of that type (complimenting each other to generate the knowledge).*

Refuting: *No. Unless and until there is established a limiting adjunct for generating knowledge, it is impossible to say so. And even if another limiting adjunct is accepted for generating knowledge, there will be the defect in that relationship too, and if other limiting adjuncts are accepted for each successive ones, then there will be regress ad infinitum.*

Taavataa api ca anubhutisvarupe

Refuting: *Even if that type of relationship is accepted (that possess the ability to generate knowledge by complimenting each other), what is negated.*

Since both the experience and the relationship of memory-ness is accepted to have existence, their inherent nature cannot be negated. And their relationship of inherent nature too cannot be negated as they do not possess the required quality (to possess the ability to generate knowledge by complimenting each other).

Smrtivasamsargaanubhuti

Supporting: *In the experience of 'the relationship of the experience and the relationship of memory-ness', will possess the ability to generate knowledge by complimenting each other which can be negated.*

Refuting: *No. The erroneous knowledge of this type cannot be distinguished (from experience).*

Since both the experience of silver-ness in the silver and mother of pearl, are both a product of the memory. But still only in the silver it is right knowledge and not so in the mother of pearl, though it is produced by the memory too.

Yatharthaayaa iti cet

Supporting: *The negation is only pertaining to the right knowledge.*

Refuting: *No. If this type of knowledge right knowledge is accepted to be existent then, the memory-ness will experience too. If its existence is not accepted, for what will it be the cause for generating knowledge?*

If it is accepted to be existent then, as it is right knowledge, then being the pramaana for that experience the memory-ness too will be experience.

If it is accepted to be non-existent then, the knowledge is non-existent too, the limiting adjunct for it too will be non-existent.

Athaatyantaasatiimeva

Supporting: *If the negation of that generating the right knowledge is accepted only in eternal absence (non-existent), of the experience.*

Refuting: *No. Then the memory too will become experience. Since, the number of knowledge if the relationship of memory-ness takes place in the memory, more will be the possibility of the capability of generating the knowledge of eternal non-existence in the memory.*

As in the negation of eternal absence of the barren women's child or mares horn etc., there is negation of just accepting the possibility of existence.

sarvaameva

Supporting: *All types of that kind of knowledge (the knowledge associated with the memory-ness) is not a generator (of knowledge) of the experience kind, but is not so for memory.*

Refuting: *No. All the knowledge of any type is impossible to be gained.*

The knowledge of everything cannot be gained by simple people like us, and this was explained earlier. And also, since the 'saamaanya-lakshana sannikarsha' is not accepted, we cannot even infer it.

Kinca – sarvaamiti ko artha

Refuting: *And again, what is meant by not generator of all, 1. All the existent (right knowledge) or 2. All the non-existent (wrong knowledge) or 3. All belonging to both the existent and non-existent variety. For the first and second, there is over-pervasion in the memory too. It is not that the knowledge is generator of all the memory pertaining to the 'association of memory endowed with memory-ness' exists, but it exists in every one of the individual memory. It being the existence was negated earlier as not being the generator (as in the right knowledge the memory-ness being the instrument, will make the experience too as memory-ness). In the third too, it cannot be non-generator (of knowledge) in the experience too. The right and wrong knowledge, whether is existent or non-existent cannot be the generator for the knowledge which is right or wrong.*

Syadetat smrtitvatasya

Supporting: *Let it be. The defect of over-pervasion which was shown in accepting the absence of one on other (anyonya-abhaava) of memory-ness in the memory does not exist, as in the system of accepting the duality and non-duality, the memory-ness is accepted to be dual and non-dual with the memory. And for which there is duality and non-duality accepted, there the absence of one in the other cannot be accepted.*

Refuting: *No. How did you come to the conclusion that the memory-ness is duality - non-duality with the memory and not with the experience?*

The mimamsakas and some logicians accept the duality – non-duality in the attribute and the attributed. The attribute is both dual and non-dual with the attributed. And thus, there cannot be the defect based on the absence of one on the other.

Anubhutyaha saha tadvishista

Supporting: *There is no right knowledge of that form with such association in relation to the experience.*

Refuting: *No. Is the right knowledge gained accepting the existence or the non-existence, whichever way the defect aforesaid will follow.*

The experience of the being endowed with the memory-ness can be seen only in the memory and not with the experience.

Praagabhavapratiyoginya

Supporting: *If that kind of right knowledge is accepted as the object of absence of the prior absence.*

Refuting: *No. As that kind of knowledge is accepted in the experience, the experience will be memory too.*

The right knowledge in association with the memory-ness does not exist in the experience as the object of absence of the prior absence, but is an object of absence for the memory.

In the object of absence accepted in the prior absence, with respect to the existence of the right knowledge, and as explained earlier through its means (pramaana), the experience too will become memory. And the same with respect to its non-existence, the right knowledge still exists (since only the object of absence is negated) which again as explained earlier will establish the experience as the memory.

Smrti-smrtitvayo

Refuting: *The absence (abhaava) of the Anyonya-abhaava (absence of one on the other) in the memory-ness pertaining to the memory, is also of the type of anyonya-abhaava and this is similar to the experience.*

In the experience too - *The absence (abhaava) of the Anyonya-abhaava (absence of one on the other) in the memory-ness pertaining to the memory, is also of the type of anyonya-abhaava. Thus the duality – non-duality of the memory-ness accepted in the memory, will be same in the experience too.*

Na hi smrtivanyonyabhavo

Refuting: *And it should not be repeated that the anyonyna-abhava (absence of one on the other) of the memory-ness is experience, as the same defects will follow.*

The eternal absence of the absence of the one on the other of the memory-ness and the memory, exists only on the memory and not in the experience, in the bheda-abheda (duality – non-duality) school. This is refuted with the logic, accepting the eternal absence of the memory-ness as absence of one on the other, similarly, accepting the absence of one on the other of memory-ness as eternal absence. And remember, the difference between the eternal absence and the absence of the one on the other is still not established.

14. Refuting the duality of the absence of one on the other and eternal absence

The duality of the **samsarga-abhaava** (eternal absence, prior absence and the post absence) and the **anyonya-abhaava** (absence of one on the other), is refuted in this topic.

Atha maa bhoot

Supporting: *Let there be no solution accepting the duality and non-duality (in differentiating the memory from experience), but still, through the experience of 'this is not that', 'that does not exist here'; the duality of the anyonya-abhaava and samsarga-abhaava is established.*

Refuting: *No. The duality established through the difference in the object of absence or the embodiment is not seen here. And the duality with respect to the class is not accepted in the absence, and thus their knowledge will not be accepted as valid. And thus the definition does not fit in.*

Here the opponent wants to establish the meaning of anyonya-abhaava as to be something which is gained through the experience of 'this is not that' etc., and not something which is derived from the words 'the absence of one on the other'.

Na ca svapratiyogi

Supporting: *The anyonya-abhaava is the absence in the same plane, same time of the object of absence of itself. And the samsarga-abhaava is absence of the anyonya-abhaava.*

Refuting: *No. As required the defects of self-dependence etc. will occur. And if the anyoyna-abhaava is not accepted in itself then, it cannot exist in anything (or will be in everything since it is not limited). And d thus if is accepted, there will be regress ad infinitum of anyonya-abhaava, and if it is not accepted at some point, the primary attributed too will cease to exist.*

If the absence is accepted as 'different from existence', there will be defect of self-dependence, as the anyonya-abhaava depends upon itself. And if it is accepted as 'eternal absence of the existence', there will be defect of inter-dependence. If we establish the anyonya-abhaava with atyanta-abhaava (eternal absence), atyanta-abhaava with the samsarga-abhaava, and the samsarga-abhaava with the anyonya-abhaava we face the cyclic defect. And if we accept for on absence the other and so on and so forth, we find ourselves in the regress ad infinitum.

Nanu samsargapratiyogi

Supporting: The absence having the object of absence as the samsarga (association) is samsarga-abhaava and the absence having for the object of absence the taadatmya (identification) is taadaatmya-abhaava, if be accepted there will be no mix-up. And the absence of the identification of association (samsarga-taadaatmya) is not of the type of samsarga, since the object of absence (pratiyogi) is taadaatmya.

Refuting: No. In the dravya etc. (substance, attribute and activity), the samavaayi-kaarana (that which is the material cause), the destruction (post absence) will not be of the form of samsarga-abhaava. Since the object of absence of the destruction is not samsarga (association). And if the samsarga is accepted to be the object of absence, then it being in samavaaya (inseperable) relationship, will become non-eternal.

If the samsarga is accepted to be the pratiyogi of the destruction, then since samsarga is in samavaayi in the dravya (substance) etc. Accepting its (samsarga) destruction will lead to accepting the destruction of samavaaya. And this will not be acceptable to any sane logician, as the samavaaya is accepted to be 'ekam, nityam, anekaanugatam' (one, eternal and existing in multitude), since the samavaaya by ones own admission becomes non-eternal.

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